Shabdadwaitvad Jain Drushti - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the Jain text "Shabdadwaitvad Jain Drushti" by Lalchand Jain, focusing on its critique of the Shabdadwaitvad (Monism of Sound) philosophy from a Jain perspective:

The book "Shabdadwaitvad Jain Drushti" by Dr. Lalchand Jain explores the Indian philosophical concept of Shabdadwaitvad, primarily championed by the grammarian Bhartrihari. This doctrine, often associated with Shaiva philosophy, posits that Shabda (sound or word) is the ultimate reality, the supreme truth. According to this view, the entire manifest world is merely a manifestation or vivarta of this ultimate reality, which they term Shabdabrahma.

The text then delves into the concept of Vak (speech or sound) as described by Bhartrihari, who divides it into three stages:

Vaikhari: The gross, audible speech expressed through the vocal organs.
Madhyama: A subtler, internal form of speech related to thought and contemplation, preceding Vaikhari.
Pashyanti: The most subtle form of speech, considered formless, unmanifest, and identical with the ultimate reality (Brahman). It is also called Sookshma (subtle) or Paravak by later grammarians.

The author then outlines the core tenets of Shabdabrahma as defined by Bhartrihari:

Beginningless and Endless (Anadinidhana): Shabdabrahma is eternal, without origin or destruction.
Indestructible (Akshara): It is unchanging and imperishable. It is also considered the efficient cause of the alphabet (a, ka, etc.).
Manifests as Meaning (Artharupa): Shabdabrahma transforms into the perceived world of objects and phenomena.
The Process of the World (Jagat ki Prakriya): The entire visible world is essentially Shabdabrahma; the world does not have an independent existence apart from it.
The World is Composed of Sound (Jagat Shabdmay): All things in the world are imbued with a "sound form," and are thus considered to be made of sound.

Critique of Shabdadwaitvad from a Jain Perspective:

The core of the book lies in its rigorous critique of Shabdadwaitvad from the standpoint of Jain logic and philosophy. Jain scholars like Acharya Vidyananda, Abhayadev Suri, Prabhachandra, Vadiyadev Suri, and Yashovijay are cited as having systematically dismantled the Shabdadvaitvad position. The critique is structured around the lack of valid evidence (pramana) to support its claims.

1. Lack of Valid Proof for Shabdabrahma's Existence:

Jain logicians argue that 'Shabda' (sound) is a knowable entity (prameya), and its existence must be proven by valid means of knowledge (pramana). They challenge the Shabdadvaitvad proponents to identify which of the three primary means of knowledge – Perception (Pratyaksha), Inference (Anumana), or Authority (Agama) – proves the existence of Shabdabrahma.

2. Rejection of Perception (Pratyaksha) as Proof:

Sense-Perception (Indriya Pratyaksha):
- The senses only perceive present, physically present, and gross (moortik) objects. Shabdabrahma, as conceptualized by Shabdadvaitvad, is subtle and all-pervading, making it imperceptible to the senses.
- If sense-perception were the proof, everyone should perceive Shabdabrahma consistently, which is not the case.
- Specifically, the ear-sense (Shrotra) perceives sound, but not the all-pervading Shabdabrahma itself. The ear's domain is limited to audible sounds (Vaikhari and Madhyama). If it could perceive Shabdabrahma, then other senses, perceiving different objects, should also perceive it, which is a contradiction.
- Furthermore, the nature of Shabdabrahma described by Shabdadvaitvad doesn't align with what can be apprehended by sensory perception.
Supra-Sensory Perception (Ateendriya Pratyaksha):
- Shabdadvaitvad proponents suggest that yogis with disciplined minds can perceive Shabdabrahma through supra-sensory perception.
- Jain critics counter that this introduces duality (yogis, yoga, and the perceived object), contradicting the monistic claim. It also raises questions about the nature of this yogic perception and its reliability.
Self-Awareness Perception (Svasamvedana Pratyaksha):
- The idea that knowledge itself is self-manifesting and cognized through self-awareness is critiqued. If all knowledge were self-aware and Shabdabrahma were self-aware, then everyone would attain liberation effortlessly, as self-awareness of the luminous Shabdabrahma is considered liberation in this doctrine. This is considered an absurd conclusion.
- Also, if Shabdabrahma is self-aware, then the perceived objects (like pots) which are its manifestations should also be self-aware, but they are not perceived as such.

3. Rejection of Inference (Anumana) as Proof:

Jain logicians argue that there is no valid inferential link (linga) that can establish the existence of Shabdabrahma.
They challenge the typical inferential methods used (cause-effect or inherent nature), arguing that a beginningless and unchanging entity cannot produce sequential effects, nor can its nature be inferred if its existence is not already established.
The argument that "whatever is pervaded by a form is that form" (e.g., clay pervades pots, so pots are clay) is rejected. Jain scholars assert that objects are not truly pervaded by a "sound form" (shabdakar). Instead, they are perceived as distinct from sound. Even when we say "blue pot," the "blue" is a quality of the pot, not an inherent sound form.

4. Rejection of Authority (Agama) as Proof:

If Shabdabrahma is proven by scripture (Agama), then why not also prove the existence of duality from the same scripture?
The validity of any scripture is itself dependent on other means of knowledge (pramana). If the scripture is not independently verifiable, it cannot prove Shabdabrahma.
If scripture and Shabdabrahma are considered identical, then the existence of scripture cannot be proven independently. If they are considered different, then duality is introduced.
The argument that scripture is a manifestation (vivarta) of Shabdabrahma is dismissed by stating that if scripture is a manifestation of the ultimate reality, it would be like ignorance (avidya) and thus unreal, unable to prove the real Shabdabrahma.

5. The World is Not Composed of Sound (Jagat Shabdmay Nahin):

The claim that the world is made of sound is refuted.
The world cannot be a "result" or "modification" (parinam) of Shabdabrahma because Shabdabrahma is considered beginningless, changeless, and singular. A changeless entity cannot undergo modification.
If Shabdabrahma undergoes modification, it either abandons its original nature (contradicting its eternal nature) or it manifests in multiple forms simultaneously without abandoning its original nature. The latter is also problematic, as it leads to contradictions. For instance, if a blue object (which is Shabdabrahma) is perceived, a deaf person should also perceive the sound associated with it, which is not the case. This indicates a separation between sound and object.
The argument that the world arises from Shabdabrahma is also rejected, as a completely eternal and unchanging cause cannot produce sequential effects; all effects would arise simultaneously, which is not observed.

6. Knowledge is Not Pervaded by Sound (Gyan Shabd-anuviddh Nahin):

The assertion that knowledge is inherently connected to sound is challenged.
Jain logicians question how this "sound-pervasion" (shabdanuviddhatva) in knowledge is known – through perception or inference.
Perception fails because sensory organs perceive distinct objects (e.g., sight perceives form, hearing perceives sound), and there's no direct perception of sound pervading the knowledge of form. Self-awareness doesn't establish this connection either.
Inference fails due to a lack of a valid inferential link.
The argument that since the world is made of sound, knowledge within it must also be sound-pervaded is rejected because the premise (world is made of sound) is already refuted.
The very definition of "sound-pervasion" is questioned: is it the simultaneous presence of sound and meaning, or their identity? Both options are found to be flawed. The presence of sound is in the ear, while the meaning is perceived elsewhere. Their identity would also lead to contradictions, as knowledge of form occurs even without the perception of associated sound, especially for the deaf.

7. The Nature of Word and Meaning:

Jain philosophy distinguishes between dravya vak (material speech, like audible sounds which are modifications of matter) and bhava vak (mental speech, conceptualization, which is a function of the soul). Vaikhari and Madhyama are considered external manifestations of matter. Pashyanti is identified with the soul's conceptualization or cognitive function, which is not inherently sound.
The text concludes that the relationship between word and meaning is not one of identity, cause-effect, or inherence as proposed by Shabdadvaitvad. There is no intrinsic pervading of meaning by sound.

In essence, the book meticulously dissects the Shabdadvaitvad philosophy, demonstrating through logical arguments and evidence-based reasoning (from a Jain perspective) that its core tenets lack empirical or inferential support. The Jain critique emphasizes the distinct nature of reality, the limitations of sensory perception, and the importance of non-contradictory reasoning in understanding the nature of existence, ultimately concluding that the world and knowledge are not fundamentally composed of or pervaded by sound (Shabda).