Tarka Pramana

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Tarka Pramana" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, focusing on the concepts of 'Tarka' (reasoning) and its place within Indian philosophical traditions, particularly Jainism:

"Tarka Pramana" by Sukhlal Sanghavi: A Summary

This excerpt from Sukhlal Sanghavi's "Tarka Pramana" delves into the complex history and philosophical understanding of 'Tarka' (reasoning or inference) across various Indian philosophical schools, with a particular emphasis on its place within Jainism.

Ancient Roots and Diverse Interpretations:

• Ancient Usage: The text highlights that the roots of 'Uha' (contemplation, reasoning) and 'Tarka' (reasoning, argument) are ancient, predating figures like Lord Mahavir, Buddha, and the Upanishads. These terms were prevalent in Sanskrit and Prakrit languages, appearing in scriptures like the Agamas, Pitakas, and philosophical sutras.
• Core Meaning: Despite variations in usage, the common thread across all these traditions is that 'Uha' and 'Tarka' refer to a "thoughtful cognitive process" or "intellectual activity."
• Jaimini Sutras and Shabara Bhashya: In the context of Jaimini Sutras and its commentary, Shabara Bhashya, the term 'Uha' is used to denote a specific kind of reasoning that Jayanta, in his Manjari, refuted by considering it as either inferential or verbal proof.

The Nyaya Perspective:

• Nyaya Sutras: The Nyaya Sutras (1.1.40) define 'Tarka' not as proof in itself, but as a mental process that supports proof.
• Later Nyaya Philosophers: Later Nyaya thinkers further refined this definition, clarifying that 'Tarka' is not a means of valid cognition (pramana). Instead, it's a form of volitional knowledge that involves positing a cause-effect relationship (vyaptyaropa) to eliminate doubts that obstruct the understanding of the causal link (vyapti). This process aids in the firm determination of the causal relationship.
• Exclusion from Proof: The text emphasizes that from ancient times, 'Tarka' has not been classified as a pramana (means of valid cognition) in the Nyaya tradition. The development of Nyaya philosophy led to highly detailed treatises clarifying the meaning and utility of 'Tarka.'

Buddhist Perspective:

• Buddhist Logicians: Even Buddhist logicians, while acknowledging the utility of 'Tarka' (reasoning or conceptual knowledge) for understanding 'vyapti' (causal connection), do not consider it as a valid means of cognition (pramana).

The Jain Tradition's Unique Stance:

• Mati-jnana and 'Iha': Within Jainism, the second type of 'Mati-jnana' (sensory or conceptual knowledge) is called 'Iha.' This 'Iha' is described as a cognitive process of evaluating merits and demerits.
• 'Uha' and 'Tarka' as Synonyms of 'Iha': The text states that in Jainism, the terms 'Uha' and 'Tarka' are used as synonyms for 'Iha' in the context of this evaluative cognitive process, as exemplified by Umaswati in his Tattvartha Bhashya (1.15).
• Akalaṅka's Contribution: When Jain logic began systematically organizing the classification and characteristics of pramanas, Akalaṅka is credited as being one of the first to establish the nature, subject matter, and utility of 'Tarka' (Laghivasvopajivi 3.2). His views were subsequently followed by other Jain logicians.
• 'Tarka' as a Pramana in Jainism: Crucially, the Jain tradition, unlike the Mimamsakas, considers 'Tarka' or 'Uha' as a valid means of cognition (pramanatmaka jnana).
• 'Tarka' as 'Vyapti-jnana': Jain logicians assert that the meaning of the word 'Tarka' or 'Uha' is 'Vyapti-jnana' (knowledge of the causal connection).
• Akalaṅka and 'Tarka Pramana': Akalaṅka, drawing on the familiar Jain concept of 'Uha' or 'Tarka,' established 'Tarka Pramana' as a sub-category of 'Paroksha Pramana' (indirect knowledge).
• Distinguishing from Nyaya: The text contrasts this with Nyaya thinkers like Vacaspatimisra, who variously defined 'vyapti-jnana' as mental perception, worldly perception, or inference. Jain logicians, however, maintain a consistent understanding of 'vyapti-jnana' as that which is indicated by the term 'Tarka.'
• Hemachandra's Support: Acharya Hemachandra is presented as a supporter of this established Jain tradition.

In essence, the text argues that while 'Tarka' is understood as a cognitive process across Indian philosophy, Jainism uniquely elevates it to the status of a valid pramana. For Jain logicians, 'Tarka' is not merely a supporting mental act but represents the direct apprehension of the causal link ('vyapti'), which is fundamental to inferential knowledge. The work of Akalaṅka is highlighted as pivotal in solidifying this unique Jain understanding of 'Tarka Pramana.'