Two Circles Or Parallel Lines

This document, "Two Circles or Parallel Lines?" by Eli Franco, is a scholarly analysis of scholarly interpretations of the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti's work, specifically his Pramāṇavārttika. The central theme is the alleged circularity in Dharmakirti's arguments regarding the authority of the Buddha and the validity of perception and inference.

Here's a breakdown of the key points:

• The "Circular Argument" Thesis: Franco begins by detailing the arguments of renowned Dharmakirti scholars like Tilmann Vetter, Masatoshi Nagatomi, Ernst Steinkellner, and Richard Hayes. These scholars assert that Dharmakirti's reasoning creates a logical loop where:

  • Perception and inference (pramāṇa) validate the Buddha's authority.
  • The Buddha's authority, in turn, validates the reliability of perception and inference.
  • This circularity, according to these scholars, arises because the Buddha provides goals and guidance beyond what perception and inference can offer, and his authority is needed to legitimize these higher realms, while his authority itself is then supported by perception and inference.

• Vetter's and Nagatomi's Specific Interpretations:

  • Vetter posits a "historical-factual circle," suggesting that Dharmakirti rightly does not avoid this circle, implying it's a necessary part of his argument. Vetter believes the Buddha's authority validates perception and inference, particularly in areas beyond ordinary experience, and that one cannot be a Buddhist solely on faith.
  • Nagatomi perceives a similar reciprocity but emphasizes that faith in the Buddha's words is decisive, with the pramāṇa system being structured within the limits of the Buddha's teachings, which are then supported by the pramāṇa system.

• Franco's Critique of the "Circular Argument" Thesis: Franco expresses surprise that these scholars have not adequately cited textual evidence for their claims. He argues that a key verse (Pramāṇasiddhi 283a-c) cited by Vetter and Nagatomi is open to multiple interpretations and that their conclusion of circularity is not supported by the immediate context or by Dharmakirti's commentators.

  • Franco contends that Dharmakirti argues the Buddha used perception and inference, not that perception and inference are valid because of him.
  • He notes that traditional commentators do not find the circularity described by Vetter or Nagatomi.
  • Franco criticizes Vetter's specific interpretation of the verse as deviating from the commentators and lacking textual substantiation, even suggesting Vetter later modified his stance.

• Richard Hayes's "Doctrinalism" and Circularity: Franco then addresses Richard Hayes's argument regarding "doctrinalism" and a different kind of circularity.

  • Hayes suggests Dharmakirti falls into circularity when establishing the Buddha's credibility, arguing that the Buddha's truthfulness is supported by his teachings (like the Four Noble Truths), which are accepted as true because the Buddha taught them.
  • Hayes also claims circularity in how Dharmakirti addresses the question of the Buddha not lying, by appealing to information about his past lives, which itself comes from scriptures whose authority Dharmakirti is trying to defend.

• Franco's Refutation of Hayes's Circularity Claims: Franco argues that Hayes misunderstands the structure of Dharmakirti's Pramānasiddhi chapter.

  • He asserts that Dharmakirti does not claim that "we" believe the Four Noble Truths simply because the Buddha taught them, nor does he rely on scriptural accounts of past lives to prove the Buddha's trustworthiness.
  • Franco proposes that Dharmakirti's reasoning proceeds in five steps, moving from the essential part of the Buddha's teaching (the Four Noble Truths, established independently by perception and inference) to inferring the Buddha's knowledge, then his compassion, then his authority and trustworthiness, and finally the truth of the non-essential parts of his teaching. This is a five-step inference, not a circle.
  • The idea of a homogeneous teaching, which Hayes seems to assume, is what leads to the mistaken conclusion of circularity.

• The Distinction Between Essential and Non-Essential Teachings: Franco highlights Dharmakirti's crucial distinction between the "main" or "essential" part of the Buddha's teaching (which is self-validating through perception and inference) and the "secondary" or "non-essential" part (whose truth is inferred from the Buddha's qualities).

• The Role of Motivation in Inference: Franco further analyzes Dharmakirti's argument for inferring trustworthiness from one domain to another. He argues that Dharmakirti's reasoning, as seen in the Svārthānumāna chapter (v. 217), relies not just on the speaker's past accuracy (like in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) but also on the speaker's motivations (e.g., having nothing to gain by lying). This is what makes the inference valid.

• Conclusion on Circularity: Franco concludes that the scholars who claim Dharmakirti's arguments are circular are misinterpreting a single verse or misunderstanding the proof strategy. He argues that Dharmakirti's approach is not circular but rather a sophisticated method of establishing the Buddha's authority by grounding it in independently verifiable teachings and the Buddha's character. The so-called circularity is either a misunderstanding of the logical steps or an incorrect interpretation of key verses. The title "Two Circles or Parallel Lines?" implies that instead of a vicious circle, Dharmakirti's arguments are more like parallel lines, moving in a logical progression.

In essence, Franco defends Dharmakirti against charges of circular reasoning, arguing that the perceived circularity stems from misinterpretations by prominent scholars and a failure to grasp the nuanced structure of Dharmakirti's epistemological arguments. He emphasizes the importance of textual evidence and traditional commentaries in understanding these complex philosophical claims.