Zur Advaitischen Theorie Der Objekterkenntnis

This paper, "Zur Advaitischen Theorie der Objekterkenntnis" (On the Advaitic Theory of Object Cognition) by Lambert Schmithausen, explores the complex philosophical landscape of how knowledge of external objects is understood within Advaita Vedanta. The author begins by highlighting that, unlike many other philosophical schools, Advaita Vedanta lacks a singular, unified stance on the fundamental epistemological problem of the relationship between subject and object.

Key Themes and Arguments:

• Diversity within Advaita: Schmithausen points out that while the majority of Advaitins, despite their illusionistic ontology, believed objects are not created by the subject's cognition but rather pre-exist it, some teachers proposed that the object is partially or entirely a creation of the subject.

• Two Contrasting Views:

  • Mandanamiśra's Brahmasiddhiḥ: This school posits that the entire manifold world is a distortion of the unified Brahman, caused by the individual souls' conceptualizations (vikalpāḥ). Therefore, the external world is always a product of the individual subject. The apparent commonality of the external world for all beings is merely a similarity stemming from the identical functioning of their "dispersing" or "projecting" ignorance (vikṣepikā avidyā).
  • Prakāśānanda's System: This later system adopts a more radical idealism, stating that "being is only consciousness" (pratītimātram sattvam). The waking world is seen as akin to the dream world, which, despite being only consciousness, is perceived as divided into the knower and the known. This idealism is noted for its connection to Buddhist Vijñānavāda.

• The Majority Advaitic Position: Most Advaitins, including Śankara and his followers, maintained that the object is not created by finite cognition but is presupposed by it, existing temporally before the act of knowing. The instance responsible for creating the object (or the world of objects) is not the ordinary cognition of the unenlightened soul (Jīvaḥ) but rather Brahman itself, or the World-Lord (Īśvaraḥ), or even a deeper aspect of the unenlightened soul.

• Influence of Sāṅkhya-Yoga: Schmithausen emphasizes that Advaita, particularly from Śankara onwards, adopted the psychology of Sāṅkhya, and more specifically Yoga, for analyzing the process of cognition of presupposed objects. However, this adoption involved significant modifications, not only regarding the subject but also, crucially, concerning how the object is known.

• Sāṅkhya-Yoga Epistemology: The paper outlines the Sāṅkhya-Yoga metaphysical prerequisites: a multiplicity of unchanging, inactive pure spirit souls (puruṣa) on one side, and objects arising from primal matter (Prakṛti) on the other. For cognition to occur, a mediating principle, the psyche (antahkaraṇa), is necessary. This psyche, comprising senses and the inner sense (manas, buddhiḥ, ahaṅkāraḥ), is an product of matter. Cognition, in Yoga, happens when the inner sense is "colored" (uparágaḥ) by the object through the sense organs. This coloring is interpreted by Śankara as the inner sense transforming into the form of the object. Importantly, according to Yoga and later Sāṅkhya, it is not the real object itself but only its representation in the inner sense that is known.

• Schmithausen's Analysis of Prakāśātman's Vivaraṇam: The core of the paper involves a detailed examination of a significant passage in Prakāśātman's Vivaraṇam, which presents three distinct theories on how the Jīvaḥ achieves limited knowledge of specific objects. Schmithausen argues that previous interpretations, like C. Cammann's, have blurred the distinction between these theories and their premises.

  • First Theory: This theory aligns closely with Sāṅkhya-Yoga but seems to imply a direct knowledge of the object itself, not just its representation. The Jīvaḥ is considered all-pervasive and self-luminous. This theory's difference from Sāṅkhya-Yoga is the implication of direct object cognition, potentially influenced by realist schools like Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā in reaction to Buddhist sākāravāda (the doctrine that cognition always takes the form of its object).
  • Second Theory: This theory posits the Jīvaḥ as finite and limited by the inner sense, acting as a reflection (pratibimba) of the all-pervasive Brahman. Cognition is understood as participation in Brahman's knowledge, made possible by an ādhyāsika-sambandhaḥ (a relation of superimposed identity). The difficulty here lies in reconciling the illusory separation of Jīva and Brahman (as reflection and original) with their actual unification. Some interpretations suggest this participation occurs through a reflection of Brahman in the inner sense. This theory is traced back to Padmapāda.
  • Third Theory: This theory suggests the Jīvaḥ's consciousness, though all-pervasive, is veiled by ignorance (avidyā). Cognition occurs when the inner sense's transformation overpowers (abhibhavaḥ) this veiling ignorance, revealing the Jīva's consciousness and allowing it to cognize the object. This theory is potentially linked to Vimuktātman. It suggests that the Jīvaḥ might be the "material cause" of the objects, and its veiled consciousness creates them and knows them, with the inner sense facilitating the revelation.

• Interpretation and Historical Context: Schmithausen dedicates a significant portion of the paper to interpreting these three theories, discussing their origins, influences (particularly from Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Nyāya, and Mīmāṁsā), and the subsequent interpretations within the Advaitic tradition (as found in texts like Appayyadīkṣita's Siddhāntaleśasaṅgrahaḥ). He carefully analyzes the terminology and philosophical arguments used to explain how cognition is possible, focusing on concepts like "coloring" (uparāgaḥ), "transformation" (pariṇāmaḥ), "reflection" (pratibimba), "superimposed relation" (ādhyāsika-sambandhaḥ), and the overcoming of "veiling ignorance" (āvaraṇābhibhavaḥ).

In essence, Schmithausen's paper provides a deep dive into the nuanced and evolving Advaitic theories of how we come to know external objects, demonstrating how the school grappled with reconciling its metaphysical idealism with the empirical reality of object-cognition, drawing heavily on earlier Indian philosophical traditions while forging its own unique path. The paper emphasizes the diversity of thought within Advaita and the critical role of texts like Prakāśātman's Vivaraṇam in understanding this development.