Zum Begriff Der Substanz Im Vaisesika

Here's a comprehensive summary of Wilhelm Halbfass's "Zum Begriff Der Substanz Im Vaisesika" (On the Concept of Substance in Vaiseṣika), based on the provided text:

Overall Argument:

Wilhelm Halbfass's essay critically examines the concept of dravya (substance) within the Vaiseṣika philosophical system. He argues that the common Western translation of dravya as "substance" is problematic due to the inherent ambiguity and historical complexity of the Western concept itself. Halbfass contends that understanding dravya in Vaiseṣika requires a deep dive into its cosmological origins, its evolving relationship with qualities (guna), and its dual role as both a cosmological substratum and a logical bearer of properties (dharmin). He highlights the system's inherent tensions, particularly in how it tries to reconcile its enumerative, nature-philosophical approach with a more logical and epistemological one, a tension exacerbated by its engagement with Buddhist critiques.

Key Points and Sections:

I. The Problematic Nature of "Substance":

• Western Ambiguity: Halbfass begins by pointing out that the Western concept of "substance" is notoriously ambiguous, with multiple meanings ranging from concrete individuals to substrata. This complexity necessitates caution when applying it to Indian philosophy.
• Dravya's Broad Meaning: He asserts that dravya in the Indian tradition, particularly in Vaiseṣika and related schools, encompasses a wide semantic field. It often contrasts the enduring with the transient, the self-sufficient with the dependent, and the concrete with the abstract.
• Cosmological and Logical Interplay: Dravya is situated at the intersection of cosmological concerns (the enduring in becoming, the world substratum) and logical/epistemological considerations (the concept of the concrete "thing").
• Methodological Openness: The essay aims not for a definitive translation but to remain methodologically open to the multifaceted implications of both the Western and Indian terms for substance.

II. The Ambiguity and Breadth of Dravya:

• Historical Context: The term dravya has been used in various contexts, including Vaiseṣika, Nyaya, grammar, Mimāmsā, Jainism, and in the critiques of Buddhism and Vedanta.
• Early Definitions: Even early attempts to define dravya, like those by Patañjali, reveal its multifaceted nature. It can refer to the particular individual thing, a stable complex of essential properties, or the material substratum underlying things.
• Dialectic of Substance: Halbfass highlights a core dialectic in the understanding of dravya: the tension between the fully qualified, concrete individual thing and the unqualified, indeterminate bearer of properties. This oscillation between extremes is central to later discussions.
• Focus on Dravya and Guna: The essay's primary focus will be on the relationship between dravya and guna (quality), primarily within classical Vaiseṣika and related Nyaya texts.
• Vaiseṣika's Nature-Philosophical Roots: The Vaiseṣika system, despite its seemingly straightforward presentation, is deeply rooted in cosmological and nature-philosophical thought. This background influences its approach to substance.

III. The Enumerative and Cosmological Approach:

• Enumeration over Definition: Vaiseṣika doesn't offer a general definition of dravya. Instead, it presents an exhaustive list of what falls under the term (earth, water, fire, air, ether, space, time, soul, mind). This enumerative approach is characteristic of its cosmological origins, contrasting with Kantian or Aristotelian categorical approaches.
• Eternal vs. Non-Eternal Substances: A key distinction within dravya is between eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya) substances.
  • Eternal Substances: These are the indivisible, indestructible atomic building blocks of the world (the atoms of the four elements).
  • Non-Eternal Substances: These are the composite, divisible things built from atoms, referred to as avayavin.
• Consequences of the Distinction: This division is not merely a categorization but signifies two different approaches to substance. Non-eternal substances (avayavin) are concrete, empirically identifiable things, introducing problems of language and epistemology that are foreign to the original cosmological framework. They are not primary building blocks but composite wholes.
• Cosmological Realism: Even the discussion of non-eternal substances retains a cosmological-nature-philosophical and enumerative realism. The qualities (guna) are seen as products or effluences of the elements, not as abstract categories.
• Hybrids of Nature Philosophy and Categories: Vaiseṣika's "category theory" remains intrinsically linked to its cosmological origins, making it a "hybrid nature philosophy." The separation and ordering of dravya and guna reflect an enduring cosmological orientation, where qualities depend on and are produced by substances, mirroring the production of composite things by atomic substances.
• Prasastapāda's Common Attributes: Prasastapāda, in the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, enumerates common attributes of all substances:
  1. Dravyatvayoga: Connection with the universal "substancehood."
  2. Svātmani ārambhakatva: The capacity to produce effects inherent in itself.
  3. Guṇavattva: Having qualities (being a possessor of qualities).
  4. Kāryakāranāvirodhitva: Non-contradiction with its own causes and effects.
• Guna vs. Guṇavattva: Halbfass emphasizes the crucial distinction between guna itself (as a category) and guṇavattva (the attribute of possessing qualities). The latter is an attribute of substance, not a quality itself.
• The "Double-Bodiedness" of Substance: The determination of substance as having qualities, while distinct from those qualities, leads to a peculiar "double-bodiness" or duality in the relationship between the bearer of properties (dharmin) and the property itself. This paradox is seemingly resolved through a "semantic ascent" rather than direct confrontation.

IV. The Problem of Perception and Buddhist Critique:

• Buddhist Challenge: Buddhist critics challenge the Vaiseṣika concept of substance, often reducing it to its perceptible qualities.
• Perception of Substance: Vaiseṣika holds that the perception of a thing presupposes the perception of its properties. However, it's unclear if properties and their bearers can be perceived as truly separable data. The perception of a substance is always qualified.
• Prasastapāda's Ambiguity: Prasastapāda's notion of svarūpālocanamātra (mere contemplation of its own nature) suggests a perception of substance itself, but its exact meaning and separability remain unclear. This concept is not well-integrated and is hard to separate from its causal factors, like contact.
• The Role of Samnikarṣa: The concept of samnikarṣa (contact) evolves. Originally, it was contact with concrete, determined whole things. After the introduction of categories, it becomes contact with the "bare substance" (āśraya). This leads to a scholastic division of contact according to categories (e.g., simple conjunction for substance, inherence for qualities), but the "bare substance" itself becomes epistemologically problematic.
• The "Bare Substance" Problem: The idea of the "bare substance" being distinguishable from its qualities, akin to separating a man from his staff-bearing role, is challenged by Buddhists.
• Form (Saṃsthāna) as a Solution: Some Naiyayikas (Aviddhakarna, Bhāvivikta, Uddyotakara) attempt to establish the perception of substance without its qualities by appealing to saṃsthāna (form or shape). They argue that a thing can be perceived by its form even when its color is not perceived.
• Critique of Saṃsthāna: Buddhist critics like Śāntarakṣita argue that only form (samsthānamātra) is perceived, not substance as such. The Nyaya response is that form, distinct from color, leads to substance. However, the Buddhist view, particularly since Dignāga, is that form itself is reducible to qualities.
• Dual-Sensory Perception: The argument for dvindriyagrāhyatva (perceptibility by two senses) is also invoked. If a thing is both visible and tangible, it must be distinct from its specific sensory qualities and thus be substantial. This enables the identification of a single object through different sensory inputs. However, analysis shows that it is primarily the form that is identified.

V. Conclusion:

• Shift from Cosmology to Epistemology: The debate shifts from cosmological substrata to individual things as conditions for numerical identification in the empirical world, aligning with the logical-epistemological concerns of the time.
• Enduring Cosmological Orientation: Despite this shift, the enumerative and nature-philosophical orientation persists. Substances remain distinct entities that bear qualities, are determined by them, and yet are different from them.
• Unresolved Paradox: The cosmological problem of the substratum and the logical-epistemological problem of the property-bearer are kept separate but never truly and thematically resolved. There is no Aristotelian distinction between a pure "underlying substratum" and a determined "this-here" individual thing.
• Dravya as a Conceptual Catalyst: The concept of dravya in Vaiseṣika, with its inherent difficulties and paradoxes, acts as a crucial conceptual catalyst for critique, contributing to the radicalism and success of critiques of the empirical world found in Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta.

In essence, Halbfass argues that dravya in Vaiseṣika is a complex concept deeply influenced by its cosmological origins, which creates significant tension when the system engages with logical and epistemological challenges, particularly from Buddhist philosophers. The essay highlights the system's attempts to define and defend substance through various arguments, ultimately revealing the inherent ambiguities and the evolving nature of the concept within Indian philosophy.