Rightness Of Action And Jaina Ethics

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The article "Rightness of Action and Jaina Ethics" by Kamalchand Sogani explores the fundamental question of how to determine the morality of an action. It begins by critiquing the reliance on social moral codes as a definitive guide, highlighting their subjectivity, potential for internal contradictions, and conflicting nature across different groups. The author argues that a reflective mind seeks a more objective criterion for judging the "rightness" of actions, introducing the Jain concept of Samyaka (or Subha action), which implies not just right action but action with a good motive.

The paper then delves into two major Western ethical theories for determining rightness:

• Teleological Theory (Consequentialism): This theory posits that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by its consequences.

  • Utilitarianism: A specific form of teleology, it judges an action as right if it leads to the greatest balance of good over evil for oneself (ethical egoism, which the author largely sets aside) or for the universe.
  • Act-Utilitarianism: This variant judges each individual action based on its specific consequences, advocating for actions that produce the maximum good in that particular situation.
  • Rule-Utilitarianism: This approach focuses on the general rules that, if followed consistently, would lead to the greatest overall good. These rules are established based on their beneficial consequences and should be followed even if, in a specific instance, breaking them might yield better immediate results.

• Deontological Theory (Duty-Based Ethics): This theory asserts that the rightness or wrongness of an action is inherent in the action itself or in its conformity to certain rules, irrespective of its consequences.

  • Act-Deontology: This perspective judges each action intrinsically right or wrong based on an immediate intuitive understanding of the situation, without considering the consequences. While general rules might emerge indirectly, they cannot override particular intuitive judgments.
  • Rule-Deontology: This view emphasizes the importance of general rules, which are considered intrinsically right or wrong and are not derived from consequences. Adherence to these rules is paramount, even if it leads to unfavorable outcomes (e.g., speaking truth even if it causes harm).

The author then critically examines these theories from a Jaina ethical perspective:

• Critique of Deontology: Jaina ethics finds both act-deontology and rule-deontology untenable.

  • Act-deontology is criticized for overemphasizing the uniqueness of each situation and neglecting the universal applicability of moral principles. Jaina ethics believes moral rules are essential and that individual moral judgments are not always reliable.
  • Rule-deontology is rejected for its absolutism, which can lead to fanaticism (e.g., speaking truth in all circumstances, regardless of dire consequences). Jaina ethics acknowledges that actions cannot be judged in a vacuum and that consequences are crucial. The text cites Mill's observation that rules often require exceptions due to the complexity of human affairs.

• Jaina Ethics and Utilitarianism:

  • Jaina ethics subscribes to the utilitarian basis for judging right and wrong, meaning that core moral rules (like "do not kill," "do not steal") are based on their propensity to produce good consequences for the universe.
  • However, it differs from strict rule-utilitarianism by allowing for exceptions to moral rules in exceptional circumstances, based on a utilitarian calculation of producing a greater balance of good over evil. The Niśitha Sūtra is mentioned as a text that details these exceptions.
  • The author notes that while Jaina ethics allows for breaking rules for utilitarian reasons, it warns against making this common, as it can undermine the social order.
  • Jaina ethics rejects the act-utilitarian approach of recalculating consequences for every single action, suggesting that rules serve as important guiding principles.

• Synthesis and the Jaina Stand:

  • The article proposes a "modified act-utilitarianism" as closer to the Jaina view, where both actions and general principles are considered. Crucially, general principles may be inadequate in complex situations, necessitating a direct assessment of the particular action's consequences.
  • Acts are logically prior to rules, and the rightness of an action is situational.
  • Duty is not self-justifying but is good as a means to producing a greater balance of good over evil.

• The Role of Motives: The author then addresses the role of motives.

  • While Jaina texts emphasize good motives (like kindness), the author points out a potential confusion: Jaina ethics sometimes equates morally praiseworthy motives with right actions, and blameworthy motives with wrong actions.
  • However, the author argues that motives do not alter the fundamental rightness or wrongness of an action, which is determined by consequences. Good motives can lead to wrong actions (e.g., fanaticism), and bad motives can sometimes lead to right actions (e.g., revenge curbing crime).
  • The presence of a good motive adds an additional good, but it doesn't change the action's moral rightness or wrongness, which is tied to its consequences.

In conclusion, the article states that according to Jaina ethics, the primary criterion for determining the rightness or wrongness of an action is the goodness or badness of its consequences. It rejects the idea of absolutely always following rules regardless of outcomes. No action is unconditionally right or wrong, and no action is a duty irrespective of its beneficial consequences. The rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of motives, although motives can be an additional factor contributing to the overall moral evaluation.