Zur Deutung Von Nyayasutram I 1 5

Here is a comprehensive summary of Gerhard Oberhammer's "Zur Deutung Von Nyayasutram I, 1, 5" in English:

The article by Gerhard Oberhammer delves into the interpretation of Nyayasutram I, 1, 5, a foundational sutra in the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy, which describes a threefold classification of inference (anumānam). The sutra states: "atha tatpūrvakam trividham anumānam pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca." (Thereupon, that which is preceded by it, the threefold inference, is purvavat, seṣavat, and sāmānyato dṛṣṭam.)

Oberhammer highlights the ambiguity surrounding this sutra, noting that its technical terms (purvavat, seṣavat, sāmānyato dṛṣṭam) are not defined within the text itself. Furthermore, the earliest surviving interpretations of these terms, notably by Vṛṣagana in the Şaṣṭitantram and by the commentator Pakṣilasvāmin, differ significantly from each other and from what Oberhammer proposes as the original meaning.

Key Challenges and Oberhammer's Approach:

• Vṛṣagana's Divergent Classification: Oberhammer points out that Vṛṣagana's Şaṣṭitantram, previously considered the oldest source for these terms, uses them differently. Vṛṣagana contrasts sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam with viseṣato dṛṣṭam anumānam (inference seen from the particular) and further subdivides sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam into purvavat and seṣavat.
• Pakṣilasvāmin's Inconsistent Interpretations: The oldest commentator on the Nyayasutras, Pakṣilasvāmin, also demonstrates a lack of clear understanding of the original meaning, offering two distinct and conflicting interpretations of the threefold inference.
• The Carakasamhita as a Key Source: Oberhammer argues that a crucial, yet underutilized, source for interpreting NS I, 1, 5 is a passage in the Carakasamhita. This text refers to and explains a doctrine of inference that is identical to the one in the Nyayasutras.

The Carakasamhita's Contribution:

The Carakasamhita passage (Sū. sth. 11, 21-22) provides examples that strongly suggest the trividham (threefold) in NS I, 1, 5 should be understood as trikālam (according to three times: past, present, and future). The examples given illustrate inferences about:

1. Past: Inferring a hidden fire from smoke.
2. Future: Inferring future fruit from seeds (after having observed fruit arising from seeds).
3. Present: Inferring a present peacock's cry from its sound.

Reinterpreting NS I, 1, 5 through Caraka and NS II, 1, 38:

Oberhammer contends that the Carakasamhita's interpretation, aligning trividham with trikālam, is highly persuasive due to the significant overlap in terminology and doctrine. He then uses Nyayasutram II, 1, 38, which presents an objection against the Nyaya theory of inference due to potential fallacies (vyabhicāraḥ), to further support his argument.

The examples cited in NS II, 1, 38 as flawed inferences (e.g., inferring rain from a swollen river, inferring rain from ants moving to their nests, inferring a peacock's presence from its cry) can be understood as attempts to illustrate the trividham anumānam. Oberhammer argues that:

• Inferring rain from a swollen river represents a purvavad anumānam (inferring the antecedent cause from the effect).
• Inferring future rain from ants moving to their nests represents a seṣavat anumānam (inferring the future consequence from the present sign).
• Inferring a peacock's presence from its cry represents a sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam (inference seen by generality, or analogy).

Crucially, Oberhammer observes that the examples in NS II, 1, 38 do not align with Pakṣilasvāmin's interpretation of seṣavat as inference from effect to cause or sāmānyato dṛṣṭam as inferring solar movement. Instead, the key distinguishing factor in these examples, as well as in the Carakasamhita's classification, is the temporal aspect of what is being inferred. Therefore, Oberhammer concludes that NS I, 1, 5 does not describe three formally different types of inference, but rather one type of analogical inference that can be applied to three different temporal contexts (trikālam).

The Significance of the Term Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭam:

Oberhammer further speculates on why sāmānyato dṛṣṭam is used for the third category. He suggests that it might not primarily refer to an inference about the present, but rather to the formal structure of inference itself. Since all inferences in the Nyaya system are considered analogical, sāmānyato dṛṣṭam (seen by generality) could apply to all of them. The author of the Nyayasutras might have omitted the temporal aspect for the inference about the present, considering it self-evident as the third possibility, and instead used the term describing the general nature of inference.

This reinterpretation allows for a more coherent understanding of later Nyaya discussions, such as NS I, 1, 39-44, which deal with the three times. It also explains why other concepts like absence (abhāvaḥ), origin (sambhavaḥ), and implication (arthāpattiḥ) are later subsumed under inference without a clear indication of which of the three categories they belong to, if they were truly distinct types.

Historical Continuity and Vṛṣagana's System:

Oberhammer argues that this interpretation of NS I, 1, 5 as a threefold classification based on temporal reference provides the clearest link to Vṛṣagana's system. Vṛṣagana's division into viseṣato dṛṣṭam and sāmānyato dṛṣṭam, with the latter further divided into purvavat and seṣavat, represents a systematic development. Vṛṣagana recognized that besides analogical inference (sāmānyato dṛṣṭam), one can also infer from a specific particular (viseṣato dṛṣṭam). When Vṛṣagana subdivided sāmānyato dṛṣṭam into purvavat (cause to effect) and seṣavat (effect to cause), he effectively shifted the focus from temporal aspects to causal relationships, thus eliminating the need for a distinct third category.

Conclusion:

In summary, Gerhard Oberhammer's article argues that Nyayasutram I, 1, 5 describes not three distinct types of inference, but rather one analogical inference that can be applied to three temporal contexts (past, present, and future). This understanding is primarily supported by an analysis of the Carakasamhita and further corroborated by the criticisms found in Nyayasutram II, 1, 38. This interpretation offers a more consistent historical trajectory for the development of Nyaya epistemology, particularly in its relationship with later systems like that of Vṛṣagana.