Slokavartika A Study

This is a comprehensive summary of K. K. Dixit's "Slokavārtika: A Study," based on the provided text.

Book Title: Slokavārtika: A Study Author: K. K. Dixit Publisher: L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad Publication Date: January 1983

Overview:

"Slokavārtika: A Study" by K. K. Dixit is a critical and analytical summary of Kumarila Bhatta's Ślokavārttika, a seminal work in the Mimāṁsā school of Indian philosophy. The study aims to correct the common misconception that Mimāṁsā is solely focused on rituals and has little to contribute to broader Indian philosophical discourse. Dixit argues that Mimāṁsā, particularly through the works of Kumarila and Prabhakara, has made significant and original contributions to Indian philosophy.

The book is structured to provide a detailed examination of the Ślokavārttika, focusing on its core philosophical arguments. The author's primary goal is to present the complex ideas and terminology of the text in a clear and understandable manner, while also offering a critique of its weaknesses.

Key Themes and Chapters:

The study is divided into five main chapters, each addressing a significant area of Kumarila's Ślokavārttika:

• Chapter I: Introduction:

  • Dixit establishes the philosophical importance of the Mimāṁsā school, placing it alongside the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Dinnāga-Dharmakirti Buddhist schools as crucial intellectual forces between 300-1000 AD.
  • He highlights Mimāṁsā's commitment to the Vedas as an authorless, infallible source of knowledge, particularly for religious matters. This commitment drives their intense focus on the problem of verbal testimony (śabda) and other means of valid cognition (pramāņas).
  • The Ślokavārttika is identified as Kumarila's magnum opus, covering crucial problems in logic, ontology, and epistemology.

• Chapter II: Verbal Testimony (Śabda):

  • This chapter delves into Kumarila's analysis of verbal testimony, exploring both its ontological and logical dimensions.
  • Ontological Level: Kumarila argues for the eternality and ubiquity of words, positing an inherent capacity in words to denote their meanings. He refutes the Buddhist theory of sphoṭavāda, which views words as impartite entities manifested by letters, asserting that letters are the real constituents of words.
  • Logical Level: Kumarila vehemently rejects the idea that understanding verbal testimony is a form of inference. He emphasizes the unique nature of grasping sentence meaning, arguing it's not reducible to inference.
  • Key Concepts Discussed:
    • Codanāsūtra: Discusses the intrinsic validity of cognition and how authorless texts like the Vedas are inherently valid.
    • Śabdapariccheda: Argues against treating verbal testimony as inference, highlighting the unique relation between words and meaning.
    • Citrākṣepavāda: Critiques the Buddhist view of apoha (conceptual exclusion) as the basis of word meaning.
    • Sphoṭavāda: Refutes the Buddhist theory of sphoṭa, defending the view that words are composed of letters.
    • Ākṛtivāda: Discusses the nature of universals as the referents of words.
    • Sambandhākṣepaparibāra: Argues against conventional or divine establishment of word-meaning relationships, asserting their eternal and natural character.
    • Śabdaniṭyatādhikaraṇa & Vākyādhikaraṇa: Defends the eternality of words and sentences.

• Chapter III: Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony:

  • This chapter examines Kumarila's treatment of the remaining five pramāņas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), implication (arthāpatti), and absence (abhāva).
  • Dixit highlights that Kumarila's treatment in this area is more "sober" and grounded, despite its connections to his more "fantastic" positions on verbal testimony.
  • Key Topics:
    • Validity of Cognition: Explores Kumarila's stance on intrinsic validity (all cognition is valid unless proven otherwise) versus extrinsic validity.
    • Means and Resultant of Cognition: Discusses how Kumarila, following Nyāya, views the steps in cognition as means to their results.
    • Perception (Pratyakṣa):
      • Denies suprasensuous perception, arguing all perception is sense-bound and of present objects.
      • Defends indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) as the initial, "nebulous" stage of perception, distinct from determinate perception (savikalpaka).
      • Argues that the object of perception is unitary despite multiple sense organs, and that words are not falsely superimposed on things.
    • Inference (Anumāna):
      • Analyzes the core components of inference: vyāpti (invariable concomitance), dṛṣṭānta (example), pakṣadharmatā (feature of the subject), and pakṣa (thesis).
      • Emphasizes the causal basis of vyāpti.
      • Critiques Buddhist views on inference, particularly the idea that inference deals only with fictitious universals.
    • Analogy (Upamāna): Defends analogy as an independent pramāṇa, distinguishing it from verbal testimony and perception-memory. He defines similarity based on shared component parts and the concept of universals.
    • Implication (Arthāpatti): Treats implication as a distinct means of cognition, often used to posit capacities (like causal powers) that are not directly observable. He argues it's distinct from inference, especially when dealing with supersensuous entities.
    • Absence (Abhāva): Argues that absence is a real entity and is cognized through a specific means of cognition called "absence" itself, which is the non-production of other pramāṇas.

• Chapter IV: Refutation of Idealism:

  • This substantial chapter details Kumarila's comprehensive critique of Buddhist idealism, particularly the Yogācāra and Madhyamika schools.
  • Idealism is presented as being defended in two ways: by offering an inference and by investigating perception.
  • Key Arguments:
    • Critique of the Idealist Inference: The core idealist argument (cognition of the external world is false because it's cognition, like dream-cognition) is systematically dismantled. Kumārila challenges the meaning of "false" and "cognition," and the nature of the corroborative instance.
    • Critique of the Idealist Critique of Perception: Kumarila refutes the idealist claim that cognition is "formed" by itself or cognizes itself, arguing that such views are either self-contradictory or lead to an infinite regress. He asserts that external objects are necessary for perception and that cognition itself is not the object of knowledge.
    • On Debate: Kumarila argues that idealists, by denying the reality of all propositions, forfeit the right to engage in debate, as debate presupposes the possibility of distinguishing truth from falsity.

• Chapter V: Doctrine of Soul (Ātmavāda):

  • This chapter explores Kumarila's defense of the existence and nature of the soul, which he sees as essential for the validity of Vedic injunctions, especially those concerning future rebirths.
  • He refutes materialist and Buddhist (momentarist) views of consciousness.
  • Key Arguments:
    • The soul is an eternal, conscious, ubiquitous entity, distinct from the body and momentary cognitions.
    • The soul acts as the agent (kartṛ) in actions and the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) of their fruits, providing analogies for how a changeless entity can be the substratum of changing states.
    • He analyzes the concept of "I" (aham) as referring to the soul, the ultimate knower.

Methodology and Contribution:

Dixit's study is a thorough analysis, presenting Kumarila's arguments systematically and critically. He clarifies the technical philosophical vocabulary and engages with the logical structure of Kumarila's reasoning. By dissecting the Ślokavārttika in this manner, Dixit demonstrates the depth and breadth of Kumarila's philosophical project, showcasing his engagement with contemporary rival schools and his significant contributions to the development of Indian epistemology and ontology. The book serves as an essential guide for students and scholars of Indian philosophy seeking to understand this complex and influential text.