Praman Mimansa Ma Pratyakshani Charcha - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Pramana Mimansa ma Pratyakshani Charcha" by Jitendra Jetli:

This article delves into the discussion of Pratyaksha (direct perception) within the Pramana Mimansa by Acharya Hemchandra. It begins by acknowledging that while Indian philosophies share some common ground, they diverge significantly in the number of valid means of knowledge (pramanas) and their characteristics. This context sets the stage for examining the unique definition of pratyaksha in Jainism.

Hemchandra's Definition of Pratyaksha:

Acharya Hemchandra defines pratyaksha in his Pramana Mimansa as:

"Viśadarthah Pratyaksham"

This translates to: "Clear and correct apprehension of meaning is Pratyaksha."

The author explains that the word "samya-arthah" (correct meaning) from the general definition of a pramana ("Samya-arthanirnayah Pramanam" - The determination of correct meaning is a pramana) is implied here. Thus, Hemchandra's complete definition of pratyaksha is "Viśadaha Samya-arthanirnayaha Pratyaksham" (Clear and correct determination of meaning is Pratyaksha).

This definition applies to both types of pratyaksha in Jainism:

Sanvyavahārika Pratyaksha: The practical, everyday perception experienced by all living beings through their senses.
Mukhya Pratyaksha (or Kevala-Pratyaksha): The pure or absolute perception, which is the clear manifestation of one's own self (soul) and is experienced only by omniscient beings (Kevalajñāni).

The key characteristic shared by both is vaiśadya (clarity).

Explanation of Clarity (Vaiśadya):

Hemchandra further elucidates vaiśadya as:

"Pramāṇāntarānapekṣitvamiti Vaiśadyam"

This means: "Clarity is the absence of dependence on other means of knowledge (like inference or scripture)."

In essence, pratyaksha is knowledge that is independent and not reliant on any other pramana for its validation. Alternatively, he offers:

"Yathārthasya Pratibhāso Vā Vaiśadyam"

This means: "The appearance of the object as it is, is clarity."

This refers to the direct experience of an object. In Sanvyavahārika Pratyaksha, this experience is mediated by the senses or the mind. In Mukhya Pratyaksha, it occurs without the involvement of any senses or the mind. Hemchandra asserts that Mukhya Pratyaksha possesses even greater clarity than everyday perception.

Critique of Other Philosophical Views:

Hemchandra's analysis goes on to critically examine the definitions of pratyaksha from other Indian philosophical schools.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: He first scrutinizes the definition by the Nyāya Sūtra proponent: "Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhichāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam" (Knowledge arising from the contact of sense and object, indescribable, unerring, and determinate is pratyaksha).
- Hemchandra notes that while the Nyāya tradition itself has differing interpretations of this sutra, a significant point of contention arises with commentators like Vācaspati Miśra and Trilocana. They reinterpret the sutra to mean that pratyaksha is of two types: nirvikalpaka (non-determinate) and savikalpaka (determinate). This reinterpretation, Hemchandra argues, was likely a response to Buddhist arguments that supported nirvikalpaka as the true pratyaksha. He points out that the original sūtra author and commentator Vātsyāyana did not intend this distinction, as they did not explicitly enumerate types of pratyaksha as they did for inference. Hemchandra highlights that this attempt to twist the meaning of the Nyāya sutra is a significant deviation.
Jain Perspective on Sense-Object Contact: Hemchandra emphasizes that while the contact of sense and object is the instrumental cause (karaṇa) for the production of Sanvyavahārika Pratyaksha, it is not the cause of the knowledge itself. Knowledge itself is the cause of knowledge. This is illustrated with examples. He notes that even in visual perception (chākṣuṣa pratyaksha), this contact isn't considered the cause of origination.
Mukhya Pratyaksha and Self-Realization: In the context of self-realization (ātmasākṣātkāra), Hemchandra stresses that the soul (ātman) is inherently of the nature of knowledge. Its manifestation (āvirbhāva) does not require any external sense organs or the mind as causes. This self-illumination is the true Mukhya Pratyaksha, and upon its attainment, the soul becomes liberated.
Critique of Other Schools' Understanding of Liberation: Hemchandra contrasts the Jain view of liberation with other traditions:
- Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Buddhism: These schools, in their paths to liberation (which they equate with knowledge), consider the mind or consciousness (citta) as an instrumental cause.
- Buddhism: For Buddhists, the soul is a stream of consciousness (jñāna-santati). Nirvana is the cessation of this stream, leading to the extinction of the "self."
- Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: While the soul persists in liberation, all its contingent qualities (viśeṣa guṇa) cease. This, Hemchandra suggests, is akin to extinction.
- Jainism: Jainism unequivocally states that liberation follows self-realization. The soul's existence is preserved; it does not become extinct. The soul's essence is knowledge and consciousness, and liberation is the full manifestation of this inherent nature.

Four Stages of Sanvyavahārika Pratyaksha:

Jain philosophy, unlike the later Nyāya interpretation of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, identifies four natural stages in Sanvyavahārika Pratyaksha:

Avagraha (Perception/Comprehension): The initial grasping of an object upon the contact of the sense organ and the object. It provides a general apprehension, a sense of "something is," without apprehending specific details. Hemchandra clarifies that this is not nirvikalpaka because there is a correct apprehension of the object.
Īhā (Enquiry/Desire): Following Avagraha, there is a desire to know the specific features of the apprehended object. This mental process leads to a tentative determination. Hemchandra distinguishes Īhā from Ūha (inference) by stating that Īhā pertains to the current object of perception, whereas Ūha deals with the relationship between cause and effect over time.
Avāya (Determination): This is the stage of determinate knowledge where the specific features sought in Īhā are definitively grasped. It is the final stage of conclusive perception.
Dhāraṇā (Retention/Memory Impression): This is the impression or tendency left on the soul by the perceptual experience, which serves as the cause for future memory (smriti). Hemchandra clarifies that while some earlier scholars defined Dhāraṇā as "non-forgetting," he posits that this non-forgetting is inherent in Avāya. A prolonged Avāya becomes Dhāraṇā, or the certainty of the determination itself is the cause of memory, and thus is encompassed by Dhāraṇā. He uses the example of sensing grass underfoot while walking – the contact is perceived but not retained to trigger memory because it lacks the necessary sustained attention or mental processing.

Conclusion:

The article concludes by highlighting Acharya Hemchandra's meticulous and nuanced approach. He not only accurately presents his own school's definitions but also critically analyzes and refutes the views of other philosophies. His ability to concisely yet comprehensively explain complex logical points, even pointing out misinterpretations by other scholars, showcases his profound understanding and logical acumen. Hemchandra's work in Pramana Mimansa is characterized by its clarity, lack of unnecessary jargon, and a rigorous logical presentation of Jain philosophical principles, particularly in the domain of epistemology.