Syadvada Manjari

This document is the English translation, by F.W. Thomas, of the Syadvādamañjarī, a commentary by Mallisena on Hemacandra's Anya yoga-vyavacchedikā. The translation, published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, is presented as a posthumous work, revised by Professor Thomas until his death in 1956. Edward Conze provides a prefatory note, highlighting the work's value in illuminating Jain philosophical views and medieval Indian philosophical debates, and praising Thomas's scholarship.

The Syadvādamañjarī is structured as a verse-by-verse commentary, and the Table of Contents reveals a systematic critique of various philosophical schools, leading to the exposition of Jainism's core tenets.

Here's a summary of the key themes and philosophical discussions presented in the translated text, chapter by chapter:

I. The Superior Qualities of Sri Vardhamana, the Last Tirthamkara: This chapter begins with an invocation and establishes the omnipotence, omniscience, and impeccability of Lord Mahavira (Vardhamana), the last Tirthankara. Mallisena elaborates on the epithets used to describe Mahavira, such as "infinite knowledge," "failings outgone," "irrefutable tenets," and "worshipful by immortals," contrasting them with the limitations of other philosophical systems and their proponents. The discussion highlights the Jain emphasis on the unique perfections of their Tirthankaras.

II. Sri Vardhamana Has Stated Things as They Really Are: This section focuses on Mahavira's accuracy in describing reality. Mallisena explains that Mahavira's pronouncements are truthful and serve to refute incorrect doctrines. The author expresses his own humble intention to praise these truthful statements, acknowledging his limited expertise.

III. Admonition to the Reader: This chapter offers advice to those who are critical of Mahavira's teachings. Mallisena suggests that even opponents should consider the "true course of method" (logic and reasoning) with an open mind, even if they initially resent the qualities of the Lord. The emphasis is on the benevolent intent of the teacher to impart beneficial knowledge, regardless of the listener's receptivity.

IV. The Vaiseṣika Doctrine of Universality and Particularity: Mallisena begins a critique of rival philosophical schools, starting with the Vaiseṣikas. He challenges their categories of universality (sāmānya) and particularity (viseṣa), arguing that these concepts are inherent in things themselves and not separate entities imposed through relations like "inherence" (samavāya). He criticizes the Vaiseṣika view that these are distinct realities, leading to logical inconsistencies.

V. The Vaiseṣika Doctrine of Eternality and Non-eternality: This chapter continues the critique of the Vaiseṣikas, specifically their views on eternality and non-eternality. Mallisena argues, using the Jain doctrine of Syadvada (the "quodammodo" or "may be" view), that all existents possess both eternal and non-eternal aspects. He refutes the idea that things are simply eternal or simply non-eternal, demonstrating how even seemingly non-eternal objects like a lamp have an eternal substance, and eternal entities like space have aspects of origination and destruction. He also critiques the Vaiseṣika concept of "efficacy" (artha-kriya-karitva).

VI. The Vaiseṣika Doctrine of a World-Creator God: Mallisena directly attacks the Vaiseṣika and Nyāya concept of a world-creating God. He presents the arguments for such a God (e.g., the world is a product, like a pot, and therefore needs a maker) and systematically refutes them. He argues against the God's unity, omnipresence, omniscience, self-dependence, and eternality, highlighting contradictions and logical fallacies in theistic arguments. He emphasizes that the world's diversity is explained by karma and the inherent nature of substances, not by a creator God.

VII. The Vaiseṣika Doctrine of 'Inherence': This section critiques the Vaiseṣika category of 'inherence' (samavāya), which explains the relationship between substance and its qualities. Mallisena argues that if attributes and their bearers are utterly distinct, a third category of inherence is unnecessary and illogical. He challenges the very notion of inherence as a distinct, eternal entity, pointing out the regressus ad infinitum problem and the lack of empirical evidence for it. He proposes that the connection between things is one of non-separate existence.

VIII. The Categories of the Vaiseṣikas: Mallisena targets the Vaiseṣika ontological framework. He criticizes their categories, particularly the concept of 'existence' (sattā) as a separate category and the notion of 'intelligence' (caitanya) being distinct from the self. He also refutes the Vaiseṣika idea of liberation (mokşa) as the annihilation of the self's qualities, presenting the Jain view of liberation as the soul's return to its pure, blissful, and conscious state.

IX. The Vaiseṣika Views About the Size of the Ātman: This chapter addresses the Vaiseṣika concept of the self (ātman). Mallisena argues against the Vaiseṣika idea of the self being omnipresent, asserting that its qualities (like consciousness) are observed only within the body. He challenges the Vaiseṣika notion of the self's size, the body's size, and the self's transformation, arguing for a Jain understanding that is not limited by these restrictive concepts.

X. Criticism of the Naiyāyikas: Mallisena shifts his critique to the Nyāya school, highlighting their emphasis on logical argumentation, disputation, and the elaborate system of categories like sophistry (chala), vagueness (jāti), and censure-situation (nigraha-sthāna). He ridicules these categories as mere intellectual games that distract from true knowledge and reality, calling them "pointless talk" and "delusion teaching."

XI. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Doctrine Enjoining Hiṁsā: This section launches a strong attack on the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school's justification of ritualistic animal sacrifice (hiṁsā). Mallisena argues that hurting living beings, even if ordained by scripture, cannot be a cause of merit. He refutes the Mīmāṁsā arguments based on appeasing deities, satisfying ancestors, and claims of Vedic authority, exposing the contradictions and illogicality in their defense of violence. He champions Jain principles of non-violence and refutes the idea that scriptural injunctions can override fundamental ethical truths.

XII. Kumārila's Theory of Knowledge: Mallisena critiques the Mīmāṁsā philosopher Kumārila's theory of knowledge. He challenges the idea that cognition is merely transcendental (parokşa) and not self-conscious. Mallisena argues that cognition must be self-aware to be valid, refuting Kumārila's arguments based on analogies like an actor not being able to stand on his own shoulders or a sword cutting itself. He asserts that cognition, like a lamp, illuminates itself and its object.

XIII. The Vedanta Doctrine of Brahma as the Sole Reality: This chapter targets the Advaita Vedanta philosophy, which posits Brahma as the sole reality and the world as an illusion (māyā) or ignorance (avidyā). Mallisena critiques the concept of māyā, questioning its reality if it exists and its efficacy if it is non-existent. He highlights the contradiction in Advaita's assertion of non-duality while simultaneously accepting māyā as a cause of the world. He argues that perception itself, which reveals the world, contradicts the idea of its ultimate unreality.

XIV. The Vedanta Theory of the Denotation of Terms: Mallisena engages with the Advaita and other schools' theories on how words denote reality. He argues for a Jain perspective where words denote entities comprising both universal and particular aspects, rejecting views that emphasize either universality alone (as the Mimāṁsakas, Advaitins, and Sāṁkhyas) or particularity alone (as the Buddhists). He critiques the contention that only universals are real or that words denote mere exclusions (apoha).

XV. The Sāṁkhya Doctrines: This chapter criticizes the Sāṁkhya philosophy, particularly its dualism of an inactive Spirit (Puruşa) and an active material Nature (Prakrti). Mallisena exposes contradictions in the Sāṁkhya cosmology and psychology, including the idea of thought being void of object, reason being non-intelligent, and the evolution of the world from Prakrti. He rejects the Sāṁkhya notion of bondage and liberation belonging solely to Prakrti, not Puruşa, and criticizes the unreality of the Puruşa's connection with Prakrti.

XVI. The Buddhist Theory of Cognition: Mallisena addresses two key Buddhist theories of cognition. Firstly, he refutes the Sautrāntika view that the product of cognition is inseparable from cognition itself, arguing that this collapses the distinction between cause and effect, especially in the context of momentary existence. Secondly, he critiques the Yogācāra "thought-only" doctrine, arguing against the notion that external objects are mere mental constructs. He defends the reality of external objects and the necessity of a cause-and-effect relationship.

XVII. The Buddhist Doctrine of Emptiness: This section focuses on the Madhyamika Buddhist doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā). Mallisena argues that this doctrine is self-refuting, as any attempt to demonstrate or prove "emptiness" requires the use of "demonstrants" (pramāṇa), which the Madhyamikas reject. He contends that without demonstrants, their entire system collapses, and that any attempt to employ them contradicts their core tenet of emptiness.

XVIII. The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: Mallisena attacks the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva). He argues that if all existents are momentary and perish instantly, then concepts like karma, enjoyment of deeds, bondage, liberation, and memory become impossible to explain. He highlights the logical inconsistencies that arise from positing a succession of momentary states without a continuous underlying reality.

XIX. The Buddhist Doctrine of Suffusion: This chapter critiques the Buddhist concept of "suffusion" (saṁskāra or väsanā) and "series" (santāna) as explanations for continuity amidst momentariness. Mallisena argues that these concepts are incoherent when analyzed within the Buddhist framework of non-difference, difference, or a combination of both. He proposes that the Jain doctrine of a persistent substance (dravya) with changing states (paryāya) offers a more coherent explanation.

XX. Criticism of the Lokāyatas: Mallisena concludes his critique of other systems by addressing the Lokāyatas (Cārvākas), materialists who champion perception as the sole means of knowledge and deny inference, scripture, and subsequent lives. Mallisena argues that their reliance solely on perception is self-contradictory, as they themselves experience and infer the intentions of others through subtle cues. He exposes the limitations of perception and the necessity of other pramāņas, including inference. He also refutes their materialistic view of consciousness.

XXI. The Main Metaphysical Tenet of Jainism: This chapter marks a turning point, introducing the core Jain metaphysical doctrine of Syadvada, presented through the "seven-nuance-view" (sapta-bhangi). Mallisena explains that reality is characterized by origination (utpāda), duration (dhrauvya), and destruction (vināśa), and that all existents possess infinite attributes. He presents the seven nuances (quodammodo is) as a way to understand this complexity without falling into one-sided, contradictory pronouncements, thus refuting the absolute assertions of other schools.

XXII. The Jain Doctrine of the Infinite Complexity of All Existents: This section elaborates on the Jain principle of anekānta (infinite complexity). Mallisena argues that every existent is imbued with an infinite number of attributes, and any attempt to grasp reality by focusing on only one or a few attributes is incomplete and potentially erroneous. He emphasizes that the Jain approach, through the seven-nuance-view, acknowledges this complexity.

XXIII. The 'Seven-Nuance-View': Mallisena systematically explains the seven nuances (sapta-bhangi) of Syadvada. These are seven possible predications about any given reality: "may be," "may not be," "may be and may not be," "may be unutterable," "may be and may be unutterable," "may not be and may be unutterable," and "may be, may not be, and may be unutterable." He illustrates how these nuances apply to concepts like existence, non-existence, and utterability, demonstrating the nuanced and context-dependent nature of reality.

XXIV. The Combination of Opposites Involves No Contradiction: This chapter defends the Syadvada principle against the accusation of contradiction. Mallisena argues that when opposing attributes like existence and non-existence, or eternal and non-eternal, are understood in relation to different "conditions" or aspects, they do not lead to contradiction. He criticizes those who, adhering to an "unequivocal" view, fear these combinations and fall prey to flawed reasoning.

XXV. The Seven-Nuance-View Applied to Four Philosophical Problems: Mallisena demonstrates the application of the seven-nuance-view to four key philosophical problems: eternality/non-eternality, universality/particularity, utterability/unutterability, and existence/non-existence. He shows how Syadvada can provide a comprehensive and non-contradictory perspective on these issues, contrasting it with the one-sided and flawed views of other schools.

XXVI. Neither Eternality nor Non-Eternality Can Be Maintained: This chapter consolidates the critique of absolute eternality and absolute momentariness, arguing that both positions lead to insurmountable logical problems, particularly concerning practical efficacy and causality. Mallisena reinforces the Jain understanding that entities possess both enduring substance and changing states, a view that avoids the pitfalls of extreme positions. He praises Mahavira's teaching as "victorious and unassailable" because it encompasses all perspectives without partiality.

XXVII. The Assumption of Either Eternality or Non-Eternality Destructive of Religion: Mallisena argues that extreme views on eternality or non-eternality undermine fundamental religious concepts like pleasure, pain, merit, sin, bondage, and liberation. He contends that if things are absolutely eternal, there can be no ethical consequences, and if they are absolutely momentary, there is no continuity for experiencing the results of actions. He shows how these one-sided views are ultimately detrimental to a meaningful spiritual path.

XXVIII. The Jain Doctrine of the Nayas (Methods): This chapter introduces the Jain concept of nayas (Methods or standpoints). Mallisena explains that these are partial perspectives or ways of looking at reality, and that understanding reality requires considering all of them. He categorizes them into "wrong-Methods" (ayathā-naya), "Methods" (naya), and "Demonstration" (pramāņa), emphasizing that Demonstration is the synthesis of all Methods and is characterized by the "quodammodo" perspective. He critiques other schools for their adherence to one-sided Methods and their inability to achieve a holistic understanding.

XXIX. The Varieties of Souls, and Their Number: Mallisena addresses the Jain doctrine of souls (jivas). He refutes the idea of a limited number of souls, arguing that this leads to contradictions like the world becoming empty or liberated souls returning to mundane existence. He champions the Jain view of an infinite number of souls, illustrating the Jain understanding of different levels of soul existence and the inexhaustible nature of living beings.

XXX. The Doctrine of the Syadvāda, All-Comprehensive and Impartial: This chapter celebrates Syadvada as the core of Jain philosophy. Mallisena contrasts the "jealousy" of other schools, which cling to mutually exclusive doctrines, with the impartiality of Jainism, which incorporates all valid perspectives through the "quodammodo" qualification. He emphasizes that Syadvada, by embracing all Nayas without partiality, avoids the contradictions and limitations of other systems, offering a complete and balanced understanding of reality.

XXXI. Praise of the Lord Mahavira: In this concluding section of the main commentary, Mallisena expresses his personal inadequacy to fully describe the profundity of Mahavira's teachings, using metaphors of overleaping oceans and drinking moonbeams to convey the immensity of the subject. He humbly acknowledges his own limitations while glorifying Mahavira's unique capacity for teaching and his ultimate superiority as the true source of knowledge.

XXXII. The Lord Mahavira is the Only Saviour: The final chapter reinforces the supremacy of Mahavira and the Jain path. Mallisena argues that Mahavira, with his "unerring statement" and "unique capacity," is the only true savior capable of uplifting the world from the "blind gloom" of ignorance and delusion caused by the flawed doctrines of other schools. He contrasts the purifying power of Jain principles with the destructive nature of other philosophical systems.

Benediction: The text concludes with a benediction from the author, Mallisena, acknowledging his indebtedness to his teacher, Udayaprabha, and expressing hope that his commentary will benefit sincere seekers of truth. He humbly invites correction for any errors and affirms his devotion to Hemacandra and the Jain tradition. The composition date is given as Saka year 1214 (A.D. 1292).

Overall, the Syadvādamañjarī presents a robust defense of Jain philosophy, systematically engaging with and refuting the core tenets of other major Indian philosophical schools, particularly the Vaiseṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṁsakas, Vedāntins, Sāṁkhyas, and Buddhists. Its central argument revolves around the Jain doctrine of Syadvada, which emphasizes the multifaceted nature of reality and the importance of multiple perspectives for a complete understanding.