Praman Lakshano Ki Tarkik Parampara

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Praman Lakshano ki Tarkik Parampara" by Sukhlal Sanghavi, focusing on the logical tradition of defining pramana (means of valid knowledge):

The Logical Tradition of Defining Pramana: A Summary

This text traces the development of the definition of pramana (means of valid knowledge) through various Indian philosophical traditions, highlighting key thinkers and their contributions, particularly within the Jain philosophical lineage.

Early Indian Philosophical Foundations:

• Kanada (Vaisheshika): Initiates the logical tradition by defining pramana as "unimpeded knowledge" (adrushtam vidya), emphasizing the purity of causes leading to knowledge.
• Akshapada (Nyaya) and Vatsyayana (Nyaya Bhashya): Vatsyayana, in his commentary on Akshapada's sutras, addresses a perceived gap in Akshapada's definition by focusing on the result of knowledge rather than its cause. He defines pramana as the "means of obtaining knowledge" (upalabdhihetutva), shifting the emphasis from causal purity to the act of acquisition.
• Vachaspati Mishra (Nyaya Vartika Tatparyatika): Refines Vatsyayana's definition by incorporating the term "artha" (meaning/object) and clarifying that "upalabdhi" (acquiring) refers to a specific instance of valid knowledge, not knowledge in general.
• Udayanacharya (Kusumanjali): Accepts Vachaspati Mishra's enriched definition, acknowledging its alignment with Gautama's (Akshapada's) philosophy. This Nyaya-Vaisheshika tradition emphasizes three main points:
  1. Informing about causal purity by avoiding defects in causes.
  2. Including the term "artha" that denotes the object of knowledge.
  3. Absence of discussion on self-luminosity/other-luminosity and the indication of the novelty or ungrasped nature of the object.

Mimamsa Contributions:

• Prabhakara: Primarily identifies "anubhuti" (experience) as pramana.
• Kumarila and his followers: Develop a comprehensive definition that integrates insights from both the Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Buddhist traditions. They use the qualifier "apradushtakaranarabdha" (initiated by non-defective causes) to address Kanada's concern about causal purity and "nirbadhatva" (unimpeded/non-contradicted) and "apurva-grahi" (grasping the ungrasped) to incorporate the Buddhist perspective.
  • Kumarila's attributed verse: "Pramanam is the definite knowledge of an ungrasped object, free from contradiction, and initiated by non-defective causes, accepted by the world."
  • Key takeaways from this definition:
    1. Inclusion of "apurva" (ungrasped) as an adjective of the object of knowledge.
    2. Absence of indication of self or other-luminosity.

Buddhist Contributions:

• Dinnaga: Introduces "svasamvitti" (self-awareness) as a qualifier of the result of pramana.
• Dharmakirti: In his Pramanavartika, uses the qualifier "visamvaditva" (non-discrepancy), which is a synonym for Vatsyayana's "pravrittisamarthya" and Kumarila's nirvachana. In his Nyayabindu, he refers to the conformity with the object's nature, similar to Dinnaga's idea of arthasaroopya.
• Shantarachita: Synthesizes the ideas of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. His definition includes: "The acquisition of the object is considered the result of pramana; or self-awareness itself is pramana, or it is conformity or qualification."
  • Key takeaways:
    1. Introduction of the concept of self-awareness, previously unaddressed by other traditions, signifying self/other-luminosity within general knowledge. This concept is strongly linked to the establishment and support of Vijnyanavada (consciousness-only doctrine) by Asanga and Vasubandhu, with Dinnaga being a strong proponent.
    2. Mimamsa's clear emphasis on knowledge of the ungrasped object.

Jain Contributions:

• Siddhasena (Divakara) and Samantabhadra: The first Jain logicians to incorporate the qualifier "svapara-bhasaka" (self and other illuminating) into their definitions, indicating self/other-luminosity. Siddhasena's "badha-vivarjita" (free from contradiction) carries the same meaning as the Mimamsakas' "badha-rahita" or Dharmakirti's "avisamvadi."
• Akalanka: A key proponent of Jain logic. He incorporated both "anadhigata-artha" (of the ungrasped object) and "avisamvadi" (non-discrepant) and also supported the "svapara-bhasaka" qualifier.
• Manikyanaandi: Following Akalanka, he concisely combined "self" (swa) and "new object" (apurvartha) into his definition, thereby consolidating the Jain tradition established by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra and developed by Akalanka.
• Vidyānanda: Diverged from the tradition of Akalanka and Manikyanaandi, focusing solely on the interpretation of Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. He used terms like "svartha-vyavasayatmaka" (engaged in the knowledge of one's own object) and omitted the terms "anadhigata" or "apurva" found in Akalanka and Manikyanaandi's definitions. Vidyānanda's "vyavasaya" (engagement/determination) is noted as a novel term in Jain pramana definitions, although it was already present in Akshapada's definition of direct perception.
• Abhayadeva (commentator of Sanmati): Followed Vidyānanda's approach but replaced "vyavasaya" with "nirniti" (determination).
• Vādidevasūri: Replicated Vidyānanda's terminology.
• Hema Candra: After considering the merits and demerits of various Jain and non-Jain traditions, he refined his definition to include only three terms: "samyak" (right/correct), "artha" (object), and "nirnaya" (decision/conclusion). In doing so, he removed the term "swa" that previous Jain scholars had included, and instead of terms like "avabhasa" or "vyavasaya," he adopted Abhayadeva's "nirniti" as "nirnaya." He also incorporated the "samyak" from Umāsvāti, Dharmakirti, and Māsarvabha, resulting in his definition of "samyagartha-nirnaya."

Summary of Differences:

Despite largely agreeing on the essence of pramana, there are verbal differences among Digambara and Shvetambara Jain scholars, reflecting the evolution of thought and influences from contemporary literature. These differences can be broadly categorized into four groups:

1. Siddhasena and Samantabhadra's definition with the term "svapara-avabhasa," likely influenced by the Buddhist concept of self-awareness, as this idea wasn't prevalent in earlier Agamic texts.
2. Akalanka and Manikyanaandi's definition incorporating "avisamvadi," "anadhigata," and "apurva," which are clearly borrowed from Buddhist and Mimamsa texts.
3. Vidyānanda, Abhayadeva, and Devāsūri's definitions that are essentially rephrased versions of Siddhasena-Samantabhadra's definition, but replacing "avabhasa" with terms like "vyavasaya" or "nirniti" to convey a specific meaning.
4. Hema Candra's definition, which is a refined version that discards terms like "swa," "apurva," and "anadhigata" to achieve conciseness and clarity.