Siddhasen Divakarjina Kevalgyan Darshan Angena Mantavya Vishe Vicharna

This document, titled "Siddhasen Divakarjina Kevalgyan Darshan Angena Mantavya Vishe Vicharna" (Discussion on the Opinions of Siddhasen Divakarji Regarding Kevalgyan and Kevaldarshan) by Muni Trailokyamandanvijay, explores the complex philosophical debate within Jainism concerning the nature of omniscience (kevalgyan) and omniscient perception (kevaldarshan).

The article begins by defining 'kevalgyan' as the highest spiritual stage where the soul possesses perfect knowledge of all objects and their attributes across all three times (past, present, future). This knowledge is exercised in two ways: knowing (bodh-kriya) and seeing (sakshatkar-kriya), which correspond to kevalgyan and kevaldarshan respectively, according to Jain philosophy.

The core of the discussion revolves around a central question debated among Jain acharyas: Are kevalgyan and kevaldarshan the same attribute with two names, or are they distinct attributes? Furthermore, if they are distinct, do they occur simultaneously or sequentially?

Three main viewpoints emerge:

1. Kramvad (Sequentialism): Adherents of this view, like Jinbhadra Gani Kshamashraman, believe that kevalgyan and kevaldarshan are distinct and manifest sequentially.
2. Yugpadvad (Simultaneity): Acharyas like Mallavadi, while considering them distinct, believe they occur simultaneously.
3. Abhedvad (Non-dualism): Propounded by Siddhasen Divakarji, this view considers kevalgyan and kevaldarshan to be entirely non-distinct.

The article then delves into a detailed debate, primarily referencing the work Vishesh-navuti, between Abhedvadis and Kramvadis.

• Abhedvadis argue that if all other knowledge (mati, shrut, etc.) ceases with the attainment of kevalgyan, then kevaldarshan, which is also limited in scope compared to kevalgyan, should also cease. They question how kevaldarshan could exist if it's distinct.
• Kramvadis counter by arguing that if limited knowledge ceases, then limited perception should also cease. They question why omniscient perception (kevaldarshan) wouldn't manifest if limited perceptions cease. They further argue that kevaldarshan's scope is limited compared to kevalgyan, and that kevalins perceive all perceivable objects with kevaldarshan. They also point out that the assumption of complete absence of other knowledge is incorrect, as the knowledge itself remains, it's just not actively used. They highlight the distinction between the knowledge-generating power (gyanatmak vikas) and the actual act of knowing (bodh-kriya), and the act of seeing (sakshatkar-kriya).

The debate continues on the nature of kevaldarshan as a kshayik (absolutely destructible) state, with Kramvadis questioning where kevaldarshan would reside if not in a kshayopashamik (partially destructible/suppressible) state, which is absent in kevalins. Abhedvadis retort that kevaldarshan is not a separate entity, but rather a different name for the same act as kevalgyan.

However, Kramvadis pose challenges to Abhedvad:

1. Why would scriptures describe separate covering karmas (avarana karmas) and separate names if they are the same?
2. Scriptures mention Siddhas as possessing both form-infused (sakara) and formless (nirakara) attributes. If kevalgyan is sakara, then how can Siddhas have a nirakara state if kevaldarshan (which would be the nirakara aspect) is not distinct?
3. Knowing objects in their true form is knowledge (gyan), while seeing them generally is perception (darshan). How can these two distinct actions be considered one?

The article then transitions to the debate between Yugpadvadis and Kramvadis, referencing the same texts.

• Yugpadvadis argue that if kevalgyan and kevaldarshan are sequential, they would be utpatti-vinashi (originating and perishing), contradicting scriptures that describe them as eternal. They also point out that this sequentiality would render the destruction of their covering karmas meaningless, as they would only last for a moment, leading to the absurd conclusion of uncaused perishing. They further argue that if one is absent when the other is present, the kevalin would never be fully omniscient and omnipercipient.
• Kramvadis use the analogy of mati and shrut knowledge, which arise sequentially and last for a limited duration (antarmuhurta). They argue that just as these limited knowledges don't last simultaneously, the same logic applies to kevalgyan and kevaldarshan if they are sequential. They also address the "defects" raised by Yugpadvadis by emphasizing that while the use (upayoga) of knowledge might be sequential, the power or potential remains. They liken this to a four-armed being who can only use one arm at a time but possesses all four powers.

The article then critically examines the historical interpretations of Siddhasen Divakarji's views. While many prominent acharyas, including Abhaydev Suri, Hemchandracharya, and Yashovijayji, identify Siddhasen Divakarji as an Abhedvadi (non-dualist), there is evidence, particularly from Haribhadra Suri, that suggests Divakarji might have been a Yugpadvadi (simultaneist). This discrepancy is explored, with the possibility that Divakarji's view was a refined form of Yugpadvad, later termed Bhedabhedvad (dual-non-dualism), which emphasizes that kevalgyan and kevaldarshan are simultaneously present, distinct in their form of action but identical in their essence, power, and the resultant knowledge.

The author then analyzes verses from the Sanmatitark and its commentaries to understand Divakarji's true stance. The analysis suggests that Divakarji's concept might be closer to Bhedabhedvad, where kevalgyan and kevaldarshan are seen as two distinct "actions" arising from the same soul-power and leading to a single, unified omniscient consciousness. This is contrasted with the view of "Darshan-Samucchedvad" (perceptual annihilation), which denies the existence of kevaldarshan altogether or equates it completely with kevalgyan.

The author concludes that Divakarji's view is a sophisticated synthesis that reconciles the seemingly contradictory scriptural statements and logical arguments. He argues that labeling Divakarji as a pure "Abhedvadi" might be an oversimplification, and his "Bhedabhedvad" is a more accurate representation. This perspective is also seen as a refinement of Yugpadvad, not in opposition to it. The article suggests that later commentators, like Abhaydev Suri, might have mislabeled Divakarji's nuanced view as "Abhedvad," contributing to historical confusion.

The article emphasizes that accepting Bhedabhedvad resolves many logical inconsistencies and aligns with the idea that the soul's innate nature is to be engrossed in a single state of consciousness. It suggests that Divakarji's philosophy represents a highly reasoned and balanced approach to understanding the ultimate state of omniscience in Jainism.

In essence, the article presents a detailed analysis of the philosophical distinctions and debates surrounding kevalgyan and kevaldarshan within Jainism, aiming to clarify the unique contribution and position of Siddhasen Divakarji.