Some Concepts Underlying Jain Logic And Philosophy

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Some Concepts Underlying Jain Logic and Philosophy" by Dr. S. S. Barlingay:

The article explores the foundational concepts of Jain logic and philosophy, aiming to clarify their contribution to the understanding of knowledge and reality. The author posits that four key terms – Anekānta, Naya, Syāt, and Bhanga – encapsulate these core ideas. While these concepts are interconnected, the author notes that Jain philosophers sometimes treat them as nearly synonymous, potentially overlooking subtle distinctions.

The author begins by stating that Jain logic, like other Indian logical systems, is rooted in metaphysical presuppositions. Unlike Advaita Vedanta's view of a singular, undifferentiated Reality, Jainism asserts that Reality is multifarious. Every object of knowledge possesses a multitude of natures, expressible through various compatible predicates. This inherent multiplicity means that any assertion about an object is always tied to a specific predicate, leading to the possibility of numerous judgments. This foundational principle, known as Anekāntavāda (Pluralism of Predication), suggests that a thing appears different when viewed from different perspectives.

Nayavāda is presented as a doctrine complementary to Anekāntavāda and is considered broader than just epistemology. "Naya" literally means a point of vision or a perspective. Due to the manifold nature of objects and the limited viewpoint of the knower, knowledge acquired is always partial. Jainism believes that different philosophical systems arise from these partial viewpoints. While the text mentions seven main types of Nayas, it acknowledges inconsistencies in their descriptions across different Jain texts. It then elaborates on some of these Nayas:

• Dravyanaya: Emphasizes the substantive character of knowledge, ignoring the attributive.
• Paryāyanaya: Focuses on the attributive character of knowledge.
• Naigamanaya: Describes a particular thing in terms of something general.
• Sangrahanaya: Considers the general nature of a thing.
• Vyavahāranaya: Emphasizes the particular character of a thing.
• Rjusūtranaya: Accepts what is immediately perceived, ignoring past or future knowledge.
• Sabdanaya: Highlights the fragmentary nature of knowledge expressed through symbolic language. This category is further sub-divided by Umaswati into Samprata, Samabhirudba, and Evambhūta.

The article then delves into Syādvāda. The author explains that "Syāt" means "possibly." He distinguishes between two uses of "possibly": one that opposes the actual (potential existence) and another where the actual implies the possible (partial truth in partial knowledge). Jain logic values partial knowledge not in terms of strict truth/falsity but in terms of possibility. This "possibility" refers to our knowledge of things, not the things themselves, and can be expressed affirmatively or negatively.

The core of Syādvāda, as explained, lies in the compatibility of seemingly contradictory propositions when qualified by "possibly." For example, "possibly p" and "possibly not-p" can coexist. This contrasts with "X is possible" and "X is not possible," which are incompatible. Jain logic focuses on this latter type of possibility, where the scope of "p" is limited, but the scope of "possibly" is not.

The author then discusses the epistemological aspect of asserting these possibilities. The assertion of possibility itself is subject to modality. This leads to the consideration of the possibility and impossibility of an assertion, and further to the dichotomy of "is" and "is not" concerning assertibility. Jain logic, therefore, deals with possibility (and its opposite) and assertibility (and its opposite) as its primary values/modalities.

The text emphasizes that the ultimate determining modality in Jain logic is "possibility." The author argues that Syādvāda is not an attempt at Many-Valued Logic in the modern sense. Instead, it aims to unify different dichotomies (assertion vs. negation, describability vs. non-describability) under the single modality of "possible."

Finally, the concept of Bhanga is introduced. While "Bhanga" literally means breaking and is often a symbol of incompatibility, the author contends that "Saptabhangi" (sevenfold predication) in Syādvāda actually represents sevenfold compatibilities. He suggests that perhaps at an earlier stage, Jain logicians considered incompatibilities, but the developed Syādvāda emphasizes compatibility through the modality of "possibility."

The article concludes by reiterating that the concept of "Avaktavya" (indescribable) might hint at a notion of indecision, potentially implying three values: truth, false, and indecisive. However, the presence of "Syāt" resolves incompatibilities and brings all alternatives under the umbrella of "possible." The author states that Syādvāda, as it stands, does not appear to be a theory of Many-Valued Logic, but rather a framework where various possibilities, including assertion and negation, are rendered compatible through the overarching modality of "possibility." The sevenfold predications (Syāt asti, Syāt nasti, Syāt Asti-nasti, Syāt avaktavya, Syāt Asti avaktavya, Syāt nasti avaktavya, Syāt astinasti avaktavya) are all governed by this modality.