Shastravartta Samucchaya Part 5 6

Here's a comprehensive summary of chapters 5 and 6 of the Shastravartta Samucchaya, focusing on the critique of Buddhist philosophy, particularly the Yogacara and Madhyamaka schools:

Overall Purpose: The text is a detailed critique of various philosophical schools prevalent at the time of Acharya Haribhadrasuri, aiming to present their doctrines and refute them with logical arguments, all within the framework of Jain philosophy's anekantavada (non-absolutism). This particular section (chapters 5 and 6) focuses on the critique of Buddhist thought.

Chapter 5: Critique of Yogacara (Vijnanavada - Consciousness-only School)

The chapter systematically dismantles the Yogacara doctrine that only consciousness exists and the external world is unreal.

• Rejection of Consciousness-only: The text begins by arguing that the Yogacara view is untenable because the very notion of consciousness (Vijnana) as exclusively internal and self-luminous is problematic.
• Critique of "External World Negation":
  • Problem of Proof for Non-existence: The text highlights the difficulty in proving the non-existence of the external world, especially through means like perception (Pratyaksha) and inference (Anumana). It argues that perception directly apprehends reality, and for inference, a proper sign (linga) is needed, which is absent if the external world is negated.
  • The Role of "Ignorance" (Anupalabdhi): The Buddhists proposed "non-apprehension" (anupalabdhi) as a means of proof for absence. However, the text argues that this is only valid if the object should have been apprehended (yogyanupalabdhi). If the external world is such that its apprehension is normally possible (e.g., through its causal relationship with consciousness), then its non-apprehension implies its non-existence.
  • The "All-or-Nothing" Argument: The text refutes the idea that if consciousness is self-luminous, it proves the external world is unreal. It argues that even if consciousness is self-aware, it doesn't negate the independent existence of the external world, which might be known through other means.
  • The "Co-experience Rule" (Sahopalambha Niyama): A key Buddhist argument is that if an object and its knowledge arise together and cease together, they are identical. The text refutes this by stating that mere co-occurrence doesn't imply identity. It uses various counter-arguments, including the idea that the perceiver (consciousness) and the perceived (object) have different functions and are not necessarily identical.
  • Critique of "Causality and Effect": The text questions how consciousness alone can explain the world if it's the sole reality. It delves into complex arguments regarding the nature of causality, the relationship between cause and effect, and the impossibility of establishing the external world's non-existence solely through internal mental states.
  • The Problem of "Appearance" vs. "Reality": The text engages with the idea that appearances are constructed by consciousness. It argues that if all appearances are merely mental constructions, then distinguishing between real and unreal becomes impossible, leading to an infinite regress or nihilism.
  • The "Inactionable" Nature of Pure Consciousness: The text critiques the notion of pure, inactive consciousness. It argues that if consciousness is truly inactive and self-luminous, it cannot illuminate or interact with anything, including itself.
• Critique of "Momentariness" (Kshanikavada): The chapter also touches upon the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, arguing that if everything is momentary, establishing continuity, memory, and even the causality necessary for the Yogacara system becomes impossible.

Chapter 6: Critique of Yogacara (Momentariness) and Madhyamaka (Shunyata)

This chapter continues the critique of Buddhist philosophy, moving from the Yogacara's consciousness-only and momentariness doctrines to the Madhyamaka's concept of emptiness (Shunyata).

• Critique of Momentariness (Kshanikavada):
  • The Problem of Causality and Destruction: The text argues that if things are momentary and cease instantly, how can there be causality or the necessity of destruction being caused? It challenges the Buddhist notion of instant destruction and the role of causal factors in it.
  • The "All or Nothing" Argument for Causality: It questions the Buddhist approach to causality by examining various hypothetical scenarios of causal relationships (e.g., whether a cause produces something with the same or a different nature), highlighting logical inconsistencies.
  • The "Unchanging Result" (Parinama): The text uses the example of milk turning into yogurt, or a child growing into an adult, to argue for a substance that persists through change (parinama). It argues that the Buddhist denial of any permanent substratum undergoing change contradicts common experience and logical inference.
  • The "End-Point Destruction" (Anthe Kshaye Kshana): The text refutes the Buddhist idea that destruction is inherent and observable at the "end" of a moment. It argues that if destruction is inherent, it should be observable from the beginning, and if it's only at the end, then there's a contradiction.
  • Critique of "Cessation of Action": The text questions the Buddhist concept of cessation of action and its relation to momentariness.
• Critique of Madhyamaka (Shunyata - Emptiness):
  • The Nature of "Emptiness": The Madhyamaka school asserts that all phenomena are "empty" of inherent existence. The text challenges this by questioning the very basis of this claim.
  • The Problem of Proof for Emptiness: The core argument against Shunyata is that any proof offered for it would itself have to be real, thereby contradicting the concept of emptiness. If the proof is real, then emptiness is not absolute. If the proof is also empty, then it cannot establish anything.
  • The Dilemma of Proof: The text presents a dilemma: If there's proof for emptiness, then that proof itself is something real, which contradicts emptiness. If there's no proof, then the claim of emptiness is unestablished.
  • The Role of the "Addressed" (Pratipadhya): The text argues that to communicate the concept of emptiness, one must assume the existence of an audience (pratipadhya) and the means of communication (pramana), both of which are contrary to absolute emptiness.
  • The Tahtparya (Intention) of Shunyata: The text acknowledges that the doctrine of Shunyata might have a pedagogical purpose – to detach disciples from worldly attachments. However, it questions the ultimate validity of this doctrine as a description of reality.

Overall Argumentation Style:

• Logical Rigor: Acharya Haribhadrasuri, through the commentary of Yashovijay, employs a highly logical and analytical approach, dissecting each Buddhist tenet with meticulous detail.
• Presentation of Opponent's View: The text first clearly states the Buddhist viewpoint (purvapaksha) before offering a refutation (uttarapaksha).
• Use of Examples and Analogies: Throughout the critique, apt examples and analogies are used to illustrate the logical flaws in the Buddhist arguments.
• Respectful yet Firm Refutation: While critically examining and refuting the Buddhist doctrines, the tone remains largely respectful, focusing on intellectual debate rather than personal attacks.
• Emphasis on Jain Principles: The underlying thread of the critique is the defense and assertion of Jain principles, particularly anekantavada and the validity of perception, inference, and scripture.

In essence, chapters 5 and 6 of Shastravartta Samucchaya provide a rigorous philosophical engagement with core Buddhist theories, aiming to demonstrate their internal contradictions and their incompatibility with a more nuanced and multifaceted understanding of reality, as presented by Jainism.