Right And The Good In Jaina Ethics - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of Kamal Chand Sogani's "Right and the Good in Jaina Ethics," based on the provided text:

Overall Aim:

Professor Kamal Chand Sogani's paper, delivered at the World Philosophy Conference, aims to reconstruct the Jaina view of ethical philosophy, specifically focusing on its concepts of "right" and "good." Sogani emphasizes that his discussion will remain within the confines of normative and meta-ethics, deliberately excluding the "supra-ethical" spiritual aspects of Jainism.

Presuppositions of Jaina Ethics:

Sogani outlines three foundational assumptions of Jaina ethics:

Existence of Individual Consciousness: Jaina ethics presupposes that individual centers of consciousness exist across time (past, present, future) and possess cognitive, affective, and conative tendencies that drive their actions.
Individual Responsibility and Free Will: A core tenet is that individuals are solely responsible for their actions. This implies the existence of free will, meaning a person could have acted otherwise if they had chosen to. Without this, praise, blame, reward, or punishment would be meaningless.
Individual as Doer and Enjoyer: Jaina ethics assumes individuals are the voluntary doers of their actions, both right and wrong, and consequently, the recipients of the consequences of those actions.

The Rightness of Action (Normative Ethics):

Criterion of Rightness: In Jaina ethics, the terms "right" and "good" are often translated by the term "śubha". The criterion for determining what is morally right is the "greater balance of good over bad" that an action brings into being compared to any alternative.
Rejection of Absolute Deontology: Jaina ethics rejects both act-deontology (certain actions are intrinsically right or wrong) and rule-deontology (certain rules are intuitively right or wrong). It does not view rules like "do not kill" or "do not steal" as absolutely binding in all circumstances.
Teleological (Utilitarian) Approach: Jaina ethics leans towards a teleological theory of rightness, which Sogani equates with a "utilitarian position." This means the rightness of an action is judged by its consequences, specifically its ability to produce the greatest balance of good.
Rejection of Rule-Utilitarianism: While acknowledging that moral rules are generally based on producing good consequences, Jaina ethics does not strictly adhere to rule-utilitarianism (following rules even if they don't yield the best outcome in a particular case).
Situational Ethics and Modified Act-Utilitarianism: Jaina ethics emphasizes that sometimes breaking a rule is necessary to achieve the greater balance of good over bad. This leads to a "modified act-utilitarianism" where each situation requires a direct consideration of the particular action's consequences. Acts are considered logically prior to rules, and the rightness of an action is situational.
Duty and Good Consequences: Moral obligation is tied to producing the greatest good. Duty is not self-justifying but is an instrumental good, a means to achieving a greater balance of good.
Role of Motive: While good motives are valued and often lead to right actions with good consequences, Jaina ethics distinguishes between praiseworthy motives and right actions. An action done with a good motive can still be wrong if its consequences are bad, and vice versa. However, a good motive mitigates blame for a wrong action. Good dispositions and right actions are important, but the consequences ultimately determine the rightness or wrongness of an action.

The Good (Meta-Ethics):

Defining "Śubha" (Good): The intrinsically good or valuable in life, according to Jaina ethics, is defined as an "experience in tune with Ahimsā." This experience is complex, comprising knowing, affecting, and active elements.
The Nature of Ahimsā:
- Presuppositions of Ahimsā: Ahimsā presupposes a world of interconnected living beings who experience pain and value their life.
- Meaning of Ahimsā:
  - Comprehensive Meaning: Ahimsā encompasses the principle that no living being should be killed, ordered, enslaved, distressed, or put into unrest. It extends to aspects like truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity, and non-possession, viewing these as forms of Ahimsā. Ahimsā is the essence of all virtues.
  - Narrow Meaning: The text acknowledges that Ahimsā is often understood simply as non-killing, which is considered a narrow and less socially significant interpretation. Killing is the extreme limit of Himsā (violence), not its sole manifestation.
- Relationship between Fact and Value: Ahimsā, while a value-assertion, is not a mere logical deduction from factual presuppositions. There is an empirical connection between the fact that "life is dear to all" and the normative statement "we ought not to kill."
What is Intrinsically Good? Jaina ethics posits three intrinsically good things:
1. Ahimsā of all living beings: This is the paramount good, with the classification of living beings (based on senses) serving as a measure of the degree of Ahimsā. However, the internal state of mind is considered crucial in judging acts of Himsā and Ahimsā, though outward behavior also has relevance.
2. Virtuous disposition and action, and appreciation for the virtuous: This includes qualities like justice, fearlessness, kindness, charity, forgiveness, straightforwardness, humbleness, egolessness, non-acquisitiveness, and self-control.
3. Knowledge: Knowledge, especially when aligned with the "Ahimsā attitude," is considered good. Misused knowledge is not good.

These three intrinsic goods can be analyzed and seen to be combinations of each other, leading to a "value pluralism" upheld by "Ahiṁsāutilitarianism."

Meta-ethical Trends in Jaina Ethics:

Definition of "Śubha": "Śubha" is defined as an experience in tune with Ahimsā, encompassing emotions, knowledge, and end-seeking actions, accompanied by satisfaction. This definition avoids the extremes of naturalism/non-naturalism and subjectivism/objectivism by relating value to consciousness and acknowledging objective facts about experiences.
Nature of Ethical Judgments: Jaina ethics adopts a cognitive-affective stance. Ethical judgments are not merely expressions of emotion (non-cognitivism) nor purely objective truths devoid of feeling (cognitivism). They are objectively true and involve both knowledge and feeling, as human experience is a blend of both.
Justification of Ethical Judgments: Value judgments are considered self-evident and directly experienced. While factual judgments can be justified through evidence, the justification of ethical judgments lies in their intrinsic goodness (experience in tune with Ahimsā) and not in deriving "ought" from "is."

Conclusion:

In essence, Sogani's paper argues that Jaina ethics is fundamentally teleological, with the consequences of actions (specifically, the balance of good over bad) being the primary criterion for rightness. The ultimate good is defined by an experience aligned with Ahimsā in its comprehensive sense, encompassing non-violence, virtuous conduct, and knowledge. The ethical framework is characterized by an acknowledgment of individual responsibility, free will, and a nuanced understanding of the interplay between rules, situations, motives, and consequences, all guided by the overarching principle of Ahimsā.