Syadvada Par Kuch Akshep Aur Unka Parihar

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the Jain text "Syadvada par Kuch Akshep aur unka Parihar" by Mohanlal Mehta, based on the provided pages:

This book, authored by Mohanlal Mehta, delves into common criticisms leveled against Syadvada (the Jain doctrine of conditional predication) and provides detailed refutations for each. The author begins by lamenting that even great philosophers, failing to grasp the true meaning of Syadvada, have falsely accused it, either through ignorance or intentional misrepresentation.

The text highlights several key criticisms and their rebuttals:

1. Syadvada as a Confluence of Opposites (Contradiction):

• Criticism: Philosophers like Dharmakirti (Buddhism) and Shankaracharya (Advaita Vedanta) accused Syadvada of promoting contradictions. They argued that Syadvada claims a single object can be both existent (sat) and non-existent (asat), one and many, identical and different, permanent and impermanent, simultaneously. This, they claimed, is like saying fire is both hot and cold at the same time, which is impossible and indicative of madness.
• Rebuttal: Mehta clarifies that Syadvada does not assert that what is permanent is also impermanent, or what is one is also many. The contradiction lies in the perspective, not in the object itself. For example, a substance can be permanent from the perspective of its underlying essence (dravya) and impermanent from the perspective of its changing modes (paryaya). Syadvada asserts that from a certain point of view, the object is permanent, and from another point of view, it is impermanent. It doesn't claim both are true from the same viewpoint. Just as a single piece of cloth can be both "contracted" and "expanded" without contradiction, Syadvada posits that an object can possess seemingly opposing qualities when viewed from different angles. The author points to the acceptance of combined colors in a single visual perception by Buddhists and the acceptance of both general and specific properties by Naiyayikas as examples of how seemingly contradictory attributes can coexist without conflict.

2. Loss of Singularity (Object becoming Dual-formed):

• Criticism: If an object is both different and identical, then the basis for difference must be distinct from the basis for identity. This would imply the object has two forms, losing its singularity.
• Rebuttal: Mehta argues that there's no need to assume separate bases for difference and identity. The object itself possesses both inherent permanence (which leads to the perception of identity) and a characteristic of change (which leads to the perception of difference). These are attributes of the whole object, not its parts. It's not that one part is different and another is identical; rather, the entire object exhibits these dual aspects. The example of a single cloth being both contracted and expanded is reiterated.

3. Infinite Regress (Anavastha Dosha):

• Criticism: If difference and non-difference are distinct attributes, what is the relationship between the attribute of difference and the thing that possesses difference? Are they different or identical? This leads to an endless chain of questioning.
• Rebuttal: This criticism is dismissed by explaining that Jain philosophy doesn't posit separate entities called "difference" or "non-difference" that then need to relate to the object. Difference is understood as the object's mutable nature, and non-difference as its immutable nature. Since these are inherent characteristics of the object itself, there is no need for an external relationship, thus avoiding infinite regress.

4. Confluence of Attributes (Shankar Dosha):

• Criticism: If difference and non-difference are inherently linked (where there is difference, there is also non-difference, and vice-versa), they would become identical, leading to the defect of confluence (Shankar).
• Rebuttal: Mehta explains that a shared substrate (the object itself) does not mean the attributes themselves become identical. Just as a single visual perception can contain multiple colors without the colors merging, or an object can possess both general and specific qualities without them becoming one, Syadvada holds that difference and non-difference coexist in the same object without merging. The fact that both are perceived indicates they are not identical.

5. Exchange of Attributes (Vyatikar Dosha):

• Criticism: If difference and non-difference can be mutually substituted (i.e., what is different is also identical, and vice-versa), this leads to the defect of attribute exchange (Vyatikar).
• Rebuttal: Similar to the refutation of Shankar Dosha, Mehta argues that Vyatikar does not apply because difference and non-difference are perceived independently. There's no necessity for them to be exchanged. The correct understanding of Syadvada is to perceive difference as difference and non-difference as non-difference, not to interchange them.

6. Indeterminacy and Doubt (Sanshaya Dosha):

• Criticism: If an object is characterized by both difference and non-difference, it becomes impossible to determine any specific attribute, leading to doubt and an inability to gain true knowledge.
• Rebuttal: The author asserts that knowing an object as both different and non-different is not doubt; rather, doubt arises when it's uncertain whether an object is different, non-different, or both. When it's clearly understood that an object possesses both attributes, there is no doubt about specific attributes, and therefore, no impediment to gaining true knowledge.

7. Syadvada and Ekantavada (One-sidedness):

• Criticism: Syadvada, by stating that all attributes are relative, implies the existence of a fundamental, absolute, non-relative entity that binds these relative attributes. This, the critic argues, contradicts Syadvada's own principle that everything is relative.
• Rebuttal: Mehta clarifies that Syadvada accepts unity within diversity. It doesn't deny unity; it simply accepts unity along with diversity. The unifying principle doesn't make Syadvada an absolute one-sided doctrine (Ekantavada) as long as it doesn't negate diversity. The concept of "everything is one because it is existence" is acceptable to Syadvada only if diversity is also acknowledged. Furthermore, the unity that binds diversity is itself dependent on diversity, and vice versa. They are so intertwined that neither can be absolute or completely independent. Therefore, accepting unity doesn't make Syadvada a form of absolute or independent monism.

8. Syadvada as Partially True and Partially False:

• Criticism: If everything is partially true and partially false, then Syadvada itself must be partially true and partially false. How, then, can it lead to accurate knowledge?
• Rebuttal: Syadvada is presented as a lens or perspective for analyzing reality. It's about understanding the multifaceted nature of reality. Syadvada accepts an object as true in the way it is perceived from a particular viewpoint. If Syadvada itself is considered false from an absolute, one-sided perspective, that's acceptable. However, from the perspective of multifaceted reality (anekanta), Syadvada is true. It's about acknowledging what is true from a specific viewpoint and what is false from another, without contradiction.

9. The Last Three Sutras of Saptabhangi are Redundant:

• Criticism: The last three of the seven modes (saptabhangi) of Syadvada are merely combinations of the first two and therefore unnecessary. If combinations are allowed, one could generate infinite modes.
• Rebuttal: The core of Syadvada lies in the two fundamental modes: affirmation (vidhi) and negation (nishedha). The remaining modes are derived from the sequential or simultaneous combination of these. The author acknowledges that while only seven are traditionally emphasized, the essence is in acknowledging both affirmation and negation as equally important for a complete understanding of reality. The fundamental issue is not the number of modes but the recognition of dual aspects.

10. Syadvada's Incompatibility with Kevalgyan (Omniscience):

• Criticism: Syadvada, with its emphasis on relativity, cannot coexist with Kevalgyan, which is considered absolute and complete, requiring no further qualification.
• Rebuttal: Mehta argues that Syadvada and Kevalgyan are not in conflict. Both refer to the same reality. The difference lies in the scope of knowledge: Kevalgyan is direct and absolute, while the knowledge of ordinary beings (chhadmastha) is indirect and based on sensory perception and inference. Kevalgyan's completeness means it's unimpeded and direct, not that it's absolute in the sense of denying the multifaceted nature of reality. Kevalgyan also understands reality in its relative, anekanta aspect, including its aspects of origination, destruction, and permanence. The author even suggests that Kevalgyan itself is subject to temporal changes as it perceives the changing states of reality. Therefore, Kevalgyan is also partly permanent and partly impermanent, aligning with Syadvada.

The book concludes by stating that Syadvada is the foundation of all philosophical debates like difference-identity, existence-non-existence, permanence-impermanence, etc. It is the soul of Jain philosophy, so much so that "Jain philosophy" is often used synonymously with Syadvada or Anekantavada. Jain scholars have diligently worked to establish this principle, and its development is evident in the Jain scriptures.