Praman And Naya In Jaina Logic

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text on "Pramana and Naya in Jaina Logic" by V. K. Bharadwaj:

The text delves into the fundamental Jaina epistemological concepts of Pramana and Naya, highlighting the author's perceived difficulty in clearly distinguishing them and their relationship with other related concepts within Jaina thought.

The Core Problem:

The author begins by identifying a significant point of confusion in Jaina literature regarding the relationship between Pramana and Naya. He presents three seemingly contradictory theses:

• Thesis T: A Naya sentence becomes a Pramana only when prefixed with "syat" or "kathamcit" (meaning "perhaps" or "from a certain perspective").
• Thesis T₂: Naya involves the knower focusing on a particular aspect of an object, excluding others, and is known through scriptural Pramana.
• Thesis T₃: Naya sentences communicate knowledge but are neither Pramana nor Apramana (non-Pramana).

The author argues that these theses create a dilemma: if Naya adds to knowledge like Pramana (as suggested by another thesis, T₄), then it should be a Pramana. However, Thesis T₃ denies this. The author criticizes the proposed solution of simply prefixing "syat" or "kathamcit" as a way to resolve this contradiction, feeling it's a superficial fix that doesn't truly clarify the logical distinctions.

Introducing Adeśa: Sakalādeśa and Vikalādeśa:

To address this, the author introduces the concept of Adeśa, which means "point of view" in Jaina terminology. Adeśa is further divided into:

• Sakalādeśa: A general description of reality, encompassing the whole, undivided, and synthetic view of an object.
• Vikalādeśa: A specific description of one aspect, property, or relation of reality, an analytical view of a part.

The author provides examples:

• "This object has existence as its only property" is a Vikalādeśa.
• "This object has existence" is also a Vikalādeśa (but presented as a simpler form).
• "Sat" (what is real) is used as an example of a Naya sentence.
• "Syat Sat" or "This object has existence as one of its infinite properties" is presented as a Pramana sentence.

The Author's Critique of the Sakalādeśa/Vikalādeśa Distinction:

While acknowledging the validity of distinguishing between general (sakalādeśa) and specific (vikalādeśa) descriptions for understanding reality, the author argues that this distinction cannot be used to differentiate Pramana from Naya. His reasoning is:

• Truth Value vs. Quantum of Information: The distinction between sakalādeśa and vikalādeśa primarily concerns the extent or quantum of information communicated. There's no inherent implication about truth values in this distinction itself.
• Pramana vs. Naya Criterion: The distinction between Pramana and Naya, however, involves truth values and confirmation. A Pramana is an evidence-backed, confirmed statement, while a Naya is a perspective-based description.
• Fallacy of Cross-Division: The author suggests that if Jaina thinkers use the same criterion (extent of information) to differentiate both pairs of concepts (sakalādeśa/vikalādeśa and pramāṇa/naya), they commit the "fallacy of cross-division."

The Role of "Syāt" and "Kathamcit":

The author further argues that simply prefixing "syat" or "kathamcit" to a Naya sentence does not automatically make it a Pramana. He asserts that:

• "Syāt" doesn't create truth: The prefix "syat" or "kathamcit" indicates a particular viewpoint but doesn't confer truth. Truth is established by Pramana (evidence or argument).
• Pramana is the source of truth: A sentence becomes a Pramana because of the supporting Pramana, not because of the "syat" prefix. The prefix might be implicitly understood in many Jaina texts (e.g., "Sat is anekāntika"), but the underlying Pramana is what validates it.
• Naya is descriptive, Pramana is confirmational: Naya sentences are descriptive of reality from a specific viewpoint, whereas Pramana sentences are confirmed descriptions.

Conclusion:

The author's main thesis is that the distinction between sakalādeśa and vikalādeśa is fundamentally different from the distinction between Pramana and Naya.

• Sakalādeśa/Vikalādeśa: Differentiates based on the scope of description (general vs. specific).
• Pramana/Naya: Differentiates based on how truth or confirmation is established (evidence-based vs. perspective-based description).

He concludes that Naya sentences, with or without the "syat" prefix, are primarily about how to describe reality, while Pramana sentences are about how to decide the truth values of those descriptions, which is achieved through evidence.