Sabhashya Tattvarthadhigama Sutra Me Pratyaksha Praman

This document is a detailed analysis of the concept of "Pratyaksha Pramana" (direct perception) within the framework of the Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, with a focus on the commentary by Umasvati. The author, Shreeprakash Pandey, explores the epistemological debates surrounding this key Jain text and its commentary.

Here's a breakdown of the key points covered:

1. Authorship and Significance of Tattvarthadhigama Sutra:

• The Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, authored by Vachak Umaswati (365-400 CE), is presented as a cornerstone of Jain philosophical literature, offering a concise yet comprehensive exposition of Jain metaphysics in ten chapters.
• It is recognized as the first Sanskrit text in Jain literature and is held in high regard by all Jain traditions (Shvetambara and Digambara).
• A significant portion of the discussion addresses the long-standing debate regarding the authorship of the Sutra and its commentary, with Umasvati being the traditionally accepted author, particularly in the Shvetambara tradition. However, some Digambara scholars attribute the authorship to Gridhrapichchha. The author leans towards Umasvati as the author of the commentary as well, citing the acceptance of Umasvati's lineage and the references in ancient commentaries.

2. The Concept of Pramana (Means of Knowledge) in Indian Philosophy:

• The document begins by defining "Pramana" as that by which something is known (pramiyate'nena).
• It then contrasts the Jain view with other major Indian philosophical schools:
  • Nyaya: Emphasizes sannikarsha (contact between senses and objects) as the primary cause of knowledge, leading to six types of sannikarsha. They also consider the completeness of causal factors.
  • Samkhya: Considers the vritti (activity) of the senses, which take the form of the object, as the proof.
  • Mimamsa: Views the gyatrvyapar (activity of the knower) as the proof, requiring the combination of soul, mind, senses, and the object.
  • Buddhism: Defines proof by the arthasaroopya (similarity with the object), considering intellect as proof, and limiting valid perception to nirvikalpaka (undifferentiated) knowledge.

3. Jain Critique of Other Schools' Theories of Pramana:

• The author then systematically refutes the theories of other schools from a Jain perspective:
  • Nyaya's Sannikarsha: Criticized because inanimate sannikarsha cannot remove ignorance. Senses and sannikarsha are seen as only contributing factors, not the primary means. It also argues that sannikarsha doesn't always lead to knowledge (e.g., vision of sky), and it cannot account for knowledge of subtle, distant, or hidden objects, thus negating omniscient knowledge.
  • Samkhya's Sense-Vritti: Deemed unacceptable as sense activities are inert and cannot be the most effective means of knowledge. The nature and existence of these vrittis are questioned.
  • Buddhist Nirvikalpaka Knowledge: Rejected because it would make worldly interactions and conceptualization impossible. The paradox of inert knowledge producing conceptual knowledge is highlighted. The author argues that if savikalpaka (differentiated) knowledge is the ultimate goal, then it should be considered the proof itself.
  • Mimamsa's Gyatrvyapar: Dismissed as its existence cannot be proven by any other valid means. The author questions whether this activity is inherent or generated, and whether it is knowledge or ignorance.

4. The Jain Conception of Pramana:

• Jains, according to the text, consider knowledge itself as the proof (prama). Umasvati defines pramana as samyag-gyana (right knowledge).
• The five types of knowledge recognized in Jainism are presented as samyag-gyana and thus valid proofs:
  • Mati (sense perception and inference)
  • Shruta (scriptural knowledge)
  • Avadhi (clairvoyance)
  • Manahparyaya (telepathy)
  • Kevala (omniscience)
• Samantabhadra (575-625 CE) further defines pramana as tattva-gyana (knowledge of reality) and divides it into yugapat-sarvabhasi (simultaneous illumination of all) and kramabhasi (sequential illumination). The author finds no fundamental difference between Umasvati's and Samantabhadra's definitions.

5. Types of Pramana: Pratyaksha and Paroksha:

• The text reiterates the universally accepted division of pramana into two types:
  • Pratyaksha (Direct Perception): Knowledge that is not dependent on other means.
  • Paroksha (Indirect Perception): Knowledge that is dependent on other means.
• Historical Context: The earliest Jain scriptures mention only these two types, with the five gyanas being categorized within them. The introduction of four proofs (like in Nyaya) is suggested to have occurred after Bhadrabahu.
• Umasvati firmly establishes the two-fold division, incorporating other schools' proofs within these categories and viewing the four-proof system of Nyaya as merely a different perspective (nayavadantara).
• Paroksha: Umasvati classifies Mati and Shruta gyana as Paroksha, as they depend on external causes (senses and mind).
• Pratyaksha: The etymology of "Pratyaksha" is explored, with "aksha" referring to the soul or self (from ash dhatu meaning to pervade). Therefore, Pratyaksha is knowledge that is self-dependent and directly apprehended by the soul. This definition contrasts with the Nyaya definition where "aksha" refers to the senses.

6. Jain Interpretation of Pratyaksha:

• The Jain tradition defines Pratyaksha as knowledge that is independent of senses and mind, apprehended solely by the soul.
• While "aksha" can sometimes refer to senses for worldly convention, the core Jain understanding emphasizes the soul as "aksha."
• Umasvati's Definition: He defines Pratyaksha as knowledge that is self-dependent and without the need for senses or mind. He explicitly excludes knowledge dependent on senses and mind from Pratyaksha, classifying it as Paroksha.
• Post-Umasvati Developments: Later Jain scholars, possibly influenced by Nyaya, introduced the concept of "Saamvyavaharika Pratyaksha" (conventional/practical direct perception) and "Paramarthika Pratyaksha" (absolute/real direct perception).
  • Saamvyavaharika Pratyaksha: This includes sensory and mental perception, which are considered empirical and derived from the five senses and mind. This is further divided into indriyaja (sense-born) and anindriyaja (mind-born). The four stages of Mati-gyana (Avagraha, Iha, Avaya, Dharana) are described here.
  • Paramarthika Pratyaksha: This refers to the truly direct and pure knowledge that relies solely on the soul's activity, without any external instruments. This category includes Avadhi, Manahparyaya, and Kevala gyanas.

7. Analysis of the Three Types of Paramarthika Pratyaksha:

• Avadhi Gyana (Clairvoyance):
  • Defined as limited knowledge of subtle, material objects (rupa dravya) without the aid of senses or mind, determined by limitations of substance, space, time, and qualities.
  • Two types:
    • Bhavapratyaya: Occurs by birth, naturally attained by beings in hell (naraka) and heaven (deva) without effort. However, even among them, only the right-faith individuals possess it from the first moment.
    • Guna-pratyaya (Kshayopasham-nimittaka): Occurs in beings of lower realms (animals and humans) due to the partial destruction and suppression of the Avadhi-gyanavarniya karma.
  • The six types of Guna-pratyaya Avadhi Gyana are detailed: Ananugami, Anugami, Hiyamanaka, Vardhamanaka, Anavasthita, and Avasthita.
• Manahparyaya Gyana (Telepathy):
  • Defined as the direct knowledge of the thoughts (vichaara-roopa paryaaya) of others, which are imprinted on mental matter (mano-vargana). This is a highly specific form of knowledge arising from the partial destruction and suppression of Manahparyaya-gyanavarniya karma.
  • It is limited to humans who are both sentient and have attained a certain level of character.
  • Two types:
    • Rijumati: Knows present thoughts in a simple, direct manner.
    • Vipulamati: Knows thoughts from the past, present, and future, and can comprehend thoughts that are conceived, unconceived, or partially conceived. Vipulamati is also described as more pure and "apratipati" (non-fading).
• Kevala Gyana (Omniscience):
  • The ultimate and all-encompassing knowledge, knowing all substances and their infinite qualities and states in all times and spaces. It is described as perfect, complete, and absolute.

8. Distinguishing Avadhi and Manahparyaya Gyana:

• The text outlines four differences between Avadhi and Manahparyaya Gyana:
  • Vishuddhikruta (Purity): Manahparyaya Gyana is considered more pure and clear than Avadhi Gyana.
  • Kshetrakruta (Scope of Space): Avadhi Gyana can extend up to the entire universe, while Manahparyaya Gyana is limited to the human realm.
  • Swamikruta (Possessor): Avadhi Gyana can be possessed by monks, householders, and beings in all four realms. Manahparyaya Gyana is limited to those with advanced spiritual conduct.
  • Vishayakruta (Object of Knowledge): Avadhi Gyana knows material substances and their incomplete states. Manahparyaya Gyana knows the thoughts of minds, which is considered a subtler object than the grosser objects of Avadhi Gyana.

9. Conclusion on Umasvati's Pratyaksha:

• The author concludes that Umasvati's explanation of Pratyaksha, based on the agamic tradition of two types of proof (Pratyaksha and Paroksha), is complete in itself.
• He reiterates that knowledge dependent on senses and mind is rightly classified as Paroksha by Umasvati.
• The later classification into Saamvyavaharika and Paramarthika Pratyaksha is seen as an attempt to reconcile Jain epistemology with other philosophical systems, particularly Nyaya, but the core Jain understanding, as presented by Umasvati, remains self-sufficient. The author implies that even Saamvyavaharika Pratyaksha, being dependent on means, is essentially akin to inference and thus Paroksha.