Pratyabhignya

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text on "Pratyabhijñā" (Recognition/Identification):

The text, "Pratyabhijñā" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, addresses the concept of recognition, a topic where philosophers have historically differed on two main points: its validity as a means of knowledge (prāmāṇya) and its essential nature (svarūpa).

1. Pratyabhijñā as a Means of Knowledge (Prāmāṇya):

• Buddhist Tradition: The Buddhist tradition, due to its theory of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda), does not consider pratyabhijñā as a valid means of knowledge. They argue that the stability or enduring nature that pratyabhijñā relies upon is not ultimately real. For Buddhists, the perception of stability is considered a delusion based on similarity.
• Non-Buddhist Traditions (Jain and Vedic): In contrast, all philosophers within the Jain and Vedic traditions, excluding the Buddhists, accept pratyabhijñā as a valid means of knowledge. They use the validity of pratyabhijñā to refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and to support the concept of permanence or stability.
• Jain Perspective on Permanence: While the Jain tradition does not adhere to an absolute or immutable permanence (kūṭastha nityatva) like some Vedic schools (e.g., Nyaya, Vaisheshika), it does recognize a real and substantial continuity (dhruvatva) across different preceding and succeeding states of an object. Therefore, the Jain tradition also upholds the validity of pratyabhijñā.

2. The Nature of Pratyabhijñā (Svarūpa):

The text outlines three primary schools of thought regarding the nature of pratyabhijñā:

• Buddhist View: The Buddhist view asserts that there is no distinct mental process called pratyabhijñā. Instead, it is merely a combination of two separate cognitions: memory (smaraṇa) and direct perception (pratyakṣa). They argue that the "that" (tat) element being recognized is past and therefore grasped through memory, not direct perception. Conversely, the "this" (idam) element is present and grasped by direct perception, not indirectly. Thus, for Buddhists, pratyabhijñā is the conjunction of two types of knowledge based on the pastness/indirectness and presentness/directness of their objects.

• Vedic View (e.g., Nyaya, Mimamsa): In opposition to the Buddhist view, Vedic philosophies like Nyaya and Mimamsa argue that pratyabhijñā is a single, unified cognition of the nature of direct perception, not a combination of two distinct knowledges (perception and memory). They acknowledge that the rule for direct perception is generally to grasp only the present, but this rule has exceptions under specific conditions of sensory input.

  • Vācaspati Miśra's Explanation: Vācaspati Miśra explains that even a sense organ, which typically grasps only the present, can lead to pratyabhijñā by grasping the present qualified by a past state, aided by the residual impression (saṃskāra) or memory.
  • Jayanta's Argument: Jayanta, following Vācaspati, adds another argument. He proposes that after a direct perception assisted by memory, there is a subsequent mental cognition (mānasajñāna) that is called pratyabhijñā. This idea is seen as a precursor to the concept of extraordinary direct perception (alaukika pratyakṣa) in later Nyaya.

• Jain View: Jain logicians do not agree with either the Buddhist view of a mere combination of two cognitions or the Vedic view of it being a direct perception through external senses. Instead, they classify pratyabhijñā as a perceptual cognition (parokṣa jñāna).

  • The Jain Process: According to Jain logicians, after the sensory cognition and memory, a concluding, disparate mental cognition (saṃkalpanātmaka vijātīya mānasajñāna) arises, and this is what constitutes pratyabhijñā.
  • Akalaṅka's System: This formulation by Akalaṅka (as found in Laghiyastraya) is considered similar to Jayanta's idea of a mental cognition and is universally accepted by all Jain logicians.
  • Acārya Hemacandra's Agreement: Acārya Hemacandra also defines pratyabhijñā in this manner, using it to refute opposing views and support the Jain position.
  • Inclusion of Upamāna: The text also notes that while Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas consider upamāna (analogy) as a separate valid means of knowledge dealing with similarity and dissimilarity, Jain logicians have from the outset included all such knowledge (like understanding "shortness" or "tallness" relative to something else) within pratyabhijñā, treating it as a specific type of matijñāna (sense-based cognition). This is a unanimously accepted Jain position.

In essence, the book "Pratyabhijñā" by Sukhlal Sanghavi establishes that the validity of recognition is a cornerstone for refuting momentariness and affirming a nuanced form of continuity in Jain philosophy. It then delves into the distinct Jain understanding of recognition as a specific type of inferential or mental cognition that follows sensory perception and memory, contrasting this with the views of Buddhist and Vedic schools.