Samkara On Question Whose Is Avidya

Here's a comprehensive summary of Daniel H. H. Ingalls' article "Samkara on the Question: Whose is avidyā?", focusing on its key arguments and contributions:

The article by Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Samkara on the Question: Whose is avidyā?", explores the philosophical conundrum presented by the concept of avidyā (ignorance or nescience) in the monistic philosophy of Samkarācārya and his followers. Avidyā is central to their doctrine as it explains the perceived diversity of the world, which in reality is seen as a single, indivisible Brahman.

The Dilemma of Avidyā

The core of the problem lies in the nature of avidyā. If avidyā is a real entity, it undermines the monistic claim of a single, undivided reality. Conversely, if avidyā is declared an imaginary or unreal entity, it negates the very concept of avidyā as the cause of illusion. This creates a logical bind: the Kevalādvaitins (followers of Samkara) could not dismiss illusion itself as an illusion, much like Descartes couldn't doubt his own doubting.

Two Ways Out of the Dilemma

Ingalls identifies two primary approaches to resolve this dilemma:

1. The "Typical Kevalādvaita" Approach (Samkara's Followers): This approach, adopted by most of Samkara's disciples, introduces a new truth-value called anirvacaniyatva (that which cannot be said to be either true or false). This allows for a multi-valued logic system, where avidyā is neither strictly real nor unreal, but indescribable. This system, as noted by Ingalls, became the most widely accepted multi-valued logic system in the world.

2. Samkarācārya's Own Approach (Avoiding the Dilemma): Ingalls argues that Samkarācārya himself took a different path, one of avoiding the dilemma rather than solving it by introducing a third truth-value. This distinction, often overlooked by scholars, is a key focus of the article. Ingalls posits that Samkara may have disapproved of the postulation of anirvacaniyatva as a third truth-value, perhaps finding it less intuitive than his own method.

Samkara's Argument: Avidyā is Never Truly Connected to the Self

The premise that underpins all of Samkara's arguments on avidyā is that avidyā is not an inherent characteristic of the self or soul. Once it's understood that avidyā does not truly belong to the self, the true nature of the self is realized, leading to mokşa (liberation). The precise modality of avidyā becomes secondary, akin to the Buddha's response to Malunkyaputta's metaphysical questions, emphasizing the urgent need for action (like removing an arrow) over abstract speculation.

Ingalls examines three key passages in Samkara's commentaries to support this view:

• Brahmasūtrabhāṣya IV.1.3: Here, Samkara uses the synonym aprabodha (unenlightenment) and engages in a rhetorical argument. When asked "Whose is this unenlightenment?", he responds, "Yours, since you ask about it." If the opponent claims to be God (fully enlightened), Samkara counters that if they were truly enlightened, they would know that unenlightenment belongs to no one. Ingalls characterizes this as "pedagogically impressive" but not "philosophically exact."

• Commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.1.6: Samkara uses the passage "brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti" (becoming Brahman, he reaches Brahman) to support the concept of jīvanmukti (liberation while alive). He argues that liberation involves no real change in the self, nor in qualities like avidyā that might be mistakenly attributed to it. The crucial point is that one is aware of avidyā only as an object (viṣaya) of knowledge, never as belonging to the knower. This awareness itself proves that avidyā cannot be an intrinsic part of the self. Samkara uses a pun on the word viviktatas (distinctly), implying that perceiving avidyā distinctly, like a pot, means it is separate from the perceiver.

• Commentary on Gītā XIII.2: Samkara addresses the potential argument that avidyā might have a real connection with the self, even if not essential. He refutes this by stating that such a connection cannot be perceived or inferred. To infer it would lead to an infinite regress of knowers, where the connection between the knower and the known (avidyā) requires another knower, and so on. The self, as the knower, is never affected by objects of knowledge like avidyā.

Samkara's Focus: Psychological and Religious Truth

In conclusion, Ingalls emphasizes that Samkara, unlike his followers, consistently avoids admitting avidyā as either real or unreal. He does not establish a third truth-value to resolve the logical dilemma. Instead, Samkara's consistent focus is on the practical, religious, and psychological truth: avidyā, regardless of its ultimate nature, is never truly connected to the self.

Ingalls suggests that Samkara's approach was more psychologically and religiously oriented, subordinating metaphysical and logical concerns to the ultimate goal of attaining mokşa. His followers, while appreciating this attitude, felt compelled to construct a more logically coherent metaphysical system, leading to the development of anirvacaniyatva. The article highlights a significant difference in philosophical methodology between the master and his disciples.