Pramey Kamal Marttand Part 2

This document is the second part (द्वितीय भाग) of the Pramey Kamal Marttand (प्रमेय कमल मार्तंड), a commentary on the Parikshamukha Sutra (परीक्षामुख सूत्र) by Acharya Manikyanandi (श्री माणिक्यनंदी आचार्य). The commentary itself is by Prabhachandracharya (श्री प्रभाचन्द्राचार्य) and the Hindi translation/commentary is by Aryika Jinmati Mataji (आर्यिका जिनमती माताजी).

The document provides a summary of various philosophical and epistemological concepts discussed in Jainism, primarily focusing on Pramana (प्रमाण), the means of valid knowledge. It delves into critical analyses and refutations of various philosophical schools like Buddhism, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, Mimansa, and Charvaka.

Here's a breakdown of the key topics covered in the summary:

Part 1 of the Work:

• Established the principles of Pramana.
• Detailed the nature of Pratyaksha Pramana (direct perception), including its types (Paramarthik and Samvyavaharik Pratyaksha).
• Covered 18 sutras from the Parikshamukha.

Part 2 of the Work (This Volume):

• Continues the discussion on Pramana and covers the remaining sutras.
• It is divided into twenty chapters (प्रकरण).

Key Topics Discussed in Part 2:

1. Arth Karanavada (अर्थ कारणवाद): Refutation of the Buddhist and Nyaya view that knowledge is a product of matter. Jainism posits that knowledge is an inherent quality of the soul, modified by karma. It also addresses the debate on whether matter or light is the cause of knowledge, refuting the idea that matter or light are the direct causes.
2. Aavaran Siddhi (आवरण सिद्धि): Discusses the concept of "covering" or obscuring substances that hinder the soul's knowledge. It refutes Avidya (ignorance) and Adrishta (an unseen quality) as coverings, identifying karmic pudgals (subtle matter) as the true coverings that obstruct knowledge. It also explains how Samvara (stopping influx of karma) and Nirjara (shedding of karma) lead to the removal of these coverings.
3. Sarvajnatva Vada (सर्वज्ञत्ववाद): Argues for the concept of omniscience (Sarvajna) in Jainism. It refutes the Mimansa and Charvaka views that reject omniscience and defends the Jain understanding of omniscience through logical arguments and refutations of opposing viewpoints.
4. Ishwaravada (ईश्वरवाद): Critiques the Nyaya and Vaisheshika belief in Ishvara (God) as the creator of the universe. It argues against a single, all-powerful creator, stating that substances undergo transformations due to their inherent nature and external causes, and that the existence of suffering and imperfection in the world contradicts the concept of a benevolent creator.
5. Prakriti Kartrutva Vada (प्रकृतिकर्तृत्ववाद): Critiques the Sankhya philosophy that posits Prakriti (primordial matter) as the creator. It argues against Prakriti being the cause of the universe, especially its conscious attributes, and also refutes the idea of Prakriti and Purusha (soul) together being the cause.
6. Kevala Aahaar Vichar (कवलाहार विचार): Discusses the controversial topic of whether Arhats (Jinas) consume food (Kevala Ahara). It refutes the Shvetambara view of Arhats consuming food, arguing that their bodies are different, they are free from desires like hunger, and they possess infinite strength, making food unnecessary. It highlights the presence of subtle karmic and 'nokarmic' matter as sustenance.
7. Moksha Swaroop Vichar (मोक्षस्वरूप विचार): Explores the nature of Moksha (liberation). It refutes various philosophical definitions of Moksha from schools like Vaisheshika, Vedanta, Buddhism, and Sankhya. The Jain perspective is presented as the attainment of the soul's pure, inherent state of infinite knowledge, perception, bliss, and power, achieved through the complete destruction of karmic coverings.
8. Stri Mukti Vichar (स्त्रीमुक्ति विचार): Addresses the possibility of women attaining liberation. It refutes the Shvetambara view of women directly attaining Moksha in their female form, arguing that the necessary spiritual discipline and detachment are hindered by societal and biological factors. However, it suggests that women can achieve liberation by taking a male form in a future birth after performing meritorious deeds.
9. Smriti Pramanyavada (स्मृति प्रामाण्यवाद): Defends the validity of memory as a means of knowledge, refuting the Buddhist denial of its validity. It argues that memory is essential for daily life, learning, and transactions, and its invalidity would also undermine other forms of knowledge.
10. Pratyabhijna (प्रत्यभिज्ञान): Discusses the validity of recognition (identifying something as the same despite changes over time). It refutes the Buddhist rejection of Pratyabhijna, arguing that it is a distinct and valid means of knowledge, crucial for understanding continuity and identity.
11. Tarka Pramana (तर्क प्रमाण): Analyzes the role of Tarka (reasoning or logic) as a means of knowledge. It explains that Tarka helps in establishing the invariability (Avinabhav) between a cause and effect or a sign and its object, which is essential for inference.
12. Anumana Pramana Lakshana (अनुमान प्रमाण लक्षण): Defines Anumana (inference) and the characteristics of a valid logical reason (Hetu). It refutes the Buddhist theory of "Trairupya" (three characteristics of a valid reason) and the Naiyayika's "Panchrupya" (five characteristics), advocating for "Saadhyavinabhavitvena Nishchita" (certainty of being invariably connected with the predicate) as the sole essential characteristic of a valid reason.
13. Avinabhavadi Lakshana (अविनाभावादि लक्षण): Elaborates on the concept of invariable connection (Avinabhav) and its types (Sahbhava, Kramabhava). It explains how Tarka is instrumental in establishing these connections.
14. Ved Apaurusheyatva Vada (वेद अपौरुषेयत्ववाद): Critiques the Mimamsa doctrine of the Vedas being unauthored (Apaurusheya) and eternal. It argues that Vedas, like other literary works, must have an author and that the concept of an unauthored scripture is illogical and contradictory.
15. Shabda Nityatva Vada (शब्द नित्यत्ववाद): Refutes the Mimamsa belief in the eternality of sound (Shabda). It argues that sound is transient and dependent on physical causes, and the concept of eternality leads to logical inconsistencies.
16. Shabda Sambandha Vichar (शब्द संबंध विचार): Discusses the relationship between words and their meanings, arguing for a conventional relationship rather than an inherent one.
17. Apoha Vada (अपोहवाद): Critiques the Buddhist theory of Apoha (negation or exclusion) as the meaning of words, arguing that words directly refer to objects, not merely to the negation of other things.
18. Sphota Vada (स्फोटवाद): Refutes the Grammarian theory of Sphota, the indivisible sound-essence that conveys meaning. It argues that meaning is conveyed through the conventional association of spoken words, not through an inherent eternal sound-essence.
19. Vakya Lakshana Vichar (वाक्य लक्षण विचार): Defines the characteristics of a sentence (Vakya) and the process of understanding its meaning, emphasizing the role of constituent words and their semantic relationships.

In essence, the second part of Pramey Kamal Marttand is a rigorous philosophical treatise that systematically analyzes and refutes various non-Jain philosophical viewpoints, reinforcing the validity and depth of Jain epistemology and metaphysics.