Pramanya Swata Ke Parat

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Pramanya Swata ke Parat" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, based on the provided PDF excerpt:

Book Title: Pramanya Swata ke Parat (Is Validity Intrinsic or Extrinsic?) Author: Sukhlal Sanghavi Publisher: Z_Darshan_ane_Chintan_Part_2_004635.pdf Catalog Link: https://jainqq.org/explore/249263/1

This essay by Sukhlal Sanghavi explores the philosophical debate surrounding the validity of knowledge, specifically whether knowledge's correctness is intrinsic to itself or dependent on external factors. The author begins by explaining the genesis of the essay, stemming from a question posed by the renowned poet Kant about a specific verse (karika) concerning the nature of validity.

Key Terms and Concepts:

The author first defines several crucial terms to ensure clarity in the subsequent discussion:

• Pramatva (પ્રમાત્વ): The correctness or truthfulness of knowledge.
• Pramanya (પ્રામાણ્ય): The inherent validity or truthfulness of knowledge. (Used interchangeably with Pramatva in this context).
• Swatah (સ્વતઃ): Intrinsic; knowledge's truthfulness is perceived simultaneously with the knowledge itself.
• Paratah (પરતઃ): Extrinsic; knowledge's truthfulness is determined by something other than the knowledge itself.
• Abhyasdasha (અભ્યાસદશા): State of frequent familiarity.
• Anabhyasdasha (અનભ્યાસદશા): State of infrequent familiarity (opposite of Abhyasdasha).
• Vyavsay (વ્યવસાય): Definitive knowledge of a subject.
• Anuvyavsay (અનુવ્યવસાય): Subsequent knowledge that apprehends the initial definitive knowledge.
• Akriyajnana (અક્રિયાજ્ઞાન): Knowledge leading to action, followed by the experience of achieving the intended purpose of that action.
• Samvad (સંવાદ): Correspondence; when subsequent experience does not contradict previous knowledge.
• Visamvad (વિસંવાદ): Contradiction; when subsequent experience contradicts previous knowledge.
• Pravartakajnana (પ્રવર્તકજ્ઞાન): Knowledge that leads to action (either to accept or reject the object of knowledge).

Historical Origin of the Debate:

The debate on intrinsic (swatah) versus extrinsic (paratah) validity has deep historical roots, primarily originating from discussions about the authority and validity of the Vedas.

• Vedic Authority: Initially, people had strong faith in the Vedic hymns. However, as the ritualistic (karma kanda) sections of the Vedas became complex and detached from genuine spiritual experience (e.g., promoting violence in sacrifices), doubts arose.
• Emergence of Opposing Views: This led to two main camps:
  1. Skeptic Camp: Those who questioned the Vedas, particularly their support for violent rituals, arguing that if the Vedas advocated unrighteousness, they couldn't be true. They began to consider Vedic texts potentially unauthoritative if attributed to human authors, who might be flawed.
  2. Orthodox Camp: Those who defended the absolute authority of all Vedic rituals and the entire Vedic corpus without compromise.
• The Core Question: The central debate became the authoritativeness (pramanya) of the Vedas.
  • The skeptical side argued that scriptures authored by humans might contain errors due to the author's self-interest or ignorance.
  • The orthodox side countered that the Vedas are not authored by humans. Therefore, any flaws stemming from human ignorance or self-interest could not be present.
• From Vedas to All Knowledge: This discussion about Vedic authorlessness (apaurusheyatva) eventually branched into the nature of eternality (nityatva) and non-eternality (anitivatva) of the Vedas. The intrinsic validity (swatah-pramanya) argument arose from the assertion that since the Vedas are not authored by humans and are eternal, their validity is inherent and not dependent on any external factor. The extrinsic validity (paratah-pramanya) argument emerged as a counter, suggesting that if human authorship (even of other texts) could introduce flaws, then validity itself might be dependent on causal factors, including potential flaws or merits.
• Expansion to All Cognition: Initially confined to the domain of verbal testimony (shabda-pramana), the concept of intrinsic versus extrinsic validity gradually expanded to encompass all forms of valid knowledge (pramana), including perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumiti), etc. The debate also evolved from focusing solely on the origin of validity to also include the apprehension (jnapti) and function (karya) of validity.

Literary Development:

The author traces the literary evolution of this debate:

• Early Mentions: Scattered references can be found in ancient texts like Nirukta, concerning the eternality/non-eternality of words.
• Significant Milestones:
  • Shaabar Bhashya (Sabara Swami): A key text supporting the intrinsic validity (swatah) view.
  • Buddhist Scholars (Dignaga) and Jain Scholars (Siddhasena, Samantabhadra): Contributed to the extrinsic validity (paratah) view.
  • Kumarila Bhatta: His "Shloka Varttika" extensively discussed the intrinsic view, drawing strong opposition from Buddhists, Jains, and Naiyayikas.
  • Shantarakshita and Kamalashila: Their works provided further Buddhist perspectives.
  • Jain Scholars (Vidyananda, Prabhachandra): Wrote extensively on this topic in works like "Ashtasahasri" and "Prameyakamalamartanda."
  • Naiyayikas (Udayana, Gangeśa, Vardhamāna): Developed sophisticated arguments for the extrinsic view.
  • Mimamsakas (Pārthasārathi Miśra) and Jain Scholar (Vādideva Sūri): Further enriched the literature.
  • Gadapradhara Bhattacharya and Yashovijaya Upadhyaya: Added final touches and practical applications to the vast body of literature.

Classification of Philosophical Schools:

The author classifies the philosophical schools based on their stance:

• Intrinsic Validity (Swatah-Pramanya): Primarily adopted by Purva Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa (Vedanta).
  • Reasoning: Mimamsakas found the intrinsic validity of Vedas to be a logical necessity to resolve Vedic scriptural claims and contradictions. Vedantins accepted this naturally as their focus was on interpreting already established Vedic truths.
• Extrinsic Validity (Paratah-Pramanya): Adopted by Jainism, Buddhism, and the remaining four Vedic schools: Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, and Yoga.
  • Reasoning: Jain and Buddhist philosophies, which questioned Vedic authority, naturally presented extrinsic validity as a more logical explanation. Nyaya and Vaisheshika, being logic-driven, could not accept intrinsic validity that contradicted reasoned analysis. They preserved Vedic authority by introducing Ishvara (God) as a supporting factor. Sankhya and Yoga largely followed Nyaya and Vaisheshika in this regard.

Core Arguments of Both Sides:

The essay delves into the main arguments concerning the origin (utpatti), apprehension (jnapti), and function (karya) of validity:

1. Origin (Utpatti):

   • Swatah-Advocates: The same causal factors that produce knowledge also produce its truthfulness. No additional cause is needed for truthfulness; only for untruthfulness (due to defects/dosha). If the causal factors are free from defects, knowledge arises with its validity intrinsically.
   • Paratah-Advocates: Just as untruthfulness (apramanya) requires an additional cause (defects), truthfulness (pramanya) also requires an additional cause – merits/virtues (guna). They argue that defects and merits are independent positive entities, not mere absences. If a knowledge-generating process lacks defects, it doesn't mean it has validity; it simply means it's free from untruth. For validity, specific merits are needed, making it extrinsic.

2. Apprehension (Jnapti):

   • Swatah-Advocates: The validity of knowledge is apprehended simultaneously with the knowledge itself. If apprehension of validity were a separate act requiring further verification, it would lead to an infinite regress (anavastha), where the truth of the verifying knowledge itself needs verification. They often rely on the experience of familiarity (abhyasa), where knowledge of familiar objects is immediately accepted as valid without doubt.
   • Paratah-Advocates: Validity, like untruthfulness, is apprehended later. The untruthfulness of a cognition is revealed through contradiction (visamvad) or failed action. Similarly, the truthfulness of a cognition is confirmed through correspondence (samvad) or successful action. They argue that not doubting familiar objects doesn't negate the need for verification for unfamiliar ones. The human desire for knowledge is limited, so an infinite regress is unlikely. Moreover, immediate acceptance of validity would eliminate doubt about whether a cognition is true or false. Therefore, validity should be apprehension by another cognition, like untruthfulness.

3. Function (Karya):

   • Swatah-Advocates: Once knowledge is produced, it performs its function (revealing the object) without needing any further external factors. If it needed external factors (like knowledge of virtues or confirmation), it would lead to infinite regress.
   • Paratah-Advocates: Knowledge requires confirmation through correspondence (samvad) to fulfill its function properly. This confirmation is the knowledge of the purpose achieved (arthakriyajnana), which is itself self-validating. The special quality of validity in the function of knowledge must stem from a cause, which is this confirmation. Therefore, the function of knowledge is also extrinsic.

Conclusion:

The essay by Sukhlal Sanghavi meticulously outlines the historical development, philosophical classifications, and core arguments of the "intrinsic versus extrinsic validity" debate. It highlights how this foundational epistemological discussion, born from the necessity of establishing the authority of the Vedas, evolved to encompass the nature of all knowledge and profoundly influenced Indian philosophical discourse for centuries. The author emphasizes that the differing stances of the schools are logically consistent with their respective goals and methodologies.