Sakyabuddhis Commentary On Pramanavarttika I 3 And Its Vrtti

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, focusing on Ernst Steinkellner's article about Śākyabuddhi's Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika I 3 and its Vṛtti:

This article by Ernst Steinkellner presents a critical edition and translation of the Tibetan translation of Śākyabuddhi's commentary on a crucial passage (PV I 3) in Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. This passage introduces Dharmakīrti's theory of non-perception (anupalabdhi) for the first time. Steinkellner emphasizes the significance of this early formulation, as it lays the groundwork for concepts that Dharmakīrti elaborates on later in his work and in subsequent writings.

The article highlights the difficulty of Dharmakīrti's initial statements on non-perception and the importance of having access to the earliest commentaries for accurate interpretation. It is noted that the Sanskrit manuscript of the most important early commentary, by Karnakagomin, is unfortunately incomplete. Therefore, the Sanskrit fragments of Śākyabuddhi's commentary, which are incorporated into Karnakagomin's explanations, are also unavailable, making a knowledge of Śākyabuddhi's original phrasing highly desirable.

Steinkellner's work provides a critical edition of the Tibetan translation of Śākyabuddhi's commentary on the specific passage PVSV 4.5–17 where Karnakagomin's explanation is missing. The edition is based on the Derge, Narthang, and Peking editions of the Tibetan translations, with annotations indicating significant textual variants.

The core of the article delves into Śākyabuddhi's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's explanation of non-perception. Key points of the commentary include:

• Non-perception as "non-activity of valid cognitions": Śākyabuddhi explains that this refers to the non-activity of valid cognitions (pramāṇāni) and clarifies that the plural is used due to the multiplicity of individual cases or in reference to authoritative tradition (āgama).
• Non-perception leading to the negation of cognition of the existent: The commentary explains that this non-perception, which is the absence of valid cognitions, results in the negation of cognizing, naming, or dealing with something as existent, particularly concerning non-existent things.
• The "result" of non-perception: Śākyabuddhi clarifies that "results in non-activity" means the negation of cognizing, naming, or handling something as existent. This "handling" (vyavahāra) is essentially dealing with the object. The reason for this negation is that cognizing things as existent presupposes perception. Therefore, if the cause (perception) is absent, the effect (cognizing the existent) is also absent.
• The "like character" of the two types of non-perception: Śākyabuddhi explains that both non-perception of something imperceptible (leading to negation of the existent) and non-perception of something perceptible (leading to affirmation of the non-existent) share a common characteristic. The article details how a non-perception of something perceptible, which meets the conditions for perception, proves the negation of cognizing something as existent.
• The definition of "existent" and "non-existent": The commentary distinguishes between being existent and non-existent, and how negation and affirmation apply to these.
• Perception as the basis of existence: Śākyabuddhi discusses how perception is understood as "existence," either as the capacity of something real or as the occurrence of cognition based on that capacity. This "existence" is considered a metaphorical usage.
• Non-existence of non-existing things: This is explained as non-perception, which is contrary to perception defined as real existence. It can be either the absence of a pot, for example, or the cognition of that absence.
• The role of "cognitional determination" (pratipatti): The article addresses the question of how something perceived can be considered non-existent. Śākyabuddhi clarifies that this "non-existence" is by virtue of the cognitional act, not reality. Things that are not perceived, even if existent, are treated as non-existent if they don't fulfill their intended purpose. Therefore, the exclusion of something existent by virtue of cognitional determination leads to its consideration as non-existent.
• The "sign of non-perception": The commentary addresses the potential issue of infinite regression when proving non-existence through non-perception. Śākyabuddhi argues that non-perception is not proved by another non-perception but can be established by itself. This is crucial to avoid an infinite regress and allow for definite cognition.

In essence, Steinkellner's article provides valuable insight into Śākyabuddhi's detailed explanation of Dharmakīrti's foundational theory of non-perception, clarifying complex philosophical arguments and highlighting the linguistic and conceptual nuances involved. The article also serves as an important philological contribution to the study of Indian Buddhist logic and epistemology.