Pramey Kamal Marttand Part 3

The provided text is the third part of "Pramey Kamal Marttand," a commentary on Manikyanandi's "Parikshamukha Sutra," authored by Prabhachandracharya and translated into Hindi by Arya Shri Jinmati Mataji. This section focuses on Jain logic and philosophy, presenting detailed refutations of various non-Jain philosophical schools, primarily Buddhism and Vaisheshika, regarding fundamental epistemological and ontological concepts.

Here's a breakdown of the key themes and arguments presented in the text:

I. The Nature of Reality and Knowledge (Pramana and Prameya):

• The Subject of Knowledge (Vishaya): The text begins by establishing that the object of valid knowledge (pramana) is something that possesses both general (samanya) and specific (vishesha) characteristics. It refutes the Buddhist view that reality is solely specific (vishesha) and the Advaitic view that reality is solely general (samanya).

  • Generality (Samanya): This is described as the principle of continuity across different instances (e.g., "cow-ness" in all cows) and also as the continuity of a substance through its different transformations (e.g., the same substance being a pot, then a wall, etc., all being "earth").
  • Specificity (Vishesha): This refers to the distinguishing characteristics that make one thing different from another (e.g., the specific color or markings of a particular cow, or the distinct transformations of earth into a pot vs. a wall).
  • Refutation of Extreme Views: The text argues against both the extreme view that reality is only general (leading to undifferentiated oneness) and the extreme view that reality is only specific (leading to momentariness and non-existence of enduring substances). It asserts that reality must be both general and specific to account for both continuity and difference, and to explain causal efficacy.

• Types of Generality (Samanya):

  • Tiryak Samanya: Generality that exists across multiple distinct substances (e.g., "cow-ness" in many cows).
  • Urdhva Samanya: Generality that represents the continuity of a single substance through its temporal changes (e.g., the persistence of "earth" as a substance despite its transformation into a pot).

• Critique of Buddhist Doctrines:

  • Kshanikavada (Momentariness): The text extensively refutes the Buddhist idea that all reality is momentary, arising and perishing in an instant. It argues that this view contradicts direct perception (which shows continuity), the possibility of memory and recognition (pratyabhijna), and causal principles. It also highlights the problem of explaining causality and continuity if things are truly momentary.
  • Anvayavada (Rejection of Substance): The Buddhist denial of a persistent substance (atman or soul) is criticized for leading to the logical fallacy of "action without an agent" (kritanasha) and "fruit without an agent" (akritabhyaagam). The text asserts the existence of a soul (atman) as the continuous, underlying principle that experiences the results of actions.
  • Asambandhavada (Rejection of Relations): The Buddhist denial of inherent relations between things is refuted by pointing to the evident relational nature of reality (e.g., threads forming cloth, ingredients forming a mixture) and the necessity of relations for causal efficacy.
  • Absence of a Real "General": The Buddhist view that generals are mere conceptual constructs is also challenged.

II. Refutation of Other Philosophical Schools (primarily Vaisheshika):

The text then systematically dismantles the Vaisheshika categories, arguing against the independent existence of several of them:

• Critique of Samanya (Generality): The text refutes the Vaisheshika notion of eternal, all-pervading generality, highlighting logical inconsistencies and contradictions with perception. It reiterates the Jain view that generality is inherent in particulars and is understood through causal efficacy and perceived similarities.
• Rejection of Brahmana-jati (Caste): The Vaisheshika concept of an inherent, eternal "Brahmana-hood" is refuted. Prabhachandracharya argues that such a concept is not supported by perception or valid inference. Birth distinctions, karma, and conduct are presented as more relevant to social roles, rather than an inherent, immutable caste essence.
• Critique of Karma (Action): The Vaisheshika classification of karma into five types (utkshepana, avakshepana, akunchana, prasarana, gamana) is criticized as being unnecessarily complex and reducible to the more general concept of "parispanda" (movement/change) inherent in all substances.
• Critique of Vishesha (Specifics): The Vaisheshika concept of "vishesha" as the ultimate, simple differentiators residing in eternal substances (like atoms and souls) is argued to be illogical. If they are truly simple and different, they would be undetectable, and their existence is based on problematic inferences.
• Rejection of Samavaya (Inherence): The Vaisheshika concept of samavaya as the relation between inseparable qualities and substances is rejected. The text argues that relations are either not perceived, or if perceived, are reducible to other known relations or are inherently problematic (e.g., leading to infinite regress). The Jain view of immanence or inherence of qualities within substances is presented as sufficient.
• Critique of Akasha (Space/Ether): The concept of space as an all-pervading, eternal, and formless substance is challenged. The text argues that the perception of "here" and "there" can be explained by the relation of substances to direction and location, and that attributing qualities like "vastness" to something formless is problematic. The existence of direction (disha) as a separate substance is also denied, being explained through the relation of objects to cardinal points.
• Critique of Kala (Time): The concept of time as a fundamental, all-pervading substance is questioned. The text argues that temporal distinctions (past, present, future, simultaneity, succession) are better understood as characteristics of substances and their changes, rather than an independent entity.
• Critique of Atman (Soul): The Vaisheshika view of the soul as an all-pervading, eternal, and simple substance is extensively critiqued. The text argues that the soul's experienced characteristics (consciousness, knowledge, experience of pleasure/pain) point to it being active, enumerable (in terms of souls), and having modalities, contradicting the idea of an unchanging, all-pervading, simple substance. It also refutes the idea of soul's activity being caused by external factors like God or unseen merit/demerit.
• Critique of Guna (Qualities): The Vaisheshika list of 24 qualities is analyzed, and many are argued to be either reducible to other categories, or to be inherent properties of substances rather than separate qualities. For example, magnitude (parimana) is seen as an intrinsic property, not a separate quality.
• Critique of Karma (Action): The Vaisheshika classification of action is seen as an unnecessary proliferation of categories, as action is viewed as a natural transformation or movement of substances.

III. Jain Epistemology and Ontology:

Throughout the text, Jain principles are implicitly or explicitly presented as superior:

• Anekantavada (Non-one-sidedness): The Jain doctrine that reality is multifaceted and can be viewed from multiple perspectives is a recurring theme. This is used to explain how something can be both general and specific, or how permanence and change coexist.
• Syadvada (Conditional Predication): The underlying principle of Jain logic, acknowledging that statements are always made from a particular perspective and are therefore conditional.
• Pratyaksha and Anumana: The text emphasizes the validity and reliability of direct perception and inference, and uses these to challenge the illogical assumptions of other schools.
• Anekantavada in Relation to Other Philosophies: The critique of other schools often stems from their adherence to extreme one-sided views (ekanta vada) which, according to Jainism, fail to capture the fullness of reality.

Overall Purpose:

The "Pramey Kamal Marttand Part 3" aims to:

1. Establish the Jain understanding of reality: Emphasizing the anekantavada view that reality possesses both general and specific characteristics.
2. Systematically refute opposing philosophical views: By exposing logical inconsistencies, contradictions with perception, and inferential fallacies in Buddhist and Vaisheshika doctrines regarding categories like generality, specificity, time, space, soul, qualities, action, and substance.
3. Assert the validity and scope of Jain logic: Demonstrating how Jain principles, particularly anekantavada, provide a more comprehensive and coherent explanation of reality.

The text is highly analytical and argumentative, engaging deeply with the philosophical tenets of the schools it criticizes.