Zur Theorie Der Kastenordnung In Der Indischen Philosophie

This document is an excerpt from Wilhelm Halbfass's book "Zur Theorie Der Kastenordnung In Der Indischen Philosophie" (On the Theory of the Caste System in Indian Philosophy). The provided text focuses on the philosophical discussions and theoretical elaborations of the caste system (varna) within classical Indian thought.

Here's a comprehensive summary of the key points discussed in the excerpt:

I. Introduction:

• The "Social Question" in Indian Philosophy: Halbfass acknowledges the long-standing observation that classical Indian philosophy is often seen as detached from societal issues. This is linked to the traditional division between soteriology-focused philosophical thought and worldly sciences of artha (wealth/politics) and dharma (duty/law). Advaita Vedanta is presented as a prime example of this perceived detachment.
• Neo-Vedanta's Counter-Claim: The "Neo-Vedanta" movement argues that this detachment hides a rich potential and that classical Indian philosophy, particularly Advaita Vedanta, has direct relevance to contemporary social and political problems, offering a metaphysically grounded ethical orientation acceptable to modern thought. Halbfass notes the significant role of this "politically engaged Vedanta" in modern India's self-representation.
• Re-examining the Social Context: The author emphasizes the need to re-examine the social relevance of classical Indian philosophy not by simply stating the "division of labor" or by purely ideological critique, but by tracing the scattered social references within the philosophical texts themselves.
• Absence of a Political Philosophy Tradition: Halbfass concedes that India lacks a tradition of political-philosophical discourse comparable to the Western tradition from Plato to Marx. However, societal themes are occasionally integrated into philosophical contexts, and philosophical concepts are applied to social matters.
• Focus on Varna: The central societal concept for theoretical discussion in the Indian tradition is the conception of the four varnas. The following discussion will concentrate on this, drawing from Hindu systems of the first millennium CE, examining how the varna order is presented, analyzed, and rationalized within cosmological, metaphysical, and epistemological discussions.
• Scope of the Work: The author clarifies that the work is a contribution to the history of Indian philosophy, not the history of actual social conditions. The focus is on theoretical statements about structures and connections that are already largely theoretical. The term "caste" will be used in the sense of the theoretical varna structure.

II. Prehistory of Philosophical Varna Theories:

• Origin and Development: The origins and historical development of the caste system are outside the scope of this work. The focus is on its philosophical representation.
• Interweaving of Cosmic and Social: From the outset, the concept of the four varnas, particularly the Brahmin, interweaves cosmic and social aspects, ethical norms, and "biological" facts. This aligns with a worldview where the normative and factual, ethical and physical are interwoven, fitting harmoniously with the doctrines of karma and samsara (cycle of rebirth).
• Early Conceptual Distinctions: Even in the early Brahmana period, terms like jātibrāhmaṇa (Brahmin by birth) and brahmabandhu (kinsman of Brahman) are contrasted with Brahmins distinguished by knowledge and action. This indicates an early conceptual separation of the ethical and hereditary aspects, which become co-ordinated.
• Buddhist Critique: The Buddhist critique emerges from this context. Their "ethicizing" interpretation of caste concepts draws on existing aspects of the terms but emphasizes the ethical element as essential, playing it off against others. This turns the co-existence of ethical-normative and factual-hereditary elements into a problem, contrasting the relevant with the irrelevant and questioning the very basis of caste distinctions.
• Svadharma as a Response: The concept of svadharma (one's own duty/dharma), particularly in the Bhagavad Gita, offers a response. While emphasizing ethical motivation, it also preserves and defends the hereditary legitimacy of caste affiliation. The hereditary and ethical moments remain distinct but are coordinated to prevent competition. Ethical evaluation is distributed according to one's birth-based status.
• Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya: The issue of caste terms and distinctions is brought into linguistic and epistemological discussions in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. Here, the analysis of the negative particle "a-" in formations like abrāhmaṇa allows for the consideration of caste identity through a summation of properties. However, this discussion remains relatively harmless and does not fundamentally challenge the caste order.
• Mimāmsā's Response: The Mimāmsā school, particularly Kumārila, develops a more profound level of problem consciousness. It fully engages with the Buddhist challenge, clearly separates ethical and factual elements, and sharpens the concept of hereditary legitimacy. The focus becomes securing caste concepts against ambivalence and mobility.
• Apologetic Orientation: Overall, discussions of the varna system in traditional Hindu philosophy are largely apologetic, reacting to external criticism and challenges. Metaphysical, cosmological, and epistemological concepts are employed in service of this apologetic task.

III. Caste-Theoretical Applications of the Guna Theory:

• Guna Theory's Scope: The theory of the three gunas (sattva, rajas, tamas) – the fundamental forces of primal matter – has the widest extra-philosophical application in classical Indian philosophy. Stemming from pre-philosophical, mythological sources, it serves as a principle for classification and explanation across various fields.
• Application to Varna: The guna theory is particularly suited for classifying living beings and their behaviors. It has been connected to the varna structure of society.
• Classical Samkhya: Classical Samkhya texts show little explicit engagement with the caste system. The Samkhyakārikā mentions human evolution as "onefold" (ekavidha), which commentators interpret differently, but it doesn't directly address social stratification.
• Bhagavad Gita and Svadharma: The Bhagavad Gita is a key text where guna theory is applied to varna. The interpretation of whether the Gita prioritizes ethical or hereditary caste affiliation is controversial.
  • Ethicizing Interpretation: Some modern Hindus, like S. Radhakrishnan, argue that the Gita shifts towards an ethical or characterological understanding of caste, with svadharma supporting this.
  • Traditional Interpretation: Conversely, traditional scholars cite the Gita to support a hereditary view, arguing that hereditary caste membership corresponds to the true, metaphysical essence of individuals.
• Bhagavad Gita's Conciliation: The Gita avoids definitive stances and tends towards synthesis and ambivalence. It defends the hereditary meaning of caste in a subtle way, appearing to accommodate the Buddhist ethical interpretation while not fundamentally questioning the hereditary order. Varnasamkara (caste mixture) is presented as a threat. Ethical classifications exist alongside and within the hereditary order without replacing or endangering it.
• Guna and Karma: The "division of gunas and works (gunakarmavibhāga)" (Bhagavad Gita IV, 13) is understood within the context of samsara. The application of karma to the four varnas is ambiguous: for the higher varnas, it emphasizes ethically relevant action (acara), while for the lower ones, it highlights occupations and functions.
• Varna and Behavior: The Brahmana and Kshatriya are associated with virtues like wisdom and truthfulness, while the Vaisya and Sudra are associated with occupations. The svadharma concept fills the lower castes' duties with content, allowing for ethical value through their diligent performance. However, a "good" Sudra cannot achieve the inherent behavioral potential of a Brahmana.
• Manu Smriti and Guna Theory: Manu's Laws also use the guna theory to lend metaphysical weight to hierarchical classifications of beings, including the varnas. These classifications can be "mixed," incorporating various criteria (ethical, biological, occupational).
• Divergent Applications of Gunas: Applying the three gunas to the four varnas presents a challenge due to the numerical mismatch. Different authors attempt to bridge this by combining gunas for the Vaisya or assigning specific gunas to each varna (e.g., Sattva for Brahmana, Rajas for Kshatriya, Tamas for Sudra).
• Critique of Guna Application: Halbfass contrasts the Indian application of gunas with Plato's social and political tripartite system. While Plato's is a rational construction independent of conventions, the guna theorists apply philosophical terms to an accepted social order without radical critique. The guna theory doesn't create an independent anthropology to rival the varna theory and fails to exhaust critical possibilities. It can remind of ethical aspects but doesn't provide criteria for independent social classification.
• Heredity Remains Central: Ultimately, the guna theory doesn't offer a real corrective to hereditary determination of caste. Traditional literature did not understand it as such.

IV. Caste-Theoretical Applications of the Concept of Universals:

• Universals (Samanya/Jati): The concept of realistic universals (samanya, jati) is another philosophical tool used for interpreting the caste system, holding significant metaphysical and epistemological importance. It is prominent in Nyaya and Vaisheshika and a target of Buddhist critique.
• Nyaya-Vaisheshika: These schools define universals as real, inherent, and unchanging essences that account for the "one-in-many" phenomenon. A universal like "horseness" (asvatva) makes a horse what it is.
• Varna in Early Nyaya-Vaisheshika: Early texts do not present the four varnas as universals. While the caste hierarchy is accepted without question, some texts, like Prasastapāda, grant the varna order a cosmological rank, aligning it with the Purusha Sukta myth as timeless forms of existence.
• Later Nyaya-Vaisheshika Discussions: In later centuries (9th-10th), the varna theory is discussed within the framework of universals, primarily from an epistemological standpoint: how are varnas reliably recognized and distinguished as universals, and how is this justifiable? The core issue is the relationship between direct perception and knowledge acquired through instruction and genealogy.
• Jayantabhatta and Sridhara: Jayantabhatta argues that while instruction is initially needed to identify a Brahmana, one then relies on sight. Sridhara elaborates, viewing the perception of "Brahmanahood" as a gradual difference compared to perceiving "cowness" and suggesting that genealogical knowledge aids perception without compromising its authenticity. Even potential issues like marital infidelity of Brahman women are considered manageable.
• Buddhist Counter-Arguments: Buddhist philosophers like Shantarakshita and Kamalasila, and Prajnākaragupta, argue against the reality and identifiability of caste universals, questioning the relationship between instruction and perception.
• Limited Role in Nyaya-Vaisheshika: The caste system doesn't hold a central position in Nyaya and Vaisheshika. This is in contrast to Mimāmsā, which, as a system defending Vedic dharma, uses the universal concept apologetically for the caste system.
• Kumārila's Defense: Kumārila (7th century), a key Mimāmsā thinker, uses the universal concept to argue that the four varnas are distinct species determined by real universals, making caste affiliation a metaphysical fact prior to ethical or characterological considerations.
• Mimāmsā Universals (Akriti): The Mimāmsā (Bhatta school) views universals as inherent in things (in re) but less hypostatized than in Vaisheshika. The term akriti (form) is often equated with jati (universal), raising a difficulty for caste application, as caste distinctions are not as visually obvious as those between species like horses and elephants. Kumārila argues that akriti is broadened beyond mere outward form.
• Perception and Genealogy: Kumārila asserts that while castes might appear similar in outward form, caste distinctions are reliably identified through memory of lineage and genealogical knowledge. This knowledge, combined with other sensory cues (smell, taste), helps in perceiving generic differences.
• Vajrasuci and Caste Criteria: The Vajrasūci (a text critiquing caste) and Kumārila's discussions touch upon the criteria for caste identity, with Kumārila arguing against deriving caste from behavior alone, as this would lead to a circulus vitiosus. Brahmanahood is a hereditary, inherent universal acquired at birth, not a result of behavior or disposition.
• Kumārila's Apologetics: Kumārila's defense is apologetic, aiming to make Vedic tradition defensible in an age of critical reflection while preserving it from autonomous rationality. His approach is seen as restorative, even introducing philosophical innovations.
• Prabhakara School's Critique: The rival Prabhākara school, represented by Śālikanātha Miśra, finds Kumārila's use of universals unnecessary. They believe genealogical connections and traditional knowledge suffice. They reject the idea of real caste universals, asserting only the universal of "humanity" (puruṣatva). They argue that caste distinctions are merely upādhis (accidental determinations) sanctioned by tradition.
• Upadhi vs. Jati: The Prabhākaras distinguish between true universals and upādhis, viewing caste distinctions as the latter. This position is philosophically significant and potentially radical.
• Kumārila's Influence: Kumārila's discussion significantly influenced later Mimāmsā, Nyaya, and Vaisheshika thought.
• Modern Pandits: Contemporary traditional scholars like Vasudeva Sastrin Abhyankara and Durgāprasāda Dviveda continue Kumārila's line of argument, emphasizing the hereditary, universal nature of caste and rejecting interpretations based on behavior.

VII. Assessment of the Caste System in Advaita Vedanta:

• Neo-Vedanta's Social Claims: Unlike other philosophical theories, Advaita Vedanta has been widely invoked in modern India for social and political purposes, often linked to concepts like tolerance, equality, democracy, and justice.
• Secularization of Advaita: Neo-Vedanta attempts to bridge the gap between Advaita's metaphysical unity and practical social/political goals, often leading to a "secularization" of Advaita concepts.
• Critique of Neo-Vedanta: Halbfass challenges the claim that Advaita provides a foundation for social equality. He highlights the distinction between absolute truth (paramārtha) and conventional truth (vyavahāra) in Advaita.
• Shankara's Conservatism: Shankara's commentary on Brahmasutra I, 3, 34–38 reveals a conservative stance on caste. He argues against the eligibility of Sudras for Vedic study, thus excluding them from liberation-knowledge, a stance analogous to their exclusion from Vedic rituals in Pūrva Mimāmsā. This exclusion is firmly based on birth.
• Metaphysical Unity vs. Social Equality: Shankara's Advaita does not equate metaphysical unity with social or religious equality in the empirical realm. The story of Satyakama Jabala is interpreted by Shankara not as evidence of ethical criteria for Brahmanahood but as an indication of his birth-legitimated status.
• Ramanuja's Criticism: Ramanuja criticizes Shankara's exclusion of Sudras from Vedic study, finding it inconsistent with the Advaita principle of absolute unity. He questions how one can exclude Sudras from liberation if all are ultimately Brahman.
• Advaita's "Double Truth": Advaita's concept of "double truth" allows the absolute unity of Brahman and the conventional reality of empirical distinctions (including caste) to co-exist without necessarily implying social equality.
• Tendency Towards Conciliation: Some Advaita texts and followers (like Sureśvara) show a tendency to soften social distinctions by referencing the absolute unity, but this does not translate to social equality. The realized person is "beyond castes" only in the absolute sense.
• Irrelevance of Caste in Absolute Truth: While caste differences are ultimately irrelevant in the absolute sense, this does not mean they are abolished in the empirical world. Caste distinctions remain, and access to liberation is not universally equal, as seen in the concept of adhikara (eligibility).
• Limited Social Application: The Advaita Vedanta of Shankara does not offer a basis for social or political responsibility or strong ethical motives derived from its metaphysical teachings. The idea of the "liberated-while-living" (jīvanmukta) does not typically imply social engagement.
• No Ethic of Compassion: Unlike Mahayana Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta lacks an ethic of compassion and does not use the concept of the absolute Self as a premise for universal empathy.
• Conservatism in Renunciation: Even in the domain of renunciation (samnyāsa), Advaita exponents remain largely conservative, ensuring that the liberation of the renouncer does not disrupt the existing social order, including the varna system.
• The "True Brahmana": The designation of the realized knower as a "true Brahmana" is not an endorsement of replacing hereditary definition with a soteriological-ethical one.
• Contrast with Neo-Vedanta: Halbfass concludes that the social and political ideas of Neo-Vedanta cannot be derived from classical Advaita Vedanta or Indian philosophy in general. The attempts to bridge the gap between absolute unity and social equality often fail to address the fundamental problem of "mediation." The equality of Brahman with Sudras, animals, and plants remains politically and socially irrelevant and cannot be concretely applied to specific programs.
• Neo-Vedanta's Ambiguity: The association of Vedanta with concepts like democracy or socialism can also coexist with nationalism or individualism, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate applications.
• Ramakrishna's Metaphors: The author refers to Ramakrishna's parables to illustrate the difficulties in translating Advaita's metaphysical unity into social practice. The parable of the elephant highlights the potential for misinterpreting divine unity as license for ignoring social conventions. The metaphor of water illustrates the unity of divine substance across different names (religions), but Ramakrishna also acknowledges varying levels of purity and suitability for different uses, suggesting a nuanced view that his followers sometimes overlook in their pursuit of social application.

In essence, Halbfass's analysis reveals that while Indian philosophical traditions, particularly Mimāmsā and Advaita Vedanta, engaged theoretically with the caste system, their primary aim was often apologetic – to justify and preserve the existing order. Even when employing sophisticated philosophical concepts like universals or gunas, the core of the varna system, its hereditary basis, remained largely intact. The author critically examines modern attempts to derive social and political equality from Advaita's metaphysical monism, arguing that such interpretations often misrepresent the classical texts and fail to address the fundamental disconnect between absolute truth and empirical social reality.