Sadachar Ke Shashwat Mandand Aur Jain Dharm - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Sadachar ke Shashwat Mandand aur Jain Dharm" (Eternal Standards of Morality and Jainism) by Prof. Sagarmal Jain, in English:

The article "Eternal Standards of Morality and Jainism" by Prof. Sagarmal Jain explores the concept of morality and its eternal standards, particularly within the framework of Jainism. It delves into the definition of morality, the basis of moral judgments, and whether absolute, unchanging moral standards exist.

Defining Morality and the Basis of Judgment:

The author begins by dissecting the term "Sadachar" (morality), which etymologically means "good conduct." However, the core question remains: what makes conduct good or bad?
While we label actions like lying, stealing, violence, and adultery as immoral ("durachar"), and compassion, honesty, and truthfulness as moral ("sadachar"), the underlying reason for these distinctions is crucial.
The English word "Right" derives from the Latin "Rectus," meaning "according to rule." Similarly, in Indian traditions, texts like the Manusmriti define Sadachar as conduct that is traditionally followed in a particular place, time, and society.
However, the author critiques this view, arguing that conduct doesn't become moral simply because it's socially accepted or traditional. Instead, it is accepted because it is intrinsically good. The essence of an action determines its morality, not its acceptance or rejection by a society.
Citing the Mahabharata, the author notes that knowing dharma (righteousness) doesn't automatically lead to practicing it, and knowing adharma (unrighteousness) doesn't guarantee its avoidance. This highlights that morality is not merely about knowing rules but about the inclination and practice.
The ultimate basis for classifying conduct as moral or immoral lies in its results or the goal for which it is undertaken. The impact on society is a factor, but the final arbiter is an ideal or ultimate goal. The highest goal of human life, according to Jainism, serves as the standard for morality.

Jainism's Criterion for Morality:

Jainism posits that the ultimate goal of human life is Moksha or Nirvana – liberation or attainment of self-perfection.
Therefore, any conduct that leads towards Moksha is considered Sadachar, and any conduct that leads to bondage is Durachar.
Moksha, in Jainism, is the realization of one's true nature, the development of inherent capabilities, and achieving a state of Samata (equanimity or balance). It means transcending external states ("parabhav") and remaining in one's own nature ("svabhav").
The core principle of Jainism is that Dharma is the inherent nature of a thing ("dravyasvabhavo धम्मो"). Attaining this inherent nature is liberation.
The author quotes Bhagavati-sutra, where Lord Mahavir states that the soul's true nature is Samata, and its ultimate goal is to achieve this Samata.
Thus, Samata (equanimity/balance) versus Vishamata (imbalance/discord), or Svabhav (one's own nature) versus Parabhav (external states/natures), are the eternal standards of morality in Jainism. Actions leading to Svabhav are Sadachar, and those leading to Parabhav are Durachar.

The Multifaceted Nature of Samata:

Samata manifests in various forms:
- Spiritual: Rising above attachment and aversion, achieving a state of Vitragata (non-attachment).
- Psychological: A calm, undisturbed mind free from desires and aspirations.
- Social: This equanimity, when expressed in social life, is known as Ahimsa (non-violence).
- Intellectual: Anagraha (non-dogmatism) and Anekanta (multi-sidedness).
- Economic: Aparigraha (non-possession), modern interpretations of which include communism and the trust theory.
While Samata is the fundamental standard, the author emphasizes the need to consider its various manifestations and the means by which it is achieved.
The internal equanimity (Vitragata) is important, but the external aspect of conduct and its societal impact are also crucial for judging Sadachar.

Ahimsa as the Ultimate Standard:

Jainism broadly accepts Ahimsa as the eternal standard of morality.
However, the author cautions that Ahimsa should not be understood merely as the absence of harm or the non-killing of beings.
Ahimsa is a comprehensive concept, encompassing both internal and external aspects, and relating to both the self and others.
Self-violence ("swa-hinsa") is the violation of one's own nature, while other-violence ("para-hinsa") is harming the interests of others. Both are forms of Durachar.
In its broader sense, violence is the criterion for Durachar, and Ahimsa is the criterion for Sadachar.

The Problem of Eternal Standards:

The author acknowledges that defining absolute moral standards is not easy. An action considered moral in one context might be immoral in another, and vice versa.
Citing examples like suicide for self-protection (moral) versus suicide in general (immoral), the author highlights the contextual nature of morality.
Jain texts themselves suggest that what typically leads to bondage can, in specific circumstances, lead to liberation, and vice versa.
The Acharya Umashwati states that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the country, time, person, and situation.
The Mahabharata also supports this view, stating that dharma and adharma can shift based on time and place, and even actions like violence or theft can become dharma in specific circumstances.
The example of Draupadi's polyandrous relationship with the Pandavas, considered moral for her in that era, versus its status today, illustrates this relativity.

The Shifting Nature of Moral Standards:

The author explains that changes in moral standards are often due to deshika (temporal) and kalika (spatial) necessities.
The concept of Aapaddharma (duties in times of distress) in Jainism allows for exceptions to general rules in specific, dire circumstances. However, these exceptions are context-specific and do not negate the underlying principle.
The author distinguishes between instrumental values (means) and terminal values (goals). Instrumental values, being tied to actions, can change with circumstances. Terminal values, like the ultimate goal, tend to be more constant.
Societal morality is not immutable; it is influenced by temporal and spatial changes. However, this change is relative to those conditions.

The "Why" Behind Morality and the Role of Intent:

The author critically examines the idea that morality is merely a matter of emotional expression or social approval. If morality is simply subjective preference, then its changes are no more significant than shifts in fashion.
He argues that human preferences and dislikes are not arbitrary but have objective bases in ideals, principles, and value systems.
The author rejects the notion that morality is solely based on social utility, as it doesn't explain why social good is superior to personal good without an appeal to an eternal standard.
He challenges the idea that society is the creator of moral standards, as social norms (what is permitted or prohibited) can differ from true moral rightness or wrongness. Examples like theft in some communities, female infanticide, or polygamy being socially accepted but not morally right illustrate this.
The author emphasizes that moral values are not entirely relative or interchangeable like fashion. While some adaptation to context occurs, fundamental values like Ahimsa, justice, self-sacrifice, and self-control have remained consistently accepted across different times and places.

Jainism's Unchanging and Relative Aspects of Morality:

Jainism acknowledges both relative and absolute aspects of morality.
The Jain proclamation that "Dharma is pure, eternal, and everlasting" points to the absolute aspect.
Jain thinkers distinguish between the external manifestation of conduct ("dravya" or "bahya") and the internal intent or disposition ("bhava" or "antar").
The external aspect of conduct is relative and subject to changes in time, place, and circumstances.
The internal aspect (intent, resolve, mental states) is always absolute, unchanging, and eternal.
For instance, mental violence ("bhava-hinsa") is always immoral, whereas physical violence ("dravya-hinsa") might be justified in specific contexts (like self-defense or protecting the innocent). Similarly, internal acquisitiveness ("antar parigraha" or greed) is always immoral, but external possession ("dravya parigraha") is not necessarily so.
Ethical intention or resolve is absolute, while ethical action is relative. This is articulated through the concepts of Nishchaya Naya (absolute perspective, focusing on intention) and Vyavahara Naya (practical perspective, focusing on action and consequences).
The intention to wage war is always unethical, but the act of war may not always be so. Similarly, the intention to commit suicide is always unethical, but the act of suicide might be considered moral in exceptional cases (like Chandana's mother or Cheta Maharaj).

The Interplay of Changeability and Unchangeability:

The author aligns with John Dewey's view that while the circumstances for achieving moral ideals change, moral principles themselves retain a regulatory force. The "body" of ethics may change, but its "soul" remains constant.
The core principles remain, but their interpretation and application evolve.
Jain ethics identifies three ways in which values change:
1. Intent vs. Action: The moral value of the intent is unchanging, while the moral value of the action is changeable. The mental/intellectual aspect of action is absolute, while its practical/behavioral aspect is relative.
2. Goals vs. Means: Moral goals or ideals are unchanging, but the means to achieve them are variable. While the ultimate good is immutable, the paths to it can differ. The classification of means and goals can also shift.
3. Fundamental vs. Specific Rules: Basic or fundamental moral rules are generally unchanging, while specific rules can be variable. Exceptions (apavada) do not negate the rule (utsarga).
The author stresses that neither absolute changeability nor absolute immutability can be applied to moral standards. They must be flexible enough to adapt to social contexts but not so fluid as to be distorted.
In essence, moral standards are internally stable and externally adaptable.
Fashion changes rapidly, but moral values do not. While Greek or Vedic values have undergone some transformation, the values upheld by Shraman culture and Jainism have remained remarkably consistent for over two millennia.
The evolution of concepts like Ahimsa and the welfare of others shows an expansion of meaning. What was once limited to family or community is now extended to all humanity and even sentient beings. This expansion or contraction of meaning does not negate the core value.
Another form of change is in the hierarchy of values. What was considered primary in one era might be secondary in another. For example, sometimes justice is prioritized over non-violence, and vice versa. This is a change in emphasis, not the negation of values.
Finally, the author warns against mistaking value inversion (e.g., considering licentious behavior moral) for value change. True value change involves evolution, not the abandonment of core principles for mere license.

In conclusion, the article argues that while the external expressions of morality can be relative and subject to context, the core principles of morality, particularly in Jainism – rooted in the pursuit of liberation through Samata and Ahimsa – remain eternal and unwavering. The internal intent and the ultimate goal are the true benchmarks of Sadachar.