Vastutva Ki Kasoti - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Vastutva ki Kasoti" (The Criterion of Reality) by Sukhlal Sanghavi:

The text "Vastutva ki Kasoti" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, within the context of Indian philosophical thought, explores the criteria used to determine the truth or reality of various metaphysical positions. It traces the evolution of these criteria from the time of Mahavira and Buddha up to later centuries, highlighting the central role of the concepts of bondage (bandha), liberation (moksha), karma, and the doer-enjoyer of karma in establishing the validity of philosophical theories.

Core Argument and Historical Context:

The author begins by noting that the fundamental debates surrounding permanence (nityatva), impermanence (anityatva), both permanence and impermanence (nitya-anityatva), and permanent-changing (parinaminityatva) existed even before Mahavira and Buddha. However, the text emphasizes that the systematic establishment of these positions and the robust argumentation supporting them are not clearly evident in the older literature.

Buddhism's Impact and the Rise of Impermanence (Kshanikattva):

Buddha's strong emphasis on impermanence (anityatva), particularly the concept of momentary existence (kshanikattva), led to two significant outcomes:

Opposition and Defense: Other schools of thought actively opposed the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, formulating their own arguments to refute it and establish their own positions.
Internalization and Philosophical Focus: Within the Buddhist tradition itself, the concept of impermanence, initially a principle for fostering detachment and a moral/ethical stance, evolved into a comprehensive metaphysical doctrine. It became a subject of rigorous philosophical debate for both its proponents and opponents.

The Criterion of Bondage-Liberation and Karma:

For many centuries, the primary criterion for the truth of any philosophical school was its ability to explain the system of bondage and liberation and the principle of karma (the doer and enjoyer of karmic fruits).

Buddhist Argument: Buddhists argued that postulating an eternal soul (atma) would undermine the possibility of bondage, liberation, and the principle of karma, as it would disconnect the doer from the consequences of their actions.
Vedantic Counter-Argument: Similarly, Upanishadic philosophers (like those interpreted by Shankara) argued against Buddhist philosophy on the same grounds, asserting that their eternalistic views were necessary for a coherent system of karma and liberation.
Jain Argument (Parinaminityatva): The Jain philosophy of "parinaminityatva" (permanent change), which views reality as having an underlying permanent substance (dravya) that undergoes modifications (paryaya), also used this criterion. Jains argued that if the soul were merely eternal or merely impermanent, the system of worldly existence and liberation, the principle of the doer receiving the fruits of karma, the efficacy of good deeds like charity for liberation, and the adoption of asceticism (diksha) would all become impossible.

The Emergence of the Criterion of "Arthakriyakaritva" (Capacity for Action):

As logical reasoning (tarkavaada) gained prominence in philosophical discourse, and in some instances, became more dominant than spiritualism, the criteria for truth began to shift. Logic proposed that "that which is capable of producing an effect (arthakriyakaritva) is real; nothing else is." The text attributes the origin of this logical criterion to the Buddhist tradition.

Buddhist Application: Buddhists utilized this criterion to support their theory of impermanence, arguing that anything not momentary could not be capable of action and therefore could not be truly real. They constructed intricate logical arguments involving concepts like sequence (krama) and simultaneity (yaugapadya) to demonstrate the impossibility of action for eternally existing entities. They also applied this criterion to refute the Jain doctrine of "dravya-paryaya" (substance-modifications) or the idea of a single entity having dual aspects (sat-asat, nitya-anitya), arguing that a single entity cannot simultaneously be the doer and non-doer of an action.

Counter-Arguments and Jain Engagement with "Arthakriyakaritva":

The text then details how other Indian philosophical schools, particularly the Vedic and Jain traditions, responded to the Buddhist criterion of "arthakriyakaritva."

Vedic Responses: Philosophers like Vachaspati Mishra and Jayanta Bhatta are identified as early critics of this Buddhist criterion. While both aimed to establish the reality of either permanence or impermanence, they used different logical strategies. Vachaspati argued for the possibility of momentary action through the interplay of relative and absolute existence, while Jayanta refuted Buddhist arguments by deconstructing their complex logical webs concerning sequence and simultaneity. The text also mentions Bhadanta Yogasen, whose arguments against Buddhist impermanence also utilized the Buddhist concept of sequence and simultaneity against them. The author notes that while Yogasen's epithet "Bhadanta" might suggest a Buddhist affiliation, in the absence of clear evidence for Buddhist proponents of permanence, it's plausible he belonged to Jain, Ajivika, or Sankhya traditions. Regardless, the core point is that Vedic scholars refuted Buddhist impermanence using the "arthakriyakaritva" criterion.
Jain Responses: The Jain tradition also emerged as a strong counter-argument to Buddhist impermanence, using the same Buddhist-originated criterion of "arthakriyakaritva" to refute it. Akalanka is cited as one of the earliest Jain thinkers to employ this strategy. He used the criterion to refute the Vedic doctrine of absolute permanence (similar to how Buddhists did) and to refute Buddhist impermanence (similar to how Bhadanta Yogasen and Jayanta did). The text clarifies that while the criterion of "arthakriyakaritva" became prominent in the logical era for refuting and establishing permanent or momentary existence, the ancient criterion of bondage-liberation and karma did not disappear entirely; it became secondary.

Jain Philosophy and "Arthakriyakaritva":

The text highlights how Jain scholars like Akalanka and later Acharya Hemachandra responded to the Buddhist critique of the Jain concept of "dravya-paryaya" (substance-modifications) or the duality of being and non-being, permanence and impermanence within a single entity. They used the Buddhist "arthakriyakaritva" argument against the Buddhists themselves. Hemachandra, for instance, first refuted the concept of absolute permanence using Buddhist arguments and then refuted absolute impermanence using the arguments of scholars like Bhadanta Yogasen and Jayanta. Crucially, he employed the "arthakriyakaritva" criterion to support the Jain doctrine of "dravya-paryaya," arguing that it is within the Jain framework that the capacity for action is truly realized.

In essence, "Vastutva ki Kasoti" demonstrates how philosophical debate in India evolved, with logical criteria like "arthakriyakaritva" being adopted and adapted by different schools to either support or refute prevailing doctrines. The Jain tradition, in particular, is shown to have skillfully used the very logical tools developed by its opponents to defend its own comprehensive philosophical system, which embraces both permanence of substance and change in modes.