Problem Of Absolute In Madhyamaka School

This article, "The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School" by J. W. De Jong, explores the complex and often misinterpreted concept of the absolute within the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, primarily focusing on the work of Nagarjuna.

De Jong begins by acknowledging the significant diversity of interpretations regarding the Madhyamaka absolute, attributing this to the inherent difficulties in understanding any philosophy, especially one outside the Western Greco-Latin and Christian traditions. He cautions against hasty analogies with Western thought and the reliance on isolated passages, emphasizing the need to follow the development of Madhyamaka thought step-by-step.

The core of the article lies in analyzing Nagarjuna's critique of other philosophical systems, particularly the Sarvāstivādins and Vaibhāṣikas, who reduced reality to ontological categories called dharmas. Nagarjuna, however, argues that even these dharmas are devoid of intrinsic reality (svabhāva). He demonstrates through reductio ad absurdum that nothing originates independently, from something else, from both, or without a cause. Therefore, the idea of production itself is false, and consequently, things that appear real are not so because they lack svabhāva.

The concept of svabhāva is central and challenging. De Jong discusses Schayer's fourfold distinction of svabhāva: essence, individual character (svalakṣaṇa), unchanging substratum (aśraya or prakṛti), and absolute being (svato bhāva). However, De Jong argues that for Nagarjuna, these are reducible to two main meanings:

1. The "own-being of each thing": This includes svalakṣaṇa (individual character) and svo bhāva (essence). Madhyamikas consider this unreal. Candrakirti, for instance, equates svalakṣaṇa with svo bhāva, deeming both unreal as they are attributed by the unenlightened to things.
2. The "own-being of all things taken together": This encompasses aśraya (basis) and prakṛti (nature), which Candrakirti interprets as an unchanging, non-contingent support for all things. This concept, for Madhyamikas, leads to the equivalence of śūnya (emptiness) and pratītyasamutpanna (dependent origination).

De Jong then addresses the question of whether this latter svabhāva is also rejected, leading to nihilism. He introduces the Madhyamaka distinction between saṃvṛti (conventional or apparent reality) and paramārtha (ultimate reality or supreme meaning). The layman operates on the level of saṃvṛti, believing in the reality of phenomena, suffering, and liberation. Madhyamikas, however, assert that things lack reality at the level of paramārtha. While things exist conventionally, they do not possess ultimate reality.

Paramārtha itself is elusive and cannot be grasped by words or discursive thought, as the duality inherent in language and cognition belongs to saṃvṛti. Madhyamikas attempt to convey paramārtha through three methods:

1. Negation: Denying attributes without assigning contrary ones.
2. Contradictory Attributes: Describing paramārtha as both void and non-void, being and non-being, thus transcending logical contradictions.
3. Metaphor: Using terms like pratītyasamutpāda, śūnyatā, dharmată, tathatā, etc., as pointers rather than definitive descriptions.

Paramārtha is accessible only through mystical intuition and direct experience, not philosophical understanding. It is the state achieved by the Yogin (saint) who attains liberation, dispelling ignorance. This experience is beyond language and conceptualization.

De Jong criticizes two prominent scholars:

• Schayer: While correctly emphasizing mystical intuition, Schayer errs by identifying paramārtha with the "totality of being." De Jong argues this is contrary to Buddhist thought, which denies the reality of both the whole and its constituent parts (illustrated by the chariot simile where even the parts are considered unreal). Schayer's interpretation attempts to answer a mystical question with philosophical terms.
• Stcherbatsky: Stcherbatsky's tendency to seek analogies with Western thought distorts Buddhist philosophy. His translation of śūnya as "relative" is a prime example, leading to misinterpretations of Nagarjunian thought. De Jong critiques Stcherbatsky's later identification of paramārtha with dharmakāya and an "absolute truth" derived from dialectical reason, arguing it misses the mystical and soteriological character of Madhyamaka.

In conclusion, De Jong asserts that the Madhyamaka absolute cannot be understood as either the totality of being or nothingness, as these are Western philosophical dichotomies. For the Madhyamikas, the absolute is approached through mystical experience, leading to liberation, and remains beyond philosophical discourse, best described as "the silence of the saints."