Praman Mimansama Pratyakshani Charcha

This document is a comprehensive discussion of the concept of Pratyaksha (direct perception) within Jain philosophy, specifically focusing on the interpretation presented by Acharya Hemachandra in his work Praman Mimansa. The author, Jitendra Jetly, meticulously analyzes Hemachandra's definition and contrasts it with those of other Indian philosophical schools.

Here's a breakdown of the key points:

1. Diversity in Indian Philosophy and Jain Distinctiveness:

• The text begins by acknowledging the general agreement among Indian philosophical systems regarding the existence of knowledge-generating means (Pramana). However, it highlights a significant divergence in the number of Pramanas accepted and the definitions/characteristics of each Pramana.
• This sets the stage for discussing the Jain perspective on Pratyaksha, noting that its definition is likely to be distinct due to these philosophical differences.

2. Hemachandra's Definition of Pratyaksha:

• Acharya Hemachandra, in his Praman Mimansa, categorizes Pramana into two types: Pratyaksha (direct) and Paroksha (indirect).
• He defines Pratyaksha with the aphorism: "Viśadarthah Pratyaksham" (विशदार्थः प्रत्यक्षम्).
• This translates to: Pratyaksha is the clear (viśad) determination (nirnaya) of the true (samyag) meaning/object (artha).
• The author clarifies that the "determination of the true meaning" (samyagarthanirnayah) is a general characteristic of all Pramana, and Hemachandra has incorporated this into the definition of Pratyaksha.

3. Two Types of Pratyaksha in Jainism (as per Hemachandra):

• Hemachandra's definition applies to both types of Pratyaksha recognized in Jainism:
  • Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyaksha (सांव्यवहारिक प्रत्यक्ष): This is the empirical, everyday direct perception experienced by all sentient beings through their senses and mind.
  • Mukhya Pratyaksha (मुख्य प्रत्यक्ष) or Kevala-Pratyaksha (केवलप्रत्यक्ष): This is the pure or absolute direct perception, characterized by the clear manifestation of one's own self (soul). This is attained only by the omniscient (Kevalajñānī).
• The text emphasizes that the clarity (vaiśadhya) is a common characteristic of both types of Pratyaksha, with Mukhya Pratyaksha possessing a superior form of clarity.

4. Explaining Clarity (Vaiśadhya):

• Hemachandra further defines vaiśadhya as: "Pramāṇāntarānanapēkṣitatvena pratibhāso vā vaiśadyam" (प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षित्वेन प्रतिभासो वा वैशद्यम्).
• This means clarity is the appearance or apprehension of an object without any dependence on other Pramanas (like inference, testimony, etc.). It signifies independence and self-sufficiency in knowledge.
• Another explanation provided is: "Idam vastu iti pratibhasah" (इदं वस्तु इति प्रतिभासः), meaning "This is that object" – the immediate experience or apprehension of an object.
• For Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyaksha, this apprehension occurs through senses or the mind.
• For Mukhya Pratyaksha, this apprehension happens without the need for any senses or mind.

5. Critique of Other Philosophical Schools' Definitions of Pratyaksha:

• Jetly then delves into Hemachandra's critical analysis of other Indian philosophical systems' definitions of Pratyaksha, particularly focusing on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school.

• Nyaya Sutra Definition: The text quotes the Nyaya Sutra definition: "Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhichāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam" (इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्). This defines Pratyaksha as knowledge arising from the contact of sense organs and objects, which is ineffable, unerring, and determinative.

• Hemachandra's Critique of Nyaya Interpretations:

  • While it's natural for a Jain scholar to critique the Nyaya view on the sense-object contact, Hemachandra's critical insight is more profound. He points out how later Nyaya scholars, like Trilocana and Vācaspati Miśra, misinterpreted the Nyaya Sutra to suit their own philosophical agenda, particularly to align with Buddhist notions of Nirvikalpa Pratyaksha (indeterminate perception).
  • These scholars interpreted "avyapadesyam" (ineffable) as Nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and "vyavasayātmakaṃ" (determinative) as Savikalpa (determinate), thereby creating two types of Pratyaksha from a single definition.
  • Hemachandra clarifies that the original Nyaya commentators (Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara) did not intend this dualistic interpretation, and the concept of Nirvikalpa Pratyaksha was not present in Gautama's original formulation.

6. Jain Perspective on Causality in Pratyaksha:

• The text highlights a key Jain distinction: While sense-object contact is considered an instrument (karana) in the origin (utpatti) of Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyaksha, it is not an instrument in the apprehension (jñapti) of knowledge itself.
• The author explains that knowledge itself is the cause for the arising of direct knowledge.
• Regarding self-realization (Ātmasākṣātkāra), Jainism asserts that the soul itself is of the nature of knowledge. Therefore, in its manifestation, neither the senses nor the mind are causes. The soul's own manifestation is the cause. This is the unique contribution of Jainism.
• Even in yogic Pratyaksha, the soul's inherent knowledge is the cause, not the mind or internal organs.

7. Stages of Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyaksha in Jainism:

• Jainism, in contrast to later Nyaya, has always recognized four natural stages of Sāmvyāvahārika Pratyaksha:
  • Avagraha (अवग्रह): The initial, general apprehension of an object. It's not indeterminate because it's a clear grasp of something.
  • Īhā (ईहा): A mental effort or process seeking to ascertain the specific characteristics of the object apprehended in Avagraha.
  • Avāya (अवाय): The definitive judgment or ascertainment of the specific characteristics. This is the conclusive stage of direct perception.
  • Dhāraṇā (धारणा): The impression or residual trace of the knowledge left in the soul, which serves as the cause for future recollection (memory).
• Hemachandra further distinguishes Īhā from Ūha (a concept in Nyaya related to inference) by stating that Ūha relates to all three times and is adept at grasping the concomitance between the predicate and the probans, while Īhā pertains only to the present object of perception.

8. Hemachandra's Scholarly Approach:

• The text concludes by commending Hemachandra for his nuanced and precise approach. He not only presents the Jain definition of Pratyaksha comprehensively but also:
  • Critically examines and refutes the definitions of other schools.
  • Identifies and criticizes misinterpretations of foundational texts by scholars within other traditions.
  • Clearly explains why his own definitions, though differing from previous Jain scholars, are consistent with the core principles and even encompass aspects that were overlooked.
  • Demonstrates a remarkable ability to convey complex philosophical ideas concisely and logically, without unnecessary jargon, embodying the spirit of a serious logician.

In essence, the document is a scholarly exploration of the Jain understanding of direct perception, highlighting its philosophical rigor and the significant contributions of Acharya Hemachandra in defining and defending this crucial epistemological concept.