Rajprashniya Sutra Me Charvak Mat Ka Prastutikaran

Added to library: September 2, 2025

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First page of Rajprashniya Sutra Me Charvak Mat Ka Prastutikaran

Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "राजप्रश्नीय सूत्र में चार्वाक मत का प्रस्तुतीकरण एवं समीक्षा" (Presentation and Critique of Charvaka Doctrine in the Rajprashniya Sutra) by Sagarmal Jain:

This document examines the presentation and critique of the Charvaka (or Lokayata) philosophical school within the Jain Agam scripture, Rajprashniya Sutra. It highlights the Rajprashniya Sutra as the first Prakrit Agam text that not only presents arguments in support of the Charvaka's materialistic and nihilistic ("ucchedavada" - annihilationism, and "tajjivattacchariravada" - the soul is identical to the body) viewpoint but also refutes them.

The text details a dialogue between King Payasi and Keśikumāra Shramana (a Jain monk). King Payasi, representing the Charvaka perspective, presents several arguments to prove that the soul and body are one and that after death, there is no continuation. Keśikumāra Shramana, in turn, provides Jain counter-arguments.

King Payasi's Arguments (Charvaka Perspective):

  1. Argument from Ancestors: Payasi argues that if his irreligious grandfather, who performed wicked deeds, were reborn in hell as claimed by Jainism, he would surely come to inform Payasi about his suffering and warn him against unrighteousness. Since this hasn't happened, Payasi concludes his grandfather, and thus his soul, ceased to exist with his body. Similarly, if his religious grandmother, destined for heaven, doesn't communicate from heaven, it means there is no separate soul.

  2. Argument from Encased Body: Payasi recounts an experiment where he sealed a thief alive in an iron pot, covered and sealed it with hot iron and tin, and placed guards. Upon opening the pot, the thief was found dead, but there was no visible opening for the soul to escape. This leads him to believe the soul and body are inseparable.

  3. Argument from Incorporeality: Payasi describes another experiment where he placed a dead body in an iron pot, sealed it with tin, and found it infested with worms. He argues that no cracks or holes were present for souls to enter and generate worms, thus proving the body alone is the source of life and existence.

  4. Argument from Weighing: Payasi claims to have weighed a person while alive and after death, finding no difference in weight. He reasons that if a soul departed, the body's weight should have decreased.

  5. Argument from Dissection: Payasi states that he cut and dissected the bodies of thieves, searching for the soul, but found no trace of it anywhere. This leads him to conclude that a separate existence of the soul independent of the body cannot be proven.

Keśikumāra Shramana's Counter-Arguments (Jain Perspective):

  1. Response to Ancestors Argument (Hell): Keśikumāra explains that beings in hell cannot come to the human world due to four reasons: lack of power, prohibition by hell-keepers, the consequence of suffering-inducing karma not having exhausted, and their lifespan in hell not having ended. Therefore, his grandfather's inability to communicate doesn't negate the existence of a separate soul. He also refers to the Digha Nikaya for similar reasons.

  2. Response to Ancestors Argument (Heaven): Keśikumāra argues that celestial beings in heaven are so engrossed and attracted to their divine pleasures that they have no desire or recollection of the human world. Their attachment to worldly affairs is severed, and their lifespan is too short (one day in heaven equals 100 years on earth) for them to easily interact with humans. Additionally, the human world is perceived as foul and unpleasant by celestial beings. Thus, his grandmother's silence doesn't imply the soul and body are one.

  3. Response to Encased Body Argument: Keśikumāra uses the analogy of a sound (like a drumbeat) from a well-covered, sealed chamber being audible outside. He states that just as sound travels unimpeded, so does the soul. Therefore, the soul can pass through seemingly impenetrable barriers. (The text notes this argument is not scientifically sound today, but an alternative explanation based on the soul's abstract nature could be offered.)

  4. Response to Incorporeality Argument: Keśikumāra uses the example of a heated iron ball. Even without holes, fire penetrates it. Similarly, the soul, with its unimpeded movement, can enter any space.

  5. Response to Weighing Argument: Keśikumāra uses the analogy of a bag filled with air and a bag emptied of air weighing the same. He explains that just as air is "agurulaghu" (neither heavy nor light), so is the soul. Therefore, a lack of weight difference doesn't prove the soul and body are one. (The text critically notes that this argument is also scientifically questionable as air has weight, and experiments show a difference in the weight of living versus dead bodies, which might not have been detectable with the primitive scales of that era).

  6. Response to Dissection Argument: Keśikumāra illustrates with a story about a man trying to find fire by dissecting logs after the initial fire went out. The man failed because he didn't know how to use the "arani" (fire stick) to generate fire. Only when his companions returned did they show him how to rub the arani with a piece of wood to create fire. Similarly, Payasi's attempt to find the soul by dissecting the body is like trying to find fire by tearing apart the logs – it's foolish. Fire is manifested through the arani, and the soul is manifested through the body, but the soul cannot be seen by dissecting the body.

The document concludes by acknowledging that while these arguments might not hold up to modern scientific scrutiny, they were the primary arguments used in that era to support and refute the Charvaka philosophy. It emphasizes their historical significance for understanding the development of Charvaka thought. The text also points out that many of these arguments are found in both Jain and Buddhist traditions, underscoring their historical authenticity and antiquity. Finally, it mentions that a more detailed philosophical analysis and critique of Charvaka thought in Jain literature can be found in the Visheshavashyakabhashya (7th century CE) by Jinabhadragani Kshamashraman, particularly in its section known as "Gandharavada," which critically examines concepts like the soul, karma, merit-demerit, heaven-hell, bondage-liberation, etc.