Zum Problem Des Gottesbeweises In Der Indischen Philosophie - Book Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary of Gerhard Oberhammer's "Zum Problem Des Gottesbeweises In Der Indischen Philosophie" (The Problem of the Proof of God in Indian Philosophy), focusing on the Jain perspective as presented in the text:

This work by Gerhard Oberhammer delves into the problem of theological argumentation in Indian philosophy, focusing specifically on the Nyāya school's attempts to prove God's existence. While the book's title suggests a broad scope, the content, as presented in these pages, primarily centers on the Nyāya school's philosophical discourse on God and the arguments for God's existence, with a particular emphasis on how this discourse was challenged and refined, notably by Buddhist logic.

The core of the book examines the Nyāya concept of God and the nature of the arguments used to establish God's existence. Oberhammer's analysis can be understood through the following key points:

1. The Nyāya Conception of God:

God as a "Cause": From its inception, the Nyāya concept of God (īśvara) is defined as the "cause of the world" (kāranam). This causality is understood initially in a natural-physical sense, later refined to "efficient cause" (nimittakāranam).
God within a Causal Schema: God is integrated into the Nyāya causal framework, appearing alongside other causes like material causes (e.g., atoms) and instrumental causes (e.g., space, time, karma). Importantly, these other causes are independent of God in their existence and essence; God merely "causes" them to act.
God as a Unique Soul/Substance: There was a debate within Nyāya regarding God's ontological status. Pakṣilasvāmin (5th century CE) considered God a unique kind of soul (ātmā), distinguished by the absence of impurities and the possession of specific virtues. Uddyotakara (200 years later) argued that God is a unique substance (dravyam) because of his unique properties. Both agreed on God's distinctness.
God's "Otherness" and Immanence: While God is acknowledged as distinct from other beings, Oberhammer emphasizes that this "otherness" does not necessarily imply transcendence in a way that separates God entirely from the fabric of existence. God remains a distinct subtype within the category of substance.
God as a "World-Mechanical" Component: Despite his unique properties, God is ultimately viewed as a system-immanent component of the "world mechanism." His role is to be the "efficient cause" that governs the interplay of material and instrumental causes for the benefit of souls.

2. The Nyāya Proof of God (Focusing on Uddyotakara):

Argument from Causality: The primary Nyāya argument for God's existence, as exemplified by Uddyotakara, is the argument from causality. The world is seen as a mechanism of causes and effects, and the ultimate efficient cause must be intelligent (buddhimat). Since the world's components (e.g., primal matter, atoms, karma) are unintelligent, they require an intelligent guiding cause, which is God.
Existence Proven by Causality: Uddyotakara's famous statement, "By the same proof (nyāyah) by which the causeseing of God the Lord is proven, his existence is also proven, for a non-existent cause does not exist," highlights that God's existence is established because he is posited as a cause, not vice-versa.
Empirical Justification: The Nyāya proof for God is characterized as an "empirical" proof, inferring the existence of one entity (God) from empirically observable entities and their properties, without needing to trace them back to their ultimate grounds of possibility.

3. Buddhist Critique (Dharmakīrti) and its Impact:

Critique of Causal Nexus: The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti critically examined the logical basis of such inferences, particularly the concept of the "causal nexus" (vyāpti). He argued that a valid inference requires a precisely established causal relationship, which he defined through the "five-point observation" (a method of direct perception and non-perception).
Unverifiability of God's Causality: Dharmakīrti argued that the causal relationship between the world and God cannot be empirically verified by his method. God is imperceptible, and even if he were, the requirement of non-perception of the cause when the effect is absent would be impossible to fulfill for an eternal being.
Problem of Equivocation and Generalization: Dharmakīrti also criticized the Nyāya tendency to generalize causal relationships. He pointed out that using a term like "composition" for both human-made objects and the world can lead to an unjustified inference of a similar cause. He emphasized that a causal nexus is specific: a particular cause produces a particular effect.
Transcendence of Generalities: Dharmakīrti's critique was deeply rooted in his understanding of "pratītyasamutpāda" (dependent origination) and "kṣanabhangavāda" (momentariness). He saw all existence as causally conditioned successions of fleeting phenomena, making the notion of an eternal, uncaused creator God problematic.

4. Nyāya's Response and the Development of Argumentation (Trilocana):

Challenging Dharmakīrti's Logic: The Nyāya school, particularly through figures like Trilocana (around 800 CE), responded to Dharmakīrti's critique by re-evaluating the foundations of inference. They challenged the Buddhist view that an inference's validity (especially for non-empirical realities) was solely dependent on empirical verification.
"Dependence of Essence" (svābhāvikah sambandhah): Trilocana proposed the concept of "dependence of essence," which posits an inherent, necessary relationship between universal concepts (sāmānyam), not merely between individual entities. This relationship is recognized through "thought" (manas) or intellectual insight, rather than solely empirical observation.
"Dependence based on the Real" (vastavaḥ pratibandhah): Building on this, Trilocana introduced "dependence based on the real." This concept allows for inferring necessary relationships by recognizing that certain properties are essential for a universal concept to inhere in a particular reality. This provided a way to bridge the gap between universal concepts and specific realities, including God.
Formalizing the Argument: Trilocana's work, especially the development of "compulsion by belonging to the subject" (pakṣadharmatābalāt), aimed to formalize these relationships within Nyāya's logical system. This allowed for inferring the existence and attributes of a divine creator without needing strict empirical "verification" as demanded by Dharmakīrti.
Proving a "Spiritual Cause": Trilocana's arguments aimed to establish that the world, as a product of "composition" (i.e., organized structure), must have a "spiritual cause" (a cause with intelligence).
Inferring God's Attributes: The crucial step was then to show that this spiritual cause must be God, possessing attributes like omniscience. This was achieved by arguing that the complexity and scope of the world's creation necessitate a cause that knows all aspects of reality – an omniscient cause. This argument relied on the idea that the specific "difference" in the effect implies a "difference" in the cause.

In essence, Oberhammer's analysis highlights a crucial philosophical struggle in Indian thought: the tension between the Nyāya desire to prove the existence of God as a creator and the Buddhist emphasis on empirical verification and the denial of inherent essences. The work traces the evolution of Nyāya's logical and epistemological tools to counter Buddhist critiques and establish a philosophical basis for its theological claims, culminating in Trilocana's innovative approach to logical inference.

While the provided text focuses heavily on the Nyāya and Buddhist interactions, it also serves as a historical and philosophical backdrop for understanding the broader landscape of theological argumentation in ancient Indian philosophy. The Jain perspective, in this context, would be situated within this broader philosophical milieu, potentially engaging with or offering alternative arguments to those presented by the Nyāya and countered by the Buddhists. However, the provided excerpt does not deeply detail specific Jain theological proofs or critiques of the Nyāya position, but rather uses the Nyāya's problem of God-proof as the central case study.