Some Amphibious Expressions In Umaswati

This paper, "Some Amphibious Expressions in Umāsvati" by Dr. M. P. Marathe, critically examines the use of certain terms by the Jain philosopher Umāsvāti in his seminal work, the Tattvārthādhigamasutra (TAS) and its commentary. The author argues that Umāsvāti employs several key terms in an "amphibious" or equivocal manner, leading to ambiguities and a lack of clear demarcation in their significances.

The paper focuses on two primary sets of these ambiguous terms:

Set 1: Artha, Tattva, and Padārtha

• Tattva and Artha: Marathe contends that Umāsvāti treats "Tattva" (truth, reality, that which is the case) and "Artha" (object, meaning, purpose) as loosely interchangeable, bordering on synonymous. He observes that Umāsvāti defines Samyakdarśana (right perception) as acceptance of "Tattvas" or "Arthas," and then later elaborates that these "Tattvas" are enumerated as "seven kinds of objects" (Arthas).
  • Marathe's critique is that while there can be overlap, these terms are not necessarily identical. A "fact" (like "it is raining") can be a Tattva but not necessarily an object. Conversely, a proposition might be considered an object but not a fact. Equating them suggests a potentially problematic co-extensivity between the sets of Tattvas and Arthas.
• Tattva and Padārtha: Umāsvāti further equates "Tattvas" with "Padārthas" (categories of existence, meaning of a word). Marathe argues this is an error. While both can be enumerated, their conceptual underpinnings differ.
  • The consideration of "Tattvas" may not necessarily require communicative language or a pre-existing conceptual scheme. They can be viewed as the core topics of philosophical discussion.
  • "Padārthas," on the other hand, inherently presuppose language and communication, and therefore, concepts and their interrelations. The author points out that Umāsvāti's equating them based on their enumerative nature is a weak justification.
  • Furthermore, Marathe questions the assumption of co-extensivity between Tattvas and Padārthas, highlighting that the number of terms used in language doesn't necessarily correspond to the number of philosophical topics. The conflation of these terms, and subsequently Arthas with Padārthas, is seen as a significant weakness.

Set 2: Dravya and Sat

• Jiva and other Tattvas as Dravyas: Umāsvāti identifies "Jiva" (soul) and other "Tattvas" (like Ajivas: Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa, Pudgala) as "Dravyas" (substances, entities).
  • Marathe notes an inconsistency where Umāsvāti enumerates seven Tattvas in Chapter 1 but then refers to five "Dravyas" (Jiva and the four Ajivas) in Chapter 5. The author suggests Umāsvāti might be conflating "Āstikāyas" (fundamental categories) with "Dravyas."
• Dravya and Bhavya: Umāsvāti's commentary suggests that "Dravya" is that which "acquires or can be acquired" (Bhavya). Marathe questions if this definition applies to Tattvas, and if so, whether it implies Tattvas are also substances that acquire or are acquirable. This further blurs the lines between these concepts.
• Dravya and Sat: The paper delves into Umāsvāti's definitions of "Dravya" and "Sat" (existent being).
  • One definition states "Dravya is that which has Gunas (qualities) and Paryāyas (modifications)."
  • Another states "Sat is the definition of Dravya."
  • Marathe argues that equating "Dravya" with "Sat" (existent) is problematic. Not everything existent is a Dravya (e.g., qualities themselves are not considered Dravyas in the same way). The term "exists" can be used in various senses, not all of which have ontological implications. The distinction between substantive usage (grammatical subject) and substantial import (ontological reality) is crucial here, and Umāsvāti's conflation fails to account for it.
  • The definition of "Sat" as that which is "generated, undergoes change, and yet retains its unity or continuity" (utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat) is also examined. If Sat and Dravya are the same, then all Dravyas should exhibit these features. However, Umāsvāti himself states that all Dravyas except Jiva are eternal (Nityadravya). This creates a contradiction, as eternal substances don't typically undergo "generation" (utpāda). The argument that utpāda might refer to the potential to produce others is dismissed as speculative.
  • The paper also touches upon the idea that utpāda, vyaya, and dhrauvya in relation to Sat might correspond to paryāyas and gunas in relation to Dravya. While this reconciles the definitions, it doesn't eliminate the ambiguity. The author reiterates the difficulty in accepting the co-extensivity of Sat and Dravya, especially as later commentators like Pujyapāda seem to further equate them.

Methodological Weakness

Finally, Marathe points to a general methodological weakness in Umāsvāti's approach. In the introduction (Chapter 1), Umāsvāti states his intention to explain Tattvas, Arthas, or Padārthas "definitionally" (lakṣaṇataḥ) and "stipulatively" (vidhānataḥ). However, in Chapter 5, when discussing Dharma and other entities, he only mentions explaining their nature "definitionally."

• Marathe argues that if these two methods are to be understood conjunctively (both must apply), then entities explained only definitionally might not qualify as Tattvas.
• If understood disjunctively (either one applies), the grounds for considering them as Tattvas, Arthas, or Dravyas become shaky, as different criteria might lead to different kinds of entities.
• Even the distinction between general and specific definitions, proposed by Pujyapāda, doesn't fully resolve the issue of grouping diverse entities under the same umbrella terms without a clear basis. The mixing of ontological and non-ontological considerations is seen as a fundamental problem.

In conclusion, Dr. Marathe's paper systematically identifies several instances where Umāsvāti's use of key philosophical terms like Artha, Tattva, Padārtha, Dravya, and Sat is ambiguous and lacks precise definition. This ambiguity, the author argues, creates significant interpretive challenges and highlights "weak links" in Umāsvāti's philosophical framework, potentially stemming from the early stages of Jain philosophical discourse where conceptual boundaries were not yet firmly established.