Wirklichkeit Und Begriff Bei Dharmakirti

This is a summary of the introduction and the first chapter of Ernst Steinkellner's "Wirklichkeit Und Begriff Bei Dharmakirti" (Reality and Concept in Dharmakirti), a scholarly work on the philosophy of the Indian Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. The provided text focuses on the crucial term svabhāvaḥ and its multifaceted role in Dharmakīrti's ontology and logic.

Here's a breakdown of the key points:

Introduction:

• Centrality of svabhāvaḥ: The author immediately establishes svabhāvaḥ as a core technical term in Dharmakīrti's philosophy, essential for understanding his logic and ontology.
• Ubiquity and Difficulty: While svabhāvaḥ is widely used in Sanskrit literature, precisely grasping its meaning within a specific thinker like Dharmakīrti is challenging. It's often harder to pinpoint the specialized use of a common word than a newly coined technical term.
• Dharmakīrti's Unique Contribution: The study aims to define the meaning of svabhāvaḥ from within Dharmakīrti's own works, rather than relying solely on a history of the word's meaning. This is possible because all of Dharmakīrti's works have been preserved. The author acknowledges that this approach limits the ability to precisely ascertain Dharmakīrti's original contribution versus what he inherited.
• Scope of the Study: The analysis is primarily based on the first chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam (PV I) and its autocommentary (Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiḥ, PVSV). The author believes these works already fully develop the semantic field of svabhāvaḥ for Dharmakīrti, with later works largely maintaining these established meanings.
• Contextual Understanding: The meaning of a philosophical term is integrated into the theory it serves. Therefore, understanding svabhāvaḥ requires understanding the theories in which it plays a central role, particularly logic and the theory of apoha (conceptual exclusion).
• Focus on Arthakriyā: The study will begin by examining statements about reality (wirklichkeit) and how arguments are constructed around them. This directly relates to the concept of arthakriyā (the ability to fulfill a purpose or perform a function), which is central to defining what is real.

Chapter I: Reality (Wirklichkeit)

• Definition of the Real: According to Dharmakīrti, that which is capable of performing a function (arthakriyākṣamah) is truly real (vastu). The inability to perform a function signifies unreality (avastu).
• Svabhāvaḥ as the Basis of Functionality: The capacity of a thing to perform a function is rooted in its svabhāvaḥ. Whether a thing fulfills a purpose depends entirely on whether it possesses the appropriate svabhāvaḥ.
• Svabhāvaḥ as Power (śakti):
  • When used in possessive constructions (like Bahuvrīhi compounds or with the suffix -vat), svabhāvaḥ denotes something that belongs to, or is inherent in, another. In statements about reality, the "thing" (vastu, bhāvaḥ, arthaḥ) is the subject.
  • The svabhāvaḥ of a thing is its inherent power (śakti) to produce an effect (kāryotpādana). It is a "capable svabhāvaḥ" (saktasvabhāvaḥ).
  • While the concept of power originates in Sautrāntika ontology, Dharmakīrti tends to avoid the term śaktiḥ itself, perhaps due to its association with Mīmāmsā. Instead, he uses the term jananam ("production," "generation") as an appositional modifier for svabhāvaḥ.
  • Svabhāvaḥ can be further qualified by adjectives like janaka ("producer"), kārin ("effector"), or utpādana ("producer"), and is sometimes directly referred to as "cause" (upādānam).
• Svabhāvaḥ of the Cause Complex (hetusāmagri):
  • Dharmakīrti views causes not as single entities but as a complex of conditions (hetusāmagri). Therefore, the svabhāvaḥ of a cause is the svabhāvaḥ of this entire complex.
  • This is illustrated by Dharmakīrti's explanation of why the variation of co-causes within a complex doesn't disrupt the logical nexus between cause and effect. He states that no single component is the sole producer; rather, the producer (janikā) is the complex itself, which is inferred by the effect.
  • The svabhāvaḥ of a thing is its capacity to produce an effect, and this capacity is determined by its causes. The svabhāvaḥ of the effect is thus determined by the svabhāvaḥ of the cause complex.
  • Crucially, Dharmakīrti rejects the idea that the svabhāvaḥ of a cause complex is a single, common force possessed by all its constituent causes. He argues that if this were true, a single cause would suffice to produce the effect.
  • Therefore, the "svabhāvaḥ of the cause complex" is not a real entity but a convenient designation for the fact that multiple causes, themselves conditioned by their own causes, produce a single effect. The interconnectedness is rooted in an unending causal chain.
• Svabhāva Niyamaḥ (Determination of Svabhāva):
  • The svabhāvaḥ of a thing, which arises from its cause complex, is determined by the svabhāvaḥ of those causes. This means the svabhāvaḥ is spatially and temporally confined, specific to a particular thing.
  • This determination ensures that things do not arise arbitrarily. The specific way a thing is arises from its causes.
  • This delimited determination of svabhāvaḥ is also the reason for the distinctness of things.
• The author's proposed translation: The author suggests that a direct German translation of svabhāvaḥ might require a neologism like "Eigenwesen" (own-essence). While this conveys the literal meaning, it needs further explanation. The paper aims to provide such supplementary definitions by clarifying the two main functional areas of the term in Dharmakīrti's work.

In essence, Steinkellner begins by highlighting the critical importance and ambiguity of svabhāvaḥ in Dharmakīrti's thought. He then delves into the ontological aspect, defining reality through the functional capacity (arthakriyā) of things, which is intrinsically linked to their svabhāvaḥ or inherent power. This power is understood as residing within a complex of causes, and its specific determination ensures the orderly nature of reality. The subsequent parts of the text (not fully detailed here, but outlined in the summary) would likely explore the logical implications of svabhāvaḥ and its relationship to concepts, language, and inference.