Two Siddhasenas And Authorship Of Nyayavatara And Sammati Tarka Pprakarana

Here's a comprehensive summary of Piotr Balcerowicz's article "Two Siddhasenas and Authorship of Nyayavatara and Sammati Tarka Prakarana":

The article by Piotr Balcerowicz delves into the complex issue of authorship concerning two significant Jain philosophical works: the Nyayavatara (NA) and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana (STP). The author challenges the traditional attribution of both texts to a single individual named Siddhasena Divakara, presenting substantial evidence for the existence of two distinct Siddhasenas.

Key Arguments and Observations:

1. Lack of Mention in Traditional Biographies: Balcerowicz notes that traditional Jain biographical accounts (Prabandhas) of Siddhasena Divakara mention his composition of Sanskrit hymns and his attempt to render the Jain canon into Sanskrit. However, they do not mention the Nyayavatara or the Sammati-tarka-prakarana by title. This discrepancy suggests that perhaps the legendary Siddhasena Divakara is not the author of these specific philosophical works.

2. Tentative Distinction: Siddhasena Mahamati vs. Siddhasena Divakara: To avoid pre-judging common authorship, Balcerowicz tentatively assigns the author of the Nyayavatara to "Siddhasena Mahamati" (based on Haribhadrasuri's identification) and the author of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana to "Siddhasena Divakara."

3. Linguistic and Stylistic Differences:

   • The Nyayavatara is written in Sanskrit, while the Sammati-tarka-prakarana is in Prakrit. While linguistic differences can be explained by a bilingual author, Balcerowicz argues for more profound stylistic divergences.
   • The Nyayavatara exhibits a highly structured and analytical style, characterized by a standardized pattern of definitions, justifications (hetus), divisions, and proofs. It is described as a clear presentation of a logical system.
   • The Sammati-tarka-prakarana, on the other hand, is a more plain exposition of Jain doctrine, with occasional refutations. It presupposes prior knowledge of Jainism and its core concepts, offering less systematic definition and justification.

4. Differences in Content and Scope:

   • The Nyayavatara (32 verses) focuses primarily on epistemology, specifically the validity of knowledge (pramanya), the definition and divisions of cognitive criteria (pramana), and the theory of viewpoints (naya-vada). It has limited discussion of anekanta-vada and no mention of the method of seven-fold predication (sapta-bhangi). Its approach is often seen as aligning with Buddhist epistemological traditions (like Dharmakirti) and the general Indian pramana tradition.
   • The Sammati-tarka-prakarana has a broader scope, covering anekanta-vada, naya-vada, niksepas, sapta-bhangi, cognitive faculties (upayoga), the nature of soul (jiva), ethical and soteriological issues (karma, moksha), and ontological matters like samanya-visesa. Its vocabulary and topics are deeply rooted in the Jain canonical literature.

5. Vocabulary and Technical Terminology:

   • NA uses terms common in general Indian epistemology and logic, often with influence from Buddhist schools. It avoids specifically Jain technical terms, making it accessible to non-Jains.
   • STP extensively uses Jain terminology and concepts that originated in canonical literature, presupposing familiarity with Jain doctrine. Its topics are more specific to Jain concerns.

6. Differences in Logical Principles and Proof Structure:

   • Inference (Hetu): NA strongly advocates for "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathanupapatti) as the sole definition of a logical reason, following figures like Patrasvamin. STP, however, discusses inference in a manner that accepts the principle of inferring a "connected attribute" (sambandhin) by means of a relation (sambandha), a principle that NA, according to the author, rejects.
   • Proof Formula (Pancavayava-vakya): STP explicitly employs and alludes to the classical five-membered proof formula (thesis, reason, example, application, conclusion), demonstrating its author's approval and use. In contrast, NA downplays the importance of the example (drstanta) and the application (upanaya), suggesting a more concise logical structure that aligns with Buddhist logic's tendency to reduce syllogistic steps. This difference in attitude towards the proof formula is a significant indicator of separate authorship.

7. Epistemological Frameworks:

   • Pramana vs. Upayoga: NA focuses on the concept of pramana (cognitive criterion) and defines it for the first time descriptively in Jain epistemology. It divides pramana into perception (pratyaksa) and indirect cognition (paroksa). Importantly, NA's concept of pratyaksa as sensory aligns with general Indian tradition, deviating from the Jain view of pratyaksa as exclusively supra-sensory. The text does not mention upayoga.
   • STP, conversely, centers its epistemological discussion on the two upayogas (jnana and darsana) and their traditional Jain divisions. The concept of pramana and related terms are absent. The correlation of darśana with samanya (general) and jnana with visesa (specific) in STP is also noted as potentially controversial and distinct from typical Buddhist or Jain views on perception and inference.

8. Contradictory Views on Verbal Communication:

   • NA posits the idea of parartha-pratyaksa, suggesting that verbal utterances can be cases of direct perception under certain conditions, enabling knowledge transfer.
   • STP explicitly states that "objects cognized through testimony are not amenable to grasping (them) directly," categorizing verbal communication as indirect cognition. This direct contradiction on a key epistemological issue further supports distinct authorship.

9. Attitude towards Other Schools:

   • NA shows awareness of and engagement with Buddhist logical and epistemological concepts, often building upon or responding to them.
   • STP's primary antagonist is the Vaiseṣika school, with sporadic references to others. There is no evidence that the author of STP was familiar with the specific ideas of Dignaga or Dharmakirti, nor does it engage in criticism of Buddhist philosophical positions. This suggests STP predates the influence of Dignaga.

10. Chronological Implications:

    • Based on its engagement with Buddhist logic and terminology, NA is placed after Dharmakirti (post-620/660 CE).
    • STP, lacking such engagement and primarily critiquing Vaiseṣika, is likely to have flourished before the significant impact of Dignaga's school on Jain logic, suggesting a date before circa 500 CE.

Conclusion:

Balcerowicz concludes that the significant differences in language, style, content, philosophical approach, logical principles, and engagement with other philosophical traditions strongly indicate that the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana were authored by two different individuals. He identifies the author of the Nyayavatara as Siddhasena Mahamati and the author of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana as Siddhasena Divakara, assigning different historical periods to each. The article effectively dismantles the assumption of a single Siddhasena as the author of both foundational texts.