Smruti Pramanya - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text on "Smruti Pramanya" (The Authority of Memory), written by Sukhlal Sanghavi:

The text discusses the concept of Smruti (memory) and its validity as a source of knowledge (Pramana) within different philosophical traditions. The central theme is the divergence between Jain and non-Jain (especially Vedic and Buddhist) views on whether memory can be considered a valid Pramana.

Two Main Traditions:

Jain Tradition: The Jain tradition considers memory as a valid Pramana. They describe it as a form of indirect knowledge (Puroksha).
Non-Jain Traditions: Vedic, Buddhist, and other Indian philosophical schools generally do not consider memory as a Pramana. While they don't label it as false knowledge (mithya-jnana), they refrain from using the term Pramana for it.

Roots of the Disagreement:

The disagreement stems from the historical context of Dharmaśāstra (religious law) within the Vedic tradition.

Vedic Perspective: The Vedic tradition primarily considers Śruti (revealed texts like the Vedas) as authoritative. Smṛti texts (like those of Manu) are also considered authoritative, but their authority is dependent on their connection to Śruti. If a Smṛti aligns with Śruti or doesn't contradict it, it's valid. Its authority is not independent.
Mīmāṁsā's Influence: The Mīmāṁsā school, deeply involved in interpreting Dharmaśāstra, extended this principle. Even when considering memory as a general form of knowledge beyond just Dharmaśāstra, they argued that memory is not an independent Pramana. Its validity relies on the validity of the prior experience it recalls. Therefore, it's not considered a primary Pramana.
Impact on Other Vedic Schools: This Mīmāṁsā philosophical decision is believed to have influenced other Vedic schools like Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, and Yoga. Consequently, despite offering different arguments, these schools agree in not using the term Pramana for memory.

Arguments of Non-Jain Schools Against Memory as Pramana:

The text outlines various arguments put forth by non-Jain philosophers:

Mīmāṁsakas (like Kumāril Bhatta): Memory is not a Pramana because it only presents subjects already known through experience. It is grīhita-grāhi (it grasps what is already grasped) and doesn't reveal any new meaning.
Vaiśeṣikas (like Śrīdhara): Śrīdhara, following Mīmāṁsā, also considers memory outside the purview of Pramana based on the grīhita-grāhi argument.
Nyāya (like Jayanta and Vācaspati Miśra):
- Jayanta: Argues memory is not a Pramana because it arises independently of the subject matter (anartha-ja). However, Śrīdhara refutes this argument.
- Vācaspati Miśra: States that common societal practice (loka-vyavahāra) does not support treating memory as Pramana, so it shouldn't be called Pramā. When defining Pramā, they only consider knowledge other than memory.
Udayanācārya: Refuting earlier Nyaya arguments, Udayanācārya ultimately agrees with Vācaspati Miśra. He argues that experience (anubhava) alone should be considered a Pramana because it is independent, while memory is dependent on experience. The reason for this is the convention of worldly usage.

Buddhist Perspective:

The Buddhist tradition also does not consider memory a Pramana. Their reasoning is similar to the Mīmāṁsakas, stating memory is grīhita-grāhi.
However, the text notes that unlike other Vedic schools, the Buddhist argument isn't influenced by Dharmaśāstra or the authority of the Vedas (since Buddhism doesn't accept Vedic authority).
Instead, Buddhism generally doesn't consider vikalpa-jnana (conceptual knowledge) as Pramana. Since memory is a form of conceptualization, its validity as a Pramana doesn't even arise for them.

The Jain Counter-Argument:

Rejection of Non-Jain Arguments: Jain logicians refute all the arguments presented by other schools, including grīhita-grāhi, anartha-jatva (arising without a specific object), and loka-vyavahara (lack of societal convention).
Jain Basis for Memory as Pramana: Jain logicians assert that just as perception (pratyaksha) and other forms of knowledge are called Pramana because they are saṁvādi (correspond to reality, valid), memory should also be considered a Pramana for the same reason – its correspondence with reality.
No Disagreement Among Jains: There is no difference of opinion among Jain scholars on this matter. Acharya Hemachandra, for instance, follows the preceding Jain tradition on the authority of memory.
Underlying Reality vs. Terminology: The text concludes that while there's no real difference in understanding the nature of memory (its validity in reflecting reality is accepted), the disagreement is solely on whether to use the term Pramā for it.

In essence, the text highlights a philosophical divide: Jainism asserts memory's inherent validity as a source of knowledge, independent of prior pronouncements, while most non-Jain traditions, influenced by the Vedic emphasis on independent authority and scriptural tradition, relegate memory to a dependent or non-authoritative status.