Pramannay Tattvalolankar

This document is a Jain text titled "Pramananay Tattvalolankar" (प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालंकार), authored by Shri Vadideva Suri (श्रीवादिदेवसूरी). The edition provided here is compiled and published by Pujya Acharya Shri Vijayramsurishwarji M. Sa. (पूज्य आचार्य श्री विजयरामसूरीश्वरजी म. सा.) and published by Shri Surendrasurishwarji Jain Tattvajnana Shala, Ahmedabad (श्री सुरेन्द्रसूरीश्वरजी जैन तत्त्वज्ञानशाला, अहमदाबाद).

The text is a commentary (Savachurika) on Vadideva Suri's original work. It was first published in 1984 (Samvat 2040 V.S., 2510 V.N.). The publication is dedicated to the memory of Shri Dhulchand Bechurdas, who generously contributed to its publication.

The Preface (Prastavana) highlights the unique significance of Jain Darshan (philosophy) within the vast landscape of Indian philosophies, attributing it to its core principles of Syadvada (the doctrine of manifold aspects) and Anekanta (non-absolutism). It explains that while other philosophies may view entities from a single perspective (e.g., Sankhya seeing the soul as eternal, Buddhism as non-eternal), Jainism, through Anekanta, presents a complete picture by acknowledging all inherent properties from different viewpoints.

The book itself is structured into eight chapters, each focusing on a specific aspect of Jain epistemology and logic:

• Chapter 1: Pramana Swarup Nirnayo (प्रमाणस्वरूप निर्णय): This chapter establishes the definition of Pramana (means of valid knowledge), asserting that it is knowledge that allows for the affirmation or negation of intended or unintended objects. It clarifies that mere sensory contact (Sannikarsa) is not Pramana, as it requires a definitive grasp of the object. It discusses the nature of valid knowledge, differentiating it from misapprehensions like Viparyaya (wrong knowledge), Samshaya (doubt), and Anadhyavasaya (indefinite knowledge). The chapter also delves into the distinction between knowledge of the self and knowledge of external objects.

• Chapter 2: Pratyaksha Swarup Nirnayo (प्रत्यक्ष स्वरूप निर्णय): This chapter focuses on Pratyaksha Pramana (direct perception). It defines Pratyaksha as clear knowledge, arising from the destruction or subsiding of obscuring karmas. It distinguishes between clear and unclear perception and further categorizes Pratyaksha into Saṁvyavahārika (empirical) and Pāramārthika (transcendental). Empirical Pratyaksha is further divided into sensory and non-sensory. It details the stages of empirical perception: Avagraha (perception), Iha (concomitant perception), Avāya (post-perceptual cognition), and Dhāraṇā (retention). Pāramārthika Pratyaksha is then explained as Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manahparyaya (telepathy), and Kevala (omniscience).

• Chapter 3: Smaraṇa-pratyabhijñā-tarka-anumāna-āgama svarūpa nirṇaya (स्मरण-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-तर्क-अनुमान-आगम स्वरूप निर्णय): This chapter covers the remaining types of valid knowledge:

  • Smaraṇa (Memory): Knowledge of a past experience triggered by recollection.
  • Pratyabhijñā (Recognition): Knowledge that identifies an object as the same one previously known, often with the addition of identifying features.
  • Tarka (Hypothetical Reasoning): Reasoning based on the relationship between a cause and its effect, or a probans and its probandum, including possibilities of absence.
  • Anumāna (Inference): This is presented in two forms: Swartha (inference for oneself) and Parartha (inference for others, typically in a logical argument). It elaborates on the nature of a valid middle term (Hetu) and refutes the validity of other inferential models. It discusses the various types of fallacies in inference (Hetvabhasas).
  • Āgama (Testimony/Scripture): Knowledge derived from the word of an Apt (truthful and omniscient being). It discusses the nature of Aptas and the characteristics of their words.

• Chapter 4: Āgama Swarup Nirnayo (आगम स्वरूप निर्णय): This chapter continues the discussion on Āgama (scriptural testimony). It defines Āgama as knowledge arising from the words of an Apt. It explains the definition of an Apt (one who knows and speaks things as they are) and their words. It categorizes Āgamas into Laukika (worldly) and Lokottara (transcendental, i.e., the teachings of Tirthankaras). It analyzes the nature of words (Varna, Pada, Vakya) and the relationship between words and their meanings, refuting theories of natural or conventional association and upholding the inherent power of words. It also discusses the Seven-Valued Logic (Saptabhangi) as a way to express the manifold nature of reality through language.

• Chapter 5: Prameya Swarup Nirnayo ( प्रमेय स्वरूप निर्णय): This chapter defines the object of knowledge (Prameya). It states that the object of valid knowledge is the entity that is characterized by Anekanta (having various aspects), being a combination of the general and the specific. It further categorizes generality into Tiryak Samanya (transverse generality, common to individuals of the same species) and Urdhva Samanya (vertical generality, common to different states of the same substance). Specificity is then divided into Guna (attributes that co-exist with the substance) and Paryaya (modes or transformations that occur in succession).

• Chapter 6: Phala Pramana Swarupadibhas Nirnayo (फल-प्रमाण-स्वरूपादिभास निर्णय): This chapter discusses the result or fruit of Pramana (Phala). It states that the result of Pramana is the removal of ignorance. It distinguishes between immediate results (like the removal of ignorance about an object) and mediate results (like the inclination towards accepting or rejecting things). It argues that the fruit of Pramana is not separate from Pramana itself, refuting theories that claim otherwise. It also elaborates on the different types of fallacies of Pramana (Pramanaabhasas) and their characteristics.

• Chapter 7: Naya Swarup Nirnayo (नय स्वरूप निर्णय): This chapter focuses on Naya (a particular perspective or partial view). It defines Naya as a viewpoint that focuses on a particular aspect of reality, derived from scriptural knowledge, while remaining indifferent to other aspects. It explains that Naya is distinct from Pramana (which grasps the entirety) and also from erroneous knowledge (Nayaabhasa). It categorizes Nayas, discussing the broad classifications of Dravyaarthika (viewpoint of substance) and Paryayaarthika (viewpoint of modes). It then details various sub-categories of these Nayas, such as Naigama, Sangraha, Vyavahara, Rujusūtra, Shabda, Samabhirūḍha, and Evambhūta, and their respective fallacies. It also explains the nature of the Seven-Valued Logic (Saptabhangi) from the perspective of Nayas.

• Chapter 8: Vadi-prativadi-nyaya Nirnayo (वादी-प्रतिवादी-न्याय निर्णय): This final chapter discusses the process of debate and argumentation (Vada). It defines Vada as a discussion aimed at establishing a point through reasoning and refutation of opposing arguments, particularly when dealing with contradictory attributes of an entity. It outlines the participants in a debate: the Vadin (speaker), Prativadin (opponent), Sabhya (audience members), and Sabhapati (moderator). It describes the qualities of each participant and the rules of debate, including the objectives of victory and establishing truth. It also discusses the different types of debaters (Jigishu - one who desires victory, and Tattvanirninishu - one who desires to ascertain truth) and their motivations.

In essence, "Pramananay Tattvalolankar" is a detailed exploration of Jain epistemology and logic, providing a systematic analysis of valid means of knowledge (Pramana), partial viewpoints (Naya), and the methodology of philosophical debate. It aims to clarify the Jain perspective on reality by emphasizing the principles of Anekanta and Syadvada.