Shrutgyan Evam Matigyan Ek Vivechan

Here is a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text "Shrutgyan evam Matigyan ek Vivechan" by Hemlata Boliya:

The article "Shrutgyan evam Matigyan: Ek Vivechan" by Dr. Hemlata Boliya delves into the complex and debated relationship between Matigyan (sensory/inferential knowledge) and Shrutgyan (scriptural/learned knowledge) within Jain philosophy.

The author begins by highlighting the lack of consensus among Jain philosophers regarding the distinction between these two types of knowledge, much like the differing views on the relationship between words and inference in other philosophical traditions. Both Matigyan and Shrutgyan are presented as cause-and-effect related, co-existing within the soul, and being indirect forms of knowledge. Their nature is so intermingled that drawing a clear dividing line is challenging.

A key point of contention is the definition of Shrutgyan by Umaswati in his Tattvartha Sutra: "Shrutam matipoorvakam" (Shrutgyan follows Matigyan). Based on this, some Jain scholars believe Shrutgyan is merely a subtype of Matigyan, not an independent form of knowledge. Siddhasen is cited as going so far as to consider it futile to differentiate Shrutgyan from Matigyan. This raises the central question of whether Shrutgyan is an independent knowledge or a part of Matigyan, a matter that has been a subject of considerable thought.

To understand this debate, the article first clarifies the nature of each:

Matigyan (Sensory/Inferential Knowledge): Generally, Matigyan refers to knowledge gained through intellect. The word "mati" itself is derived from the root "man" meaning mind, implying knowledge gained through reasoning and intellect. Jain philosophers offer specific definitions. Acharya Griddhpichh, in the Tattvartha Sutra, considers terms like "mati," "smriti," "sanjna," "chinta," and "abhinibodh" as synonyms, differing only in their inherent nature. He further categorizes Matigyan into four types: Avagrah (reception), Eeha (investigation), Avay (determination), and Dharana (retention). However, the author notes that this definition primarily outlines the types and synonyms rather than the core essence of Matigyan.

The author of the Panchasangraha defines Matigyan as the intellect that engages with subjects like poison, machinery, puzzles, cages, and bindings without external instruction. Another philosophical perspective suggests Matigyan is the knowledge of an object that arises through the mind and the senses, or any knowledge acquired through sensory organs other than the ear.

Shrutgyan (Scriptural/Learned Knowledge): The literal meaning of "Shrut" is "heard" or "listening," stemming from the Sanskrit root "shr." Pujyapada defines it as that through which an object is apprehended or simply the act of hearing, which occurs upon the subsidence of the karmic obstruction to scriptural knowledge.

However, the term "Shrut" in Jainism is specifically used for a particular type of knowledge. Even though its etymological meaning relates to hearing, the article clarifies that "Shrutgyan" is not merely passively heard sounds. The author discusses the apparent conflict when considering the well-known "word-based" Twelve Limbs of Jain scripture (Dvadashanga Shrut) as Shrutgyan, as it's unclear whether "Shrut" refers to the knowledge itself or the words conveying it.

The text explains that Jain philosophers accept the word-based aspect of "Shrut" metaphorically. This is supported by the fact that the sutrakara details the various types of words if the intention was solely knowledge derived from them. Therefore, while the primary meaning of Shrut for Jain philosophers is knowledge, they also accept its linguistic form as valid.

Historically, before Umaswati, knowledge gained through hearing words was called Shrutgyan, with words being the primary cause. However, Umaswati's definition, "Shrutam matipoorvakam," shifted the emphasis. The article notes that most Jain scholars after Umaswati, with the exception of Nemichandra Siddhantika, agree that Shrutgyan follows Matigyan. However, Umaswati's definition alone doesn't fully illuminate Shrutgyan's nature, leading to separate definitions by various scholars.

Distinguishing Shrutgyan and Matigyan: The article then presents differing views on how to differentiate the two:

• Jainbhadragani: Defines "Bhava Shrut" as knowledge gained through senses and mind, aligned with words and capable of expressing a specific meaning. Matigyan, in contrast, arises through senses and mind but is not necessarily word-aligned.
• Akalanka: Agrees with Jainbhadragani but places greater emphasis on words. He states that mental processes like Mati, Smriti, and Chinta occurring before word formulation are Matigyan, and the same processes after word formulation become Shrutgyan. Akalanka integrates other pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge) like Upamana, Arthapatti, Abhav, Sambhav, Aitihya, and Pratibha into Shrutgyan, asserting that word-based evidence is Shrutgyan. While later scholars supported his view, they found his overemphasis on words questionable, although they concurred on the prominence of words in Shrutgyan.
• Amritchandra Suri: Defines Shrutgyan as the knowledge that follows Matigyan and involves logical reasoning about a clear meaning.
• Nemichandra Siddhantika: Offers a distinctly different definition. He does not accept that Shrutgyan necessarily follows Matigyan. His reason might be that Shrutgyan has both verbal (aksharātmaka) and non-verbal (anāsharātmaka) forms. The non-verbal form, according to the Digambara tradition, is not word-based. If Shrutgyan is defined as Matigyan that occurs after word formulation, then there would be no distinction between Matigyan and non-verbal Shrutgyan. Therefore, he defines Shrutgyan as knowledge of objects different from those that are the subject of Matigyan.

Reconciling "Shrutam Matipoorvakam": The author explains that the statement "Shrutam matipoorvakam" (Shrutgyan follows Matigyan) is not contradictory. It implies that the hearing of words, which is necessary for Shrutgyan, is part of Matigyan and falls under the purview of the ear sense. When a word is heard, its meaning is remembered. The act of hearing itself is Matigyan, and the subsequent knowledge cannot be considered Shrutgyan in isolation. This doesn't mean Matigyan is the primary cause of Shrutgyan because even with Matigyan, Shrutgyan cannot occur without the subsidence of the karmic obstruction to scriptural knowledge. Matigyan is merely an external cause.

Conclusion: The article concludes that Shrutgyan is a distinct and independent form of knowledge, occurring with the help of the mind and senses when the karmic obstruction to scriptural knowledge subsides, leading to clear knowledge capable of manifesting its subject matter. The author asserts that philosophers who consider Shrutgyan a mere subtype of Matigyan have not fully grasped its nature.

Further distinctions are drawn:

• Matigyan's cause is different, and its effects are different from Shrutgyan.
• Shrutgyan's sole sense organ is the ear, while Matigyan involves all senses.
• Matigyan is silent, whereas Shrutgyan is vocal.
• Matigyan primarily apprehends the present, while Shrutgyan can encompass the past, present, and future.
• Matigyan is purely knowledge, while Shrutgyan is both knowledge and word-based, which the knower understands and can also communicate to others.

Therefore, the article strongly advocates for Shrutgyan as an independent form of knowledge, asserting that those who see it as merely a part of Matigyan have misunderstood its true essence.