Some Remarks On The Pramanyavada Of Jainism - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Some Remarks on The Pramanyavada of Jainism" by Atsushi Uno, presented in English:

Summary of "Some Remarks on The Pramanyavada of Jainism" by Atsushi Uno

This paper by Atsushi Uno delves into the prāmānya-vāda, a significant epistemological topic in Indian philosophy concerning how the truth value of a cognition (its truth or falsity) is determined, both objectively and subjectively. Indian philosophical systems generally agree that truth and falsity are determined either svatah (intrinsically, by its own conditions) or paratah (extrinsically, by additional conditions). The paper explores this concept within Jainism, contrasting it with other major Indian schools.

Key Concepts and Comparisons:

The Problem of Pramāṇya: The core issue is the determination of the validity of knowledge. This concerns how we ascertain if a cognition is true (pramā) and valid (pramāṇa), or false (apramā). The determination can relate to the origination (utpatti) of the cognition or its apprehension (jñapti).
Svatastva vs. Paratastva:
- Svatastva refers to the intrinsic conditions that produce the cognition itself (jñāna-mātrotpadakakāraṇa-samagri) or the apprehension of the cognition (jñānagrāhaka-kāraṇa-sāmagri).
- Paratastva refers to additional necessary conditions that are added to the intrinsic determinants to establish truth or falsity.
Views of Other Schools (as summarized by Madhava and discussed by Uno):
- Mīmāṁsakas: Primarily concerned with the validity of Vedic scriptures, they attribute truth to verbal testimony (śabda or āgama). The paper notes Madhava's summary which attributes truth and falsity svatah (intrinsically) to the Sāṁkhyas, paratah (extrinsically) to the Naiyāyikas, and svatah to the Bauddhas regarding their truth, and paratah regarding their falsity. Uno expresses caution regarding the accuracy of attributed Sāṁkhya and Bauddha views based on extant texts.
- Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas: Generally hold that both truth and falsity are determined paratah (extrinsically). They aim to avoid infinite regress by positing self-valid knowledge.
- Bauddhas (Saugatas): Madhava attributes svatah determination of truth to them. Uno finds this difficult to reconcile with known Buddhist tenets, suggesting it might be a peculiar school or linked to anityatva (impermanence).
- Sāṁkhyas: Madhava attributes svatah determination for both truth and falsity. Uno notes this view is not clearly found in extant Sāṁkhya texts.
Jain Perspective:
- Pramāṇa as True Knowledge: Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Jainas regard pramāṇa as true knowledge possessing subjective cognitive function or faculty. It encompasses both the resultant cognition and the process itself.
- Definition of Truth and Falsity: According to Jaina scholar Devasūri (11th-12th century), truth (prāmāṇya) is the consistency of cognition with its object, and falsity (apramāṇya) is inconsistency. Importantly, this consistency is judged in relation to objects other than the self. A cognition is always true in relation to itself; falsity arises in relation to external objects.
- Results of Pramāṇa: Devasūri distinguishes between immediate results (annihilation of ignorance, determination of self and others) and mediated results (judgments of acquisition, abandonment, and indifference).
- Non-Absolutism (Syādvāda): The result of pramāṇa is neither completely identical nor entirely different from the pramāṇa itself, reflecting the Jain doctrine of non-absolutism.
- Determination of Truth Value in Jainism:
  - Origination (Utpatti): Truth and falsity in origination are determined paratah (extrinsically).
  - Apprehension (Jñapti): Truth and falsity in apprehension can be determined svatah (intrinsically) or paratah (extrinsically).
- Internal vs. External Determination:
  - Internal Determination: For well-acquainted objects (through repeated experience, abhyasa), truth is ascertained internally. For example, recognizing one's own palm requires no external means; it is known through internal cognition.
  - External Determination: For unacquainted objects, the first cognition is followed by volitional action (pravṛtti), leading to a second cognition. The truth of the first cognition is confirmed by the second confirmatory cognition (saṁvādaka-jñāna) or by the cognition of pragmatic consequences (arthakriyā-jñāna). The truth of these confirmatory cognitions is accepted by Jains without further verification, thus avoiding infinite regress. External determination relies on the presence of positive qualities (guṇa) for truth and deficiencies (doṣa) for falsity.
Development of the Jaina Theory:
- Prabhācandra's Three-Fold Division: While earlier treatises focused on utpatti and jñapti, Prabhācandra (10th-11th century) in his works Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa (PKM) and Nyāyakumudacandra (NKC) introduced a third aspect: svakārya (the result of pramāṇa). This includes the volitional actions (pravṛtti, nivṛtti, upekṣā) which are seen as results. The paper highlights that pravṛtti can have a dual role: to determine truth value (in jñapti) and to be determined by truth value (in svakārya).
- Anantavirya's Two-Fold Division: Anantavirya (12th century), in his commentary Prameyaratnamālā, proposed a two-fold division: utpatti and svakārya. This svakārya encompasses the determination of the object (viṣaya-paricchitti) and subsequent responses like pravṛtti. Uno suggests this might be a more faithful interpretation of the original Pramāṇamimāṁsā.
- Self-Evident Knowledge: Similar to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Jainas posit certain cognitions that are apprehended at once, without needing further confirmation, to avoid infinite regress. These are often cognitions of well-acquainted objects.
- Influence of Buddhist Thought: The idea that apprehension (jñapti) is not always fixed (i.e., it can be determined internally or externally based on object familiarity) is a view held among Jains. Uno suggests this concept might have been influenced by Buddhist works like Tattvasamgraha and its commentary Pañjikā, which argue against fixed determinations and lean towards an aniyama (unrestricted) nature of truth determination. This aligns with the Jain view, and later Navya-Nyāya scholars also adopted similar stances.

Peculiarities of the Jaina Theory:

Three-Fold Division: Prabhācandra's inclusion of svakārya alongside utpatti and jñapti adds a distinct dimension by analyzing the results of pramāṇa.
Self-Validity: The Jain acceptance of self-evident cognitions, akin to Navya-Nyāya, addresses the problem of infinite regress.
Context-Dependent Apprehension: The notion that apprehension is not fixed but depends on the object's familiarity (abhyāsa) and can be determined internally or externally is a key characteristic, possibly influenced by Buddhist epistemology.

In essence, Uno's paper provides a detailed examination of the Jaina prāmāṇya-vāda, highlighting its unique definitions of truth and falsity, its nuanced approach to the determination of validity across different stages of cognition, and its engagement with comparative epistemological theories in Indian philosophy.