Reals On The Jaina Metaphysics

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Overview:

"Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics" by Harisatya Bhattacharya, a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Calcutta in 1947 and published in 1966, is a comparative and critical study of the ontological speculations of Jaina philosophers. The author aims to present Jaina metaphysical concepts by placing them alongside similar problems in other Indian philosophical schools (Nyaya-Vaishēshika, Samkhya-Yoga, Vedanta, Buddhism, Charvaka, Mimamsa) and, where relevant, Western philosophy and science. Bhattacharya emphasizes his neutrality and academic interest, seeking to highlight the plausibility and reasonableness of Jaina philosophical answers.

Key Themes and Structure:

The book is structured thematically, exploring various "reals" and metaphysical concepts, primarily from the Jaina perspective, but always in dialogue with other systems. The author meticulously compares and contrasts viewpoints, often delving into "tedious details of verbal warfare" to ensure clarity.

Core Jaina Metaphysical Concepts Discussed:

The book systematically examines the following "reals" according to Jaina metaphysics:

1. The Problem of Reals (Chapter 2):

   • Particular vs. General: Jainism, unlike some Buddhist schools emphasizing the particular (Svalakṣaṇa), emphasizes understanding a real in all its aspects, including its persisting principle (Sāmānya and Viśeṣa).
   • Rejection of Nihilism: Jainism, like most Indian schools, refutes Buddhist Śūnyavāda (voidism), arguing that absolute nihilism is an impossible position.
   • Critique of other Schools: The book critically examines and contrasts Jaina views with those of the Sābdikas (ultimate reality of Sound), Vedānta (Brahma as the only real), Çārvākas (matter as the basic reality), Sāṁkhya (Prakriti as the ultimate unconscious real), and Nyāya-Vaishēshika (pluralism of atoms, Ākāśa, Kāla, etc.).
   • Jaina Ontology: Jainism recognizes the Soul (Jiva) as a real substance, distinct from Ajivas (non-psychical substances). The Ajivas include:
     • Pudgala (Matter): Discussed extensively, including its subtle and gross forms, properties (touch, taste, smell, color, sound), atomic theory (Paramāņu), and combination of atoms.
     • Ākāśa (Space): Admitted as a real substance, distinct from matter, providing space for all other reals.
     • Kāla (Time): Recognized as a real substance responsible for change (Vartanā, Pariņāma).
     • Dharma and Adharma: Unique Jaina concepts representing principles of motion and rest, respectively. These are admitted as unconscious, formless, eternal, and pervasive reals, distinct from Ākāśa, Kāla, and Pudgala. They are not active causes but "accompanying causes" (Udāsīna Hetus) for motion and rest.
   • Pudgala (Matter): Matter is called Pudgala because it can be combined or separated, changing its extent. Jainas hold that matter is fundamentally one kind, with the potential to develop various qualities. Atoms (Paramāņu) are considered the ultimate, indivisible particles of matter, analogous to mathematical points, devoid of inherent qualities until they combine.
   • Sound: Sound is considered a modification (Paryāya) of matter itself, not an attribute of Ākāśa as in Nyāya-Vaishēshika.
   • Darkness and Shadow: Jainas consider these as modes of matter, not negations of light, contrasting with the Nyāya view.
   • Bodies: Jainas categorize souls into various bodies based on their subtle or gross nature and function, including Audārika (gross), Taijasa (luminous), Kārmaṇa (subtlest, formed from Karma-matter), Vaikriyika (supernatural), and Āhāraka (assumed).
   • Karma: Karma is material (Pudgala) but modified due to its proximity to the soul. It has four aspects: Prakrti (types), Sthiti (duration), Pradeśa (minute parts), and Anubhāga (degree of fruition). Karma is the cause of the soul's bondage, influencing its rebirths and experiences.
   • Sense-Organs (Indriya): Sense-organs are material (Paudgalika) but are considered instruments for the soul's cognition, imbued with a degree of consciousness due to proximity to the soul. They are further classified into Dravyendriya (material) and Bhāvendriya (subjective aspects of the soul). Jainas differentiate their view from Nyāya by emphasizing the soul's role in the sensory process and the Prāpyakāri nature of most senses, disagreeing with Buddhists on vision.
   • Mind (Manas): Jainas differentiate between material Manas (Dravya-Manas) and subjective tendencies of the soul (Bhāva-Manas). While the latter is an aspect of the soul, the former is considered material, a modified form of Pudgala, not an evolution from Pradhāna (as in Sāṁkhya) nor identical with the soul (as in some Buddhist and Vedānta interpretations). They reject the Nyāya view of Manas being eternal and atomic.
   • Soul (Jiva): The Jiva is recognized as a real, conscious substance, distinct from matter. It is described as a doer, an enjoyer, formless (Amūrta), of the same extent as its body, and subject to Karma's influence in its mundane state. It is finite but possesses infinite potentiality. Jainas reject the soul-denying theories of Çārvākas and the momentary conscious series of the Buddhists. They also differ from Vedānta's monism and Nyāya's view of an essentially unconscious soul. Jainas posit an infinite plurality of souls, each unique.
   • The Fourteen Stages of Self-Perfection (Guņasthānas): These describe the soul's progressive journey from ignorance and delusion towards liberation, marked by the gradual shedding of Karma.
   • Five States of the Soul (Bhāva): Pāriņāmika (natural), Audayika (due to Karma's rise), Aupaśamika (due to Karma's mitigation), Kṣāyopaśamika (due to partial annihilation and mitigation of Karma), and Kṣāyika (due to complete annihilation of destructive Karma).
   • The Six Kinds of Souls: Classified by the number of sense-organs possessed, from one-sensed immobile beings to five-sensed beings with minds.
   • The Seven Standpoints (Syādvāda): The Syādvāda, or theory of "in some respects," is central to Jaina epistemology and metaphysics. It states that reality is multi-faceted, and any single predication (like "exists" or "does not exist") is partial. The seven Bhangas (predications) represent a comprehensive understanding of a thing's various aspects (existence, non-existence, inexpressibility, and their combinations).
   • Omniscience (Kevala-jñāna): Jainas believe omniscience is possible and is the natural state of the soul, obscured by Karma. The Tirthamkaras and Siddhas have attained this state. They refute Mimamsa arguments against omniscience and critique the limited omniscience attributed to liberated souls by some other Indian schools.

2. The Principles of Motion and Rest (Chapter 3):

   • Dharma and Adharma: Jainism uniquely posits Dharma as the principle that aids motion and Adharma as the principle that aids rest. These are passive, formless, eternal, and pervasive Ajiva substances, confined to Lokākāśa. They are not the direct causes of motion or rest but facilitate them, analogous to water for a fish.

3. Space (Ākāśa) (Chapter 4):

   • Jaina View: Ākāśa is an infinite, eternal, formless, non-psychical substance that provides space for all other reals. It is distinct from matter.
   • Comparison: Discusses various Western theories (Zeno, Plato, Aristotle, Atomists, Newton, Kant) and Indian theories (Vedanta, Buddhism) on space. Jainas critique the Buddhist notion of space as mere negation and the Vedantic view of its derivative reality. They find some similarities with Plato's concept of an eternal, formless substance.
   • Loka and Aloka: Ākāśa is divided into Loka (world-space, containing all substances) and Aloka (void space, beyond the Loka).

4. Time (Kāla) (Chapter 5):

   • Jaina View: Kāla is a real, distinct, inactive (Niskriya), formless, eternal Ajiva substance. It is responsible for change (Vartanā, Pariņāma). It is composed of indivisible units called Kālāṇus.
   • Comparison: Contrasts Jaina views with Kant, Spinoza, Berkeley, Teichmuller, Vedānta, and Nyāya-Vaishēshika. Jainas reject the idea of time being purely subjective or derived. They distinguish between Phenomenal Time (Vyavahāra Kāla), measured by events, and Noumenal Time (Niścaya Kāla), the underlying reality. Their theory of discrete Kālāṇus and the concept of Vartanā (persistence amidst change) are highlighted.

5. Matter (Pudgala) (Chapter 6):

   • Jaina View: Pudgala is matter, characterized by touch, taste, smell, and color. It is an active (Sakriya) Ajiva substance. Atoms (Paramāņu) are the fundamental, simple, and partless units, unlike Greek atoms. Combination of atoms occurs through inherent forces (Sneha and Rūkṣa) and external conditions. Sound is considered a modification of matter. Darkness and shadow are also seen as material modes.
   • Comparison: Extensive comparisons are made with Greek theories of elements and atoms, and with Indian schools (Çārvāka, Buddhist, Nyāya-Vaishēshika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Vedānta) on the nature of matter, the reality of atoms, and the concept of continuity vs. atomicity. The book suggests Jaina atomism is closer to modern scientific conceptions due to its emphasis on the abstract, point-like nature of atoms.
   • Bodies: Jainas classify bodies into five types: Audārika, Vaikriyika, Āhāraka, Taijasa, and Kārmaṇa, detailing their subtle and gross aspects and their relationship with the soul and Karma.

6. Soul (Jiva) (Chapter 7):

   • Jaina View: The Jiva is a real, conscious (Cetana), active, formless but body-conditioned, agent and enjoyer substance. It is infinite in number and distinct from other souls. It is subject to Karma and transmigrates through various states (Guņasthānas) until liberation. Consciousness has grades: passive feeling, awareness of activity, and pure knowledge.
   • Comparison: Critically analyzes and contrasts Jaina views with Çārvākas (materialism), Buddhists (momentary conscious series, denial of soul), Vedānta (monism of Brahma), Sāṁkhya-Yoga (dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, passive soul), and Nyāya-Vaishēshika (unconscious, immutable, all-pervasive soul). The Jaina insistence on consciousness as the soul's essence, its mutable yet substantial nature, and its body-bound extent are highlighted.
   • Classification: Souls are classified in numerous ways, including by number of senses (Ekendriya to Pañçendriya), stages of spiritual development (14 Guņasthānas), five states (Bhāvas), nine categories (Tattvas), and their relation to Karma.
   • Omniscience: Jainas believe in the possibility of omniscience, attained by perfected souls (Arhats, Siddhas), and criticize other systems that deny it or limit it to a stage before liberation.

Methodology:

Bhattacharya's approach is characterized by:

• Comparative Analysis: Constantly comparing Jaina doctrines with those of other philosophical systems.
• Critical Evaluation: Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of various arguments.
• Detailed Explanation: Engaging with the intricacies of Jaina terminology and concepts.
• Historical and Scientific Context: Drawing parallels with Western philosophy and contemporary scientific understanding to illuminate Jaina ideas.

Conclusion:

"Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics" stands as a rigorous academic exploration of Jaina ontology. It aims to establish Jainism's significant and often unique contributions to Indian philosophy, demonstrating its systematic coherence and intellectual depth through extensive comparative analysis. The book serves as a valuable resource for understanding the complex metaphysical framework of Jainism within the broader landscape of Indian thought.