Pramanmimansa Ek Adhyayan

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Pramanmimansa: Ek Adhyayan" by Shrichand Choradiya, focusing on its core arguments and concepts:

The text explores the nature of pramana (valid cognition) within Jain philosophy, examining its definition, characteristics, and the nuances of its origin and fruit.

1. The Nature of the Soul and Cognition:

• The soul is characterized by its attribute of consciousness (chaitanya). This consciousness, manifesting as knowledge (jnana) and perception (darshana), differentiates the soul from inert matter.
• Darshana (perception) apprehends general qualities and is considered formless (nirakaropayoga). Jnana (knowledge) apprehends specific qualities and is considered to have form (sakaropayoga).
• There's a debate on the timing of darshana. Some texts place it before the contact of the object and the cognizer, where no specific realization occurs. Others place it after this contact, leading to a general overview of the object.
• The text distinguishes Jain darshana from Buddhist nirvikalpa jnana and Naiyayika's nirvikalpa pratyaksha, asserting that neither is equivalent to Jain darshana.

2. The Definition and Characteristics of Pramana:

• Pramana is defined as that knowledge (jnana) which correctly reflects the state of an object as it is perceived. It is the most effective means (sadhakatama karana) for attaining true knowledge (prama).
• Knowledge (jnana) itself is the true instrument of pramana, not the senses or other inert means. Just as a lamp dispels darkness, pramana dispels ignorance.
• Key characteristic of Pramana: Avyabhichari (Non-deviating): A knowledge is considered pramana if the perceived object is found exactly as it was apprehended. This implies truthfulness and absence of error.
• While in scriptural contexts, knowledge associated with mithyadarshana (false perception) is false, and that with samyagdarshana (right perception) is right, philosophically, the crucial factor for pramana is avyabhichari (non-deviation from the perceived object).
• The text emphasizes that all knowledge, in its own nature, is pramana. The distinction between pramana and apramana (non-pramana) arises from the successful or unsuccessful apprehension of the external object. From an internal perspective, all knowledge is self-illuminating.
• Some scholars define pramana as knowledge that illuminates both oneself and the object, or knowledge that accurately determines the nature of an object.
• Yathartha jnana (accurate knowledge) is pramana. Jnana is a broader category encompassing both accurate and inaccurate knowledge (like doubt, error), while pramana is exclusively accurate knowledge.

3. Historical Development of Pramana Definitions:

• The text traces the definition of pramana through various philosophical traditions:
  • Kanada: First to define pramana generally as adushtavidha (untainted means), emphasizing the purity of the cause.
  • Vatsyayana: Defined it as the cause of apprehension (upalabdhihetutva), possibly focusing on the result.
  • Vachaspati Mishra: Added the concept of relation to the object. This definition was influential in later Nyaya-Vaisheshika schools.
  • Prabhakara (Mimamsaka): Considered mere apprehension (anubhuti) as pramana.
  • Kumarila Bhatta (Mimamsaka): Defined it as the apprehension of an unknown object (anadhigatarthagantu).
  • Buddhism: Introduced concepts like self-awareness (svasamvitti), capacity for action (pravrttisāmarthya), and non-deviation (avyasambaditva). While these offered insights into self-illumination, they were considered lacking in definitive determination. The Buddhist concept of tadakāratā (form of the object) is also discussed, but its efficacy is questioned due to the absence of constant correlation with the object.
  • Later Jain Scholars: Defined pramana as right knowledge (samyagjnana) and accurate determination of the object (samyagarthanirnayaha).
  • Acharya Hemachandra: Simplified the definition to samyagarthanirnayaha pramanam.
  • Acharya Vidyananda: Introduced vyavasaya or nirniti (determination) into the definition.

4. Pramana Samplava (Concurrent Validity):

• Pramana samplava refers to the application of multiple pramanas to the same object.
• Jain philosophy accepts pramana samplava because objects possess multiple qualities and are subject to both permanence and change. When one aspect of an object is determined, another pramana can investigate the undetermined aspects.
• The text critiques the Buddhist notion of constant impermanence, arguing that objects possess a degree of permanence.
• Jains differentiate between dhruva (permanent) and adhruva (impermanent) aspects of knowledge, accepting the validity of pramanas based on their correspondence and coherence with reality, even if it's not always a complete apprehension.

5. The Authenticity (Pramanyam) of Pramana:

• Source of Authenticity: The authenticity of knowledge is primarily derived from its correspondence with reality (yatharthya). Other factors like absence of contradictory knowledge, mutual coherence of statements, and the ability to produce fruitful results are also considered.
• Origin of Authenticity (Pranyapramananya):
  • Satah (Self-originated): Knowledge is considered self-authenticated when its authenticity is realized internally, often when the object is familiar.
  • Paratah (From Another): When the object is unfamiliar, its authenticity is determined by external factors or corroborating knowledge.
  • The text argues that both authenticity and inauthenticity originate from external factors (related to the causes of knowledge). If defective causes lead to inauthenticity, then pure causes should lead to authenticity.
  • The debate on satah vs. paratah origin of authenticity is traced historically, originating with the authority of Vedic texts and later expanding to all knowledge.
  • Jain View: Jain philosophy generally holds that while the knowledge itself is intrinsically about the object, the determination of its authenticity can be both satah and paratah, depending on the familiarity of the object.

6. The Cause of Knowledge:

• Jain tradition, particularly through Acharya Akalankadeva, establishes that the mind and senses are the causes of knowledge.
• The text refutes the idea that the object itself is the cause of knowledge, arguing that knowledge merely apprehends the object and doesn't necessarily understand its causal relationship with the object. The knowledge of past and future objects, which don't exist at the time of cognition, further negates this causal link.
• The interaction between senses, mind, soul, and object is complex, and the object cannot be considered the sole or direct cause of knowledge.
• The text also argues against light (aloka) being the cause of knowledge, as it is itself an object of knowledge and not always necessary for cognition (e.g., nocturnal animals).
• The classification and naming of knowledge are based on the causal factors (senses, mind), not on the object itself.

7. The Fruit (Phala) of Pramana:

• The Fruit of Pramana: The ultimate fruit of pramana is the removal of ignorance (avidyanivartti). A secondary or indirect fruit is the appropriate action (acceptance, rejection, indifference) based on the knowledge gained.
• Distinction between Pramana and Phala:
  • Buddhism: Believes pramana and its fruit are identical, as knowledge itself is the apprehension of the object.
  • Jainism: Adopts an anekanta (non-one-sided) view. Pramana and its fruit (pramiti) are considered both different and non-different.
    • Non-different (Abhinna): They are non-different because the same soul is involved in both the act of knowing (pramana) and the result of that knowledge (fruit).
    • Different (Bhinna): They are different due to the causal relationship; pramana is the cause, and the fruit is the effect, implying a temporal or modal distinction.
  • The Process: In the flow of cognition, earlier stages (like avagraha) can be pramana for subsequent stages (iha to dharana), which in turn become phala for the earlier stage and pramana for their own subsequent operations.
  • The Fruit of Kevalajnana (Omniscience): For an omniscient being, the only fruit is indifference (upeksha), as they are free from attachment and aversion and thus have no need for acceptance or rejection. For other forms of knowledge (mati, shruta, avadhi, manahparyaya), all three (acceptance, rejection, indifference) are the fruits.

Conclusion:

The text emphasizes that true well-being for the soul lies in the pursuit of samyagjnana (right knowledge), samyagdarshana (right perception), and samyagcharitra (right conduct), along with austerity. This path leads to liberation (moksha). The soul's well-being is synonymous with the "three jewels" (ratnatraya). The ultimate aim is to engage in self-reflection and attain this supreme state of liberation.