Sankhya Ka Pratyaksha Lakshan

This document, titled "Sankhya ka Pratyaksha Lakshan" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, discusses the nature of "pratyaksha" (direct perception) in Sankhya philosophy and its critique by various other Indian philosophical schools, particularly Buddhists, Jains, and Naiyayikas. It then delves into a related debate concerning "dharavahika jnan" (sequential or continuous cognitions).

Here's a breakdown of the key points:

1. Sankhya's Definitions of Pratyaksha:

• The text identifies three main types of pratyaksha definitions within the Sankhya tradition:
  • The definition by Vindhyavasa, referred to as Varshaganya by Vacaspati (as per Tatparya, p. 155).
  • The definition by Ishvara Krishna (Sankhya Karika 5).
  • The definition found in the Sankhya Sutras (Sankhya Sutra 1.86).

2. Critiques of Sankhya's Pratyaksha:

• Buddhists, Jains, and Naiyayikas all refuted Sankhya's definitions of pratyaksha.
• Vindhyavasa's definition was criticized by all these schools.
• However, only Jayanta (as per Nyaya Manjari, p. 116) criticized the definition of ancient Sankhya scholars like Ishvara Krishna.
• Crucially, the definition found in the Sankhya Sutras was not criticized by any ancient āchārya.

3. Key Critics and Their Contributions:

• Dignaga is identified as the first Buddhist critic of Sankhya's pratyaksha (Pramana Samuccaya 1.27).
• Udyotakara is the first Naiyayika critic (Nyaya Varttika, p. 43).
• Akalanka is considered the first Jain critic (Nyaya Vijnapti 1.165).
• Acharya Hemachandra followed the critiques of his predecessors in his refutation of Sankhya's pratyaksha definitions (Pramana Mimamsa, p. 24). His critique is particularly aligned with that of Jayanta (Nyaya Manjari, p. 106), who had criticized both Vindhyavasa and Ishvara Krishna. Hemachandra, in turn, echoed Jayanta's words.

4. The Debate on Dharavahika Jnan (Sequential Cognitions):

• The text shifts to discussing the concept of "dharavahika jnan", which refers to a series of cognitions that follow one another, often concerning the same object.
• While the validity of "smriti" (memory) has always been a topic in Indian epistemology, the discussion on the validity of sequential cognitions likely originated in the Buddhist tradition after Dignaga. This discussion then spread across all schools of philosophy, leading to established arguments for and against it.

5. Different Schools' Stances on Dharavahika Jnan:

• Nyaya-Vaisheshika scholars (Vacaspati, Shridhara, Jayanta, Udyana) considered sequential cognitions valid by calling them "adhigatarth" (dealing with already known objects). They denied the necessity of apprehending minute temporal distinctions in these cognitions and thus did not include terms like "unconquered" (anadhigata) in their definition of valid cognition.

• Both the Prabhakara and Kumarila traditions of Mimamsa also accepted the validity of sequential cognitions, but with different justifications.

  • Prabhakara followers (Shalikanatha) consider them valid simply by being "anubhuti" (experience) without requiring the apprehension of "kala-kala" (minute temporal moments), a stance influenced by Nyaya-Vaisheshika.
  • Kumarila followers (Parthasarathi) justify their validity by assuming the apprehension of "sukshma kala-kala" (minute temporal moments). This explanation is deemed necessary because the Mimamsa definition of valid cognition includes the term "apurva" (unprecedented). This justification is seen as influenced by Buddhist and Jain thought.

• Buddhist Tradition:

  • While Dharmottara did not explicitly discuss "dharavahika," his general statements suggest he considered them invalid.
  • Archata, in his commentary on the Hetubindu, clarified his position. He considered sequential cognitions in yogis (ascetics/meditators) valid because they apprehend minute temporal distinctions. However, for ordinary individuals, he considered them invalid because they do not apprehend these minute temporal differences. This shows a distinction made within the Buddhist tradition based on the nature of the knower.

• Jain Tradition:

  • The Jain tradition has two schools of thought on the validity of sequential cognitions: Digambara and Shvetambara.
  • Digambara Tradition: Sequential cognitions are valid only if they apprehend specific differentiating factors (like momentary distinctions) and produce specific cognitions. If they do not, they are invalid. Even within a single cognition, if it apprehends a specific aspect of a substance, it is valid for that aspect and invalid for others.
    • This conclusion is drawn from observing the commentaries of Vidyānanda (following Akalanka) and Prabhachandra (following Manikyanandi).
    • Akalanka and Manikyanandi, like other Jain āchāryas, supported the validity of memory. When they included terms like "anadhigata" and "apurva" in their definitions of valid cognition, similar to Buddhists and Mimamsakas, the purpose of these terms could only be explained in the context discussed (i.e., to differentiate valid from invalid sequential cognitions).
    • Unlike Buddhists and Mimamsakas who did not consider memory independently valid (or only memory in the case of Mimamsakas), the Jain tradition does not have this limitation.
  • Shvetambara Tradition: All Shvetambara scholars unanimously consider sequential cognitions valid, just like memory. Therefore, they did not include terms like "anadhigata" or "apurva" in their definitions of valid cognition. They explicitly stated that even if a cognition deals with something already known, it is as valid as one dealing with something unknown. They believe that dealing with the already known does not invalidate a cognition. Consequently, there is no need to consider aspects of a sequential cognition as valid and others invalid, nor is there a need to consider any of them invalid.
    • Acharya Hemachandra is highlighted for his unique contribution in Shvetambara thought. He demonstrated the equality of both grasped and to-be-grasped cognitions, thus supporting the validity of all sequential cognitions. This is a significant point in his work (Pramana Mimamsa, p. 4).

In essence, the text meticulously outlines the different approaches to understanding direct perception in Sankhya and how various other schools critiqued it. It then transitions to the complex issue of sequential cognitions, showcasing how different philosophical systems, including the internal variations within Jainism, grappled with defining their validity. The core of the later discussion revolves around whether the cognition of an already known object (adhigata-grahi) or the apprehension of minute temporal distinctions is necessary for a cognition to be valid.