Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

This article, "Pramanas and Language: A Dispute Between Dinnaga, Dharmakirti and Akalanka" by Piotr Balcerowicz, delves into a complex epistemological debate within Indian philosophy, focusing on the Jaina thinker Akalanka's interpretation of cognitive criteria (pramāṇa) in relation to language, and his engagement with Buddhist philosophers Dinnaga and Dharmakirti.

The core of the discussion revolves around a verse from Akalanka's work, Laghiyas-traya (LT 10cd-11ab), which attempts to classify cognition. Balcerowicz presents differing interpretations of this verse, highlighting the challenge of reconciling Akalanka's ideas with earlier Jaina tradition and Buddhist epistemology.

Key Points of the Article:

• Akalanka's Verse and Initial Interpretations: The article begins by presenting Akalanka's verse and an initial interpretation (Int. 1) where the first type of cognition (perception) is understood to precede language, encompassing memory, recognition, induction, and determined cognition, while the remaining cognition (testimonial) is mediated by speech. This interpretation is supported by early commentators like Vidyānanda and Abhayadeva.

• Emerging Problems and Prabhācandra's Counter-Interpretation: A significant issue arises with this initial interpretation: how can processes like memory and recognition, which are often considered distinct from direct perception, be categorized as direct cognition? Prabhācandra, an 11th-century commentator, offers a contrasting interpretation (Int. 3) suggesting that memory, recognition, induction, and determined cognition are actually indirect (testimonial) cognitions that occur after association with speech. This interpretation challenges the traditional Jaina equivalence of mati-jñāna (sensuous cognition) with perception.

• Historical Context and Jaina Epistemology: Balcerowicz traces the historical development of Jaina epistemology, noting the adoption of the concept of pramāṇa (cognitive criterion) from Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions. He highlights the unique Jaina understanding of pratyakşa (direct perception) as solely the soul's activity, distinct from mainstream Indian thought which grounds perception in the senses. This early Jaina model classified mati-jñāna (sensuous cognition) as indirect.

• The Buddhist Influence: Dinnaga and Dharmakirti: The article then shifts to the significant influence of Buddhist philosophers Dinnaga and Dharmakirti.

  • Dinnaga's Two Pramanas: Dinnaga famously reduced all valid cognition to two pramāṇas: perception (pratyakşa) and inference (anumāna). His distinction was based on the nature of their objects: perception grasps the unique particular (sva-lakṣaṇa), while inference grasps the universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). Perception was characterized as conceptual-construction-free (kalpanā-poda).
  • Dharmakirti's Innovations: Dharmakirti refined Dinnaga's model by adding the criterion of causal efficacy (artha-kriyā-samarthya) for perception. He emphasized that perception deals with the ultimately real, while inference deals with the conventionally real. He also maintained perception's non-conceptual nature, though he later acknowledged its potential for error.

• Akalanka's Response and the Criterion of Clarity: Akalanka, influenced by these Buddhist developments, sought to harmonize the Buddhist categories with Jaina tradition. He adopted a two-pramāṇa model (perception and indirect cognition) but introduced the criterion of clarity (vaiśadya) or lucidity (spaṣṭatva) to define perception.

  • Clarity as a Defining Feature: For Akalanka, clear cognition grasps the particular, leading to certainty. Indirect cognition, on the other hand, is unclear, dealing with general concepts and verbal symbols.
  • Conceptual Nature of Perception: Crucially, Akalanka argued that even perception, particularly its later stages beyond the initial sensation, is conceptual (kalpita). This contrasts with Dinnaga and Dharmakirti, who considered perception non-conceptual. Akalanka believed that conceptualization is integral to perception and that clarity pertains to the cognitive process itself, not necessarily the object.
  • Non-Verbal vs. Verbal: Akalanka also distinguished between non-verbal (direct perception) and verbal (indirect, testimonial cognition) processes.

• Revisiting Akalanka's Verse: Based on this analysis, Balcerowicz proposes a revised interpretation (Int. 4) of Akalanka's verse. It suggests that sensuous cognition (memory, recognition, induction, determined cognition) can be classified as either direct (conventional perception) or indirect (testimonial cognition) depending on its association with language. The causal chain of sensuous cognition leads to testimonial cognition when speech is involved.

• Akalanka's Critique of Buddhist Views: The article highlights how Akalanka critiqued the Buddhist emphasis on the non-conceptual nature of perception, arguing for the conceptual aspect of even yogic perception. He also challenged Bhartrhari's idea that all cognition is inherently verbal.

• Prabhācandra's Reinterpretation: The article concludes by examining Prabhācandra's interpretation, which classifies memory, recognition, etc., as indirect cognitions, aligning more with the older Jaina tradition but diverging from Akalanka's nuanced view of their potential directness. Balcerowicz posits that Akalanka, while borrowing from Buddhist thought, creatively adapted it to Jaina philosophy, offering sophisticated analyses of epistemological issues.

In essence, the article explores the intricate philosophical exchange between Jaina and Buddhist epistemologies, with Akalanka's interpretation of pramāṇa and the role of language serving as a focal point for understanding the evolution of these traditions. Akalanka's introduction of clarity as a defining criterion for perception and his assertion of the conceptual nature of perception, while acknowledging the influence of Buddhist thought, mark significant developments in Jaina epistemology.