Pramannay Tattvalok

This is a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Pramannay Tattvalok" by Pandit Shobhachandra Bharilla, focusing on its content as presented in the provided pages.

Book Title: Pramannay Tattvalok (प्रमाण-नय-तत्त्वालोक) Author: Pandit Shobhachandra Bharilla (पं० शोभाचन्द्र भारिल्ल) Publisher: Aatmjagruti Karyalay (आत्म-जागृति-कार्यालय), Shri Jain-Gurukul-Shikshan-Sangh, Beawar (श्री जैन-गुरुकुल-शिक्षण-संघ, ब्यावर) Original Author of the work being commented upon: Shri Vadidevsuri (श्री वादिदेवसूरि)

Overall Purpose and Significance:

The "Pramannay Tattvalok" is presented as a crucial introductory text for understanding Jain logic and philosophy. It is described as a foundational step, like the first rung of a ladder, to enter the vast temple of logic. The book's primary goal is to elucidate the fundamental principles of Pramana (means of valid knowledge) and Naya (viewpoints or perspectives) which are considered the lifeblood of Jain philosophy and the basis of its unique doctrine of Syadvada (conditional predication). The work emphasizes the originality, comprehensiveness, and depth of Jainism's contribution to Indian philosophical thought.

Key Concepts and Structure:

The book, based on Shri Vadidevsuri's original work, is structured into several chapters (Parichhed), each dedicated to specific aspects of Jain epistemology and logic:

1. Introduction to the Author and the Work (Pages 4-8):

• Jainism's Importance: The preface highlights the significant place of Jain philosophy in Indian thought due to its originality, comprehensiveness, and profoundness.
• Syadvada: Syadvada is identified as the core innovation of Jainism, designed to resolve all worldly conflicts and disputes. It is built upon the foundational principles of Pramana and Naya.
• The Work's Value: "Pramannay Tattvalok" is lauded for making the complex field of Jain logic accessible. It is structured in the style of Manikyanandi's 'Pariksha Mukha' and serves as a key to understanding Jain logic. The author, Pandit Shobhachandra Bharilla, is praised for his profound understanding and teaching experience in logic.
• Historical Context: The preface provides a brief biography of Shri Vadidevsuri, noting his birth in Gujarat, his philosophical lineage, and his significant contributions through debate, authorship (including the commentary "Syadvadaravtakara"), and religious propagation. His debates with Digambara scholars are mentioned as evidence of his intellectual prowess.
• Need for this Edition: The current edition is highlighted as necessary to make the valuable work accessible to a wider audience, especially students, by providing a simple, clear, and authentic Hindi translation and commentary. It aims to reduce the difficulties faced by those who find the subject matter complex or lack Sanskrit knowledge.
• Curriculum Relevance: The book is noted for being prescribed in the syllabi for Jain logic examinations, including at the Calcutta Sanskrit Association.

2. Chapter-wise Breakdown of Content:

• Chapter 1: The Nature of Pramana (Pages 10-23):

  • Mangalacharan (Invocation): Begins with an invocation to the Tirthankaras, who are described as victorious over passion and aversion, omniscient, worshiped by Indra, and masters of speech.
  • Definition of Pramana: Defined as knowledge that ascertains oneself and others. It is what enables one to accept or reject desirable or undesirable objects.
  • Rejection of Non-knowledge as Pramana: Concepts like 'Sannikarsha' (contact of senses and objects), which are considered non-cognitive or ignorant, are refuted as means of valid knowledge because they do not ascertain self or others.
  • Pramana as Determinative (Nishchayatmak): Pramana is characterized as being determinative and counteracting doubt (samshaya), misconception (viparay), and indecision (anadhyavasaya).
  • Types of Samshaya (Doubt) classified as Somaropa (Misapprehension):
    • Viparay (Misconception): Mistaking one thing for another (e.g., mistaking a shell for silver).
    • Samshaya (Doubt): Uncertainty about multiple possibilities (e.g., "Is it a pillar or a person?").
    • Anadhyavasaya (Indecision/Vagueness): A very general awareness without specific identification (e.g., the mere tactile sensation of a blade of grass while walking).
  • Definition of 'Para' (Other): Clarified as anything distinct from knowledge.
  • Self-Validation (Swaparavyavasayi): Argues that knowledge cognizes itself as well as external objects, using analogies like the sun illuminating itself and other objects.
  • Nature of Valid Knowledge (Pramanata): Defined as non-deviation from the object's reality.
  • Origin and Cognition of Pramanata: Pramanata (validity) originates from external causes (paratah) but is cognized both externally and internally.
  • Dichotomy of Knowledge: All knowledge is ultimately classified as either Pratyaksha (direct/perceptual) or Paroksha (indirect/inferential).

• Chapter 2: The Nature of Pratyaksha Pramana (Pages 24-35):

  • Definition of Pratyaksha: Defined as clear (spashta) knowledge. Clarity is the distinctive feature that differentiates it from indirect knowledge.
  • Types of Pratyaksha:
    • Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha (Empirical/Conventional Direct Knowledge): Occurs with the help of senses or mind.
    • Paramarthika Pratyaksha (Absolute/Pure Direct Knowledge): Arises from the self, without reliance on senses or mind.
  • Sub-types of Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha:
    • Indriya-nibandhana (Sense-based): Knowledge derived through the five senses.
    • Anindriya-nibandhana (Mind-based): Knowledge derived through the mind.
  • Stages of Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha: Each of the above is further divided into four stages:
    • Avagraha: Initial perception of the object's existence.
    • Iha: Desire to know more specific details.
    • Avasaya: Determination of the specific details.
    • Dharana: Retaining the determined knowledge (impression).
  • Distinction between Iha and Samshaya: Iha follows Avagraha and involves seeking specifics, whereas Samshaya involves doubt between equally probable options.
  • Interrelation of Stages: The sequence of Avagraha, Iha, Avasaya, and Dharana is essential for understanding an object.
  • Sub-types of Paramarthika Pratyaksha:
    • Vikal Paramarthika Pratyaksha (Imperfect Absolute Direct Knowledge): Includes Avadhi (clairvoyance) and Manahparyaya (telepathy).
    • Sakal Paramarthika Pratyaksha (Perfect Absolute Direct Knowledge): Kevala Jnana (omniscience).
  • Avadhi Jnana: Knowledge of subtle, gross, distant, and proximate objects with form, arising from the destruction of Avadhi-jnanavarana karma.
  • Manahparyaya Jnana: Knowledge of the thoughts of others, arising from the destruction of Manahparyaya-jnanavarana karma and purity of mind.
  • Kevala Jnana: Omniscience, the highest form of knowledge, achieved by the complete destruction of all four types of Ghātikarma.
  • Arhats as Omniscient: Argues that Arhats are the only omniscient beings due to their faultlessness, evidenced by their non-contradictory teachings which are supported by valid knowledge.
  • Kevala Jnana and Eating: Refutes the idea that one who eats cannot be omniscient.

• Chapter 3: The Nature of Paroksha Pramana (Pages 38-73):

  • Definition of Paroksha: Defined as unclear or indirect knowledge.
  • Five Types of Paroksha:
    • Smarana (Memory): Recalling past experiences.
    • Pratyabhijnyana (Recognition): Identifying something as the same or similar to a past experience, involving both memory and present perception.
    • Tarka (Reasoning/Hypothetical Reasoning): Involves the logical relationship (Vyapti) between cause and effect, presence and absence, through hypothetical reasoning.
    • Anumana (Inference): Deriving knowledge of an unknown object from a known one based on a logical connection.
    • Agama (Testimony): Knowledge gained from reliable testimony.
  • Anumana Types: Svartha (self-inference) and Parartha (inference for others).
  • Nature of Hetu (Middle Term): Defined by its inseparable connection with the Sadhyam (what is to be proved). It must be present in the case to be proved (Paksha), present in a similar instance (Sapaksha), and absent in a dissimilar instance (Vipaksha).
  • Rejection of Tri-lakshana Hetu: Criticizes the Buddhist and Naiyayika definitions of a Hetu based on three or five characteristics, deeming them inadequate and prone to fallacies.
  • Nature of Sadhyam (Probandum): Must be unknown, not contradicted by evidence, and desired to be proved.
  • Vyapti (Invariable Concomitance): Discusses the nature of Vyapti and its relationship with the Sadhyam (as a quality) and the Paksha (as the instance possessing the quality).
  • Parartha Anumana Structure: Discusses the components of inferential arguments for others: Paksha (thesis), Hetu (reason), Drishtanta (example), Upanaya (application), and Nigamana (conclusion). However, it argues that only Paksha and Hetu are essential for conveying knowledge to others, with Drishtanta, Upanaya, and Nigamana being potentially redundant or problematic if not used carefully.
  • Types of Hetu Usage: Tathopapatti (affirmative reasoning) and Anyathanupapatti (negative reasoning).
  • Role of Drishtanta: Explains the purpose of examples (Drishtanta) in establishing concomitance, differentiating between Sadharmya (similarity) and Vaidharmya (dissimilarity) Drishtantas.
  • Critique of Drishtanta: Argues that Drishtantas can lead to infinite regress and may not fully establish the universal concomitance needed for inference.
  • Types of Upalabdhi (Cognition) and Anupalabdhi (Non-cognition) as Hetus: Details various categories of Hetus based on the presence or absence of a cause, effect, pervaded, pervader, preceding, succeeding, or co-existing element.
  • Classification of Hetus: Further elaborates on Upalabdhi Hetus (Hetus based on presence) and Anupalabdhi Hetus (Hetus based on absence), and their sub-types like presence/absence of cause, effect, etc.
  • Rejection of Buddhist View on Causality: Critiques the Buddhist view that only the immediate cause or effect can be a Hetu, arguing that a causal relationship exists more broadly.

• Chapter 4: The Nature of Agama Pramana (Testimony) (Pages 84-98):

  • Definition of Agama: Knowledge derived from the words of a reliable person (Apta). The words themselves are also referred to as Agama.
  • Definition of Apta (Reliable Person): Someone who knows the object of knowledge accurately and expresses it truthfully, without delusion or passions.
  • Types of Apta:
    • Laukika Apta (Conventional: Parents, elders, etc.
    • Lokottara Apta (Transcendental): Tirthankaras, Ganadharas, etc.
  • Critique of Mimamsa View on Vedas: Argues against the Mimamsa claim that Vedas are self-valid and not attributed to any author, asserting that all valid testimony must originate from an Apta.
  • Nature of Speech (Vachana): Defined as composed of letters (Varna), words (Pada), and sentences (Vakya).
  • How Words Convey Meaning: Words convey meaning through inherent power and convention.
  • Primacy of Speech: Speech conveys meaning by indicating the object through affirmative (vidhi) and negative (pratishesha) statements.
  • Saptabhangi (Seven-Valued Logic): Explains the sevenfold predication (Syadvada) as a way of speaking about an object's multifaceted nature, using the term 'Syat' (perhaps/in some way) to qualify each statement. It covers affirmations, negations, and combinations thereof, asserting that each statement is partial and conditional. The seven propositions are explained in detail with their philosophical underpinnings.
  • Critique of Ekantavada: Argues against single-sided assertions (ekantavada) regarding speech, emphasizing that language is capable of expressing multiple perspectives.
  • Types of Nayas (Viewpoints): Introduces the classification of Nayas, first broadly into Vyasa (extensive) and Samasa (concise), and then the two main Samasa Nayas: Dravyarthika Naya (substance-oriented viewpoint) and Paryayarthika Naya (mode-oriented viewpoint).
  • Dravyarthika Naya Types: Naigama, Sangraha, and Vyavahara.
  • Paryayarthika Naya Types: Rujusutra, Shabda, Samabhirudha, and Evambhut.
  • Saptabhangi and Nayas: Explains how the sevenfold logic (Saptabhangi) applies to each viewpoint (Naya).
  • Avasaya (Fallacies): Briefly touches upon fallacies related to Nayas.

• Chapter 5: The Subject Matter of Pramana (Pages 105-108):

  • The Object of Pramana: The object of valid knowledge is the object as it is, possessing generalities (Samanya) and specificities (Vishesha), and being multifaceted (anekanta).
  • Support for Samanya-Vishesha: Argues that objects are known through both general similarities and specific differences, and through their causal and sequential relationships, highlighting product, destruction, and persistence.
  • Types of Samanya (Generality): Tiryak Samanya (horizontal generality, common across individuals) and Urddhva Samanya (vertical generality, persistence of substance across time).
  • Types of Vishesha (Specificity): Guna (qualities, inherent and co-existing) and Paryaya (modes, sequential and changing).

• Chapter 6: The Fruit of Pramana (Pages 109-120):

  • The Fruit of Pramana: The fruit of Pramana is what is achieved or accomplished by it.
  • Types of Fruit: Immediate (anantara) and mediate (parampara).
  • Immediate Fruit: Removal of ignorance (ajnananivritti) for all types of Pramana.
  • Mediate Fruit: For Kevala Jnana, it is indifference (udaseenya). For other Pramanas, it is the inclination towards acceptance (upadana), rejection (hāna), or indifference (upeksha).
  • Relationship between Pramana and Fruit: The fruit is both different from and identical with the Pramana.
  • Refutation of Fallacies related to Fruit: Argues that the fruit, being an outcome of knowledge, is intrinsically related to the knower and the process of knowing.
  • Introduction to Fallacies (Abhasa): Defines fallacies as deviating from the correct nature, number, object, or fruit of Pramana.
  • Types of Fallacies: Swarupa Abhasa (fallacies of nature), Sankhya Abhasa (fallacies of number), Vishaya Abhasa (fallacies of object), and Phala Abhasa (fallacies of fruit).
  • Examples of Swarupa Abhasa: Mistaking non-knowledge, self-illumination without external object cognition, or mere vague cognition for valid knowledge.
  • Examples of Samvyavaharika and Paramarthika Pratyaksha Abhasa: Mistaking illusory phenomena (like Gandharva city) or mistaken perceptions (like seeing happiness in suffering) for direct knowledge.
  • Examples of Smarana and Pratyabhijnyana Abhasa: Mistaking something unexperienced for a memory or misrecognizing an object.
  • Tarkabhasa: Fallacious reasoning where a concomitance is assumed without valid basis.
  • Anumana Abhasa: Fallacious inference arising from flaws in the components of inference (Paksha, Hetu, Drishtanta, etc.).
  • Types of Pakshabhasa: Paksha that is already known, contradicted, or not desired.
  • Types of Hetvabhasa: Asiddha (unproven), Viruddha (contradictory), and Anaikantika (indeterminative).
  • Types of Drishtantabhasa: Flawed examples in both Sadharmya and Vaidharmya inferences.
  • Upanaya and Nigamana Abhasa: Incorrect application or conclusion.
  • Agamabhasa: Knowledge derived from the testimony of unreliable persons.
  • Sankhya Abhasa: Incorrect enumeration of Pramanas.
  • Vishaya Abhasa: Mistaken understanding of the scope of Pramana's object.
  • Phala Abhasa: Incorrect understanding of the fruit of Pramana.

• Chapter 7: The Nature of Nayas (Viewpoints) (Pages 134-159):

  • Definition of Naya: A particular viewpoint or perspective that focuses on one aspect of an object while setting aside others, as understood through Shruta Pramana (scriptural testimony).
  • Nayabhasa: A viewpoint that denies or negates aspects other than the one it focuses on.
  • Types of Naya: Vyasa (extensive) and Samasa (concise). Samasa Naya is further divided into Dravyarthika and Paryayarthika.
  • Dravyarthika Naya: Focuses on the substance. Its types are Naigama, Sangraha, and Vyavahara.
    • Naigama Naya: Considers aspects from multiple perspectives, including the past, present, and future, and their interrelationships.
    • Sangraha Naya: Focuses on generalities, ignoring specificities. Types are Parasangraha (focusing on ultimate existence) and Aparasangraha (focusing on intermediate generalities like substance-hood).
    • Vyavahara Naya: Distinguishes between substances and modes, enabling practical and conventional understanding.
  • Paryayarthika Naya: Focuses on the modes or states. Its types are Rujusutra, Shabda, Samabhirudha, and Evambhut.
    • Rujusutra Naya: Focuses on the present momentary aspect of an object.
    • Shabda Naya: Differentiates meaning based on grammatical variations (time, case, gender, etc.).
    • Samabhirudha Naya: Differentiates meaning based on the root derivation of words, even for synonyms.
    • Evambhut Naya: Asserts that a word can only refer to an object when it is actively engaged in the action or state indicated by the word's root.
  • Arthas Naya vs. Shabda Naya: The first four Nayas are arthas (meaning) oriented, while the last three are shabda (word) oriented.
  • Hierarchy of Nayas: The Nayas are presented in a hierarchy of scope, with Dravyarthika Nayas having a broader scope than Paryayarthika Nayas.
  • Saptabhangi through Nayas: Explains how Nayas contribute to the Saptabhangi by focusing on different aspects.

• Chapter 8: The Nature of Vada (Debate) (Pages 166-174):

  • Definition of Vada: A reasoned discussion involving thesis (Paksha), reason (Hetu), refutation of the opponent's arguments (Dusana), and establishment of one's own arguments (Sadhan), aimed at resolving contradictory viewpoints.
  • Types of Vada Initiators:
    • Jigishu: One who debates for victory.
    • Tattvanirninishu: One who debates to ascertain the truth.
  • Dichotomy of Tattvanirninishu: Debating for oneself (e.g., a disciple) or for others (e.g., a guru).
  • Types of Debate Structure: Based on the roles of initiator and respondent, and the presence of the four limbs: Vadi (speaker), Prativadi (respondent), Madhya (arbiters), and Sabhapati (presiding authority). The number of effective limbs varies depending on the initiator's intent.
  • Role of Arbiter (Madhya): To assess the arguments, maintain fairness, and ensure the debate remains focused on the subject matter.
  • Role of Presiding Authority (Sabhapati): To manage the debate, make decisions, and ensure decorum.
  • Rules of Debate: Discusses how long each participant should speak and the conditions for concluding the debate.

In essence, "Pramannay Tattvalok" meticulously breaks down the fundamental epistemological tools of Jainism, explaining how knowledge is acquired, validated, and articulated. It provides a systematic framework for understanding Jain logic, the nuances of different perspectives, and the principles of philosophical discourse.