Vadvichar

Added to library: September 2, 2025

Loading image...
First page of Vadvichar

Summary

Here is a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Vadvichar" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, based on the given pages:

The text, "Vadvichar," by Sukhlal Sanghavi, delves into the nature and classification of debate or discourse (katha) within Indian philosophical traditions, with a particular focus on the Jain perspective. It begins by differentiating between two types of discourse: question-answer format and refutation-reaffirmation format. Words like sammbashā, kathā, and vād are used for the latter.

The author draws parallels between the medical tradition (specifically Charaka) and the Nyaya (logic) tradition regarding their classifications of discourse.

  • Sammbashā (Medical Tradition): Divided into Sandhyā Sammbashā (cooperative discourse) and Vigṛhya Sammbashā (contentious discourse).
  • Kathā (Nyaya Tradition): Divided into Vād (argument), Jalpa (sophistry/argumentation for victory), and Vitanda (caviling/refutation without establishing one's own thesis).

Key Comparisons and Distinctions:

  • Sandhyā Sammbashā and Vād: The text argues that Sandhyā Sammbashā in the medical tradition is equivalent to Vād in the Nyaya tradition. This is based on the similar qualifications and purpose of their participants. Both aim for the "determination of truth" (tattvanirnaya).
  • Vigṛhya Sammbashā and Jalpa/Vitanda: The medical term Vigṛhya Sammbashā is seen as analogous to Jalpa and Vitanda in the Nyaya tradition. Charaka further divides Vigṛhya Sammbashā into Jalpa and Vitanda. The Nyaya tradition uses the term Vijigīṣukathā (discourse for the sake of victory) to encompass these contentious forms. The text asserts that "vigṛhya sammabāshā" and "vijigīṣukathā" are synonymous.
  • Shared Origins: The author posits that the Nyaya and medical traditions, in their core ideas about discourse, are essentially two different streams originating from the same thought.

The Jain Perspective:

  • Emphasis on Vād: The Jain tradition predominantly uses the term vād for discourse aimed at establishing truth.
  • Rejection of Jalpa and Vitanda: Jainism does not consider jalpa and vitanda to be valid forms of discourse. Therefore, for Jains, the term vād exclusively refers to the cooperative, truth-seeking discourse found in Sandhyā Sammbashā (medical) and Vād Kathā (Nyaya).
  • Later Buddhist Influence: The text notes that later Buddhist logicians also began to reject jalpa and vitanda, advocating solely for vād. This convergence further aligns the Jain understanding of vād with a refined Buddhist view.

Attributes of Discourse Participants:

  • Non-Envy (Anasūyaka): Charaka describes the participants of Sandhyā Sammbashā as anasūyaka (free from envy or fault-finding). Akṣapāda (in Nyaya) uses the same term for the participants of vād kathā. This reinforces the equivalence between the two.
  • Desire for Victory (Vijigīṣu): Charaka describes the participants of Vigṛhya Sammbashā as those who desire victory and possess strength. The Nyaya tradition similarly describes the participants of Jalpa and Vitanda as vijigīṣu.
  • Difference in Vijigīṣu: A crucial distinction is made between the vijigīṣu of the Nyaya-Vaidyaka traditions and the Jain vijigīṣu.
    • Nyaya-Vaidyaka Vijigīṣu: Aims to defeat the opponent by any means, including unfair tactics, deceit (chala), etc.
    • Jain Vijigīṣu: Aims to establish the truth of their own side through righteous means (nyāya) and eschews deceit and unfairness. Because of this adherence to righteous means, the Jain vijigīṣu is very close in character to the tattvabubhūtsu (one who desires to know the truth) of the Nyaya tradition.
  • Jain Non-Victorious Discourse: The Jain tradition also recognizes a type of discourse engaged in by vītarāga (detached individuals) who are not driven by the desire for victory. This discourse is not the "four-limbed debate" (chaturanga vād) because these individuals, being free from envy, do not require the oversight of a chairman or audience. They engage in the exchange of knowledge mutually.
  • Distinction within Jainism: Jainism further distinguishes between the vijigīṣu (who, while adhering to nyāya, might still have some attachment and thus require guidance) and the tattvanirṇinīṣu (who, in addition to following nyāya, is independent of external guidance in accepting the determination of truth).

The Concept of Chaturanga Vād:

  • Traditionally, the chaturanga vād (four-limbed debate) involved both the disputants being vijigīṣu.
  • However, Vādī Devasūri expressed a subtle difference, suggesting that chaturanga vād is possible even with only one of the participants being a vijigīṣu. This point was likely made in consideration of earlier logicians like Akalanka and Vidyānanda. Acharya Hemachandra seems to align with the views of Akalanka and Vidyānanda on this matter.

Unified Purpose of Discourse:

Across Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jain traditions, the primary purpose of discourse is to attain true knowledge or protect existing true knowledge. While the ultimate aim is shared, the methodologies differ.

Rejection of Deceitful Tactics:

The core difference, as reiterated, is that Jain and later Buddhist logicians consider the use of deceit (chala), fallacious arguments (jāti), etc., as unacceptable.

The Status of Jalpa and Vitanda in Jainism:

When Jainism prohibited the use of deceitful tactics, it effectively rendered jalpa and vitanda indistinguishable from vād. Jain logicians extensively discussed this, with works like Kathātrayabhanga (mentioned in the Siddhiviniścaya Tīkā) being cited. The conclusion reached is that jalpa and vitanda are not distinct categories of discourse but mere "debatable fallacies" or "mock debates" (kathābhāsa). Acharya Hemachandra also supported this view, stating that there is no acceptable form of discourse called jalpa separate from vād.

In essence, "Vadvichar" meticulously traces the evolution and classification of debate, highlighting the Jain tradition's commitment to truth-seeking through ethical means, rejecting any form of sophistry or deceit in argumentation.