Prakrit Sahitya Me Upalabdh Jain Nyaya Ke Bij

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First page of Prakrit Sahitya Me Upalabdh Jain Nyaya Ke Bij

Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided Jain text, "Prakrit Sahitya me Upalabdh Jain Nyaya ke Bij" (Seeds of Jain Logic Available in Prakrit Literature) by Dharmchand Jain:

The article explores the foundational elements of Jain logic (Jain Nyaya) found within Prakrit literature, arguing that while later Jain Nyaya developed significantly in Sanskrit, its core principles have deep roots in the Prakrit agamas and subsequent Prakrit works.

Evolution of Jain Logic:

The author outlines three phases in the development of Jain epistemology (pramana-mimamsa):

  1. Agama-centric: Early exposition of pramanas found in the agamas, written in Prakrit.
  2. Anekanta-literature Period: Development of pramana theories in both Prakrit and Sanskrit.
  3. Post-Akalaṅka Period: Primarily in Sanskrit, with Bhatt Akalanka significantly systematizing Jain Nyaya, a tradition that continued until Acharya Yashovijaya in the 17th century.

Early Contributions and Prakrit Roots:

  • Siddhasena Divakara: His "Nyayavatara" is considered the first independent treatise on Jain Nyaya, concisely presenting its principles in 32 karikas. His "Sanmati-tarka" in Prakrit, while not directly discussing pramanas, lays the groundwork for understanding knowledge, which Acharya Abhayadev Suri elaborated upon in his commentary.
  • Umaswati: In Sanskrit, Umaswati's "Tattvartha Sutra" is cited as an early significant work. He categorized the five types of knowledge (mati, shruta, avadhi, manahparyaya, kevala) into two pramanas: paroksha (indirect) for mati and shruta, and pratyaksha (direct) for avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala. This division is traced back to Prakrit agamas like the Nandi Sutra and Sthananga Sutra.
  • Pujyapada Devanandi: A commentator on Umaswati, he defined pramana as that by which something is known or the act of knowing itself.
  • Acharya Samantabhadra: While focusing on establishing Anekantavada in works like "Aptamimamsa," he also touched upon the nature of pramana and the words of the Apta (reliable authority).
  • Mallavadi Kshama Shramana: In his "Dvadasharanayachakra," he clarified the concept of pramana, asserting that it is savikalpaka (with conceptualization).
  • Pre-Akalaṅka Philosophers: Mention is made of philosophers like Sumati and Patrakesari, whose works are lost but whose views are criticized by Buddhist philosopher Shantarakshita in "Tattvasangraha." Patrakesari's critique of the Buddhist trilakshana hetu (three-featured inference) and his assertion of anyathanupapannatvam (inability to be otherwise) as the characteristic of a valid hetu (reason) are highlighted as influential.

The Core Argument: Seeds in Prakrit Literature

The central thesis is that despite the extensive development of Jain Nyaya in Sanskrit, the seeds or foundational principles are undeniably present in Prakrit literature, particularly in the agamas.

  • Agamas as the Primary Basis: The agamas, with their descriptions of the five types of knowledge (mati, shruta, avadhi, manahparyaya, kevala), form the primary basis for Jain pramana-mimamsa. These classifications of knowledge, originating from the time of Tirthankara Parshvanatha, are later divided into pratyaksha and paroksha.
  • Nandi Sutra and Sthananga Sutra: These Prakrit texts are crucial. The Nandi Sutra classifies pratyaksha into indriya pratyaksha (sense-perception) and no-indriya pratyaksha (non-sense-perception), which includes avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevala. Mati and shruta are classified as paroksha.
  • "Vyavasaaya" as a Key Term: The Sthananga Sutra uses the term "vyavasaaya" (determination) for pramana, which is further divided into pratyaksha, pratyayika (interpreted as Agama), and anugami (interpreted as Anumana by Abhayadev Suri). This tripartite division is seen as the precursor to the three pramanas (pratyaksha, anumana, agama) in later works.
  • "Sva-para Prakashakta" (Self and Other Illuminating Nature of Knowledge): Acharya Kundakunda's concept in "Niyamasara" that both knowledge and perception are self and other illuminating is considered the basis for the view that pramana is swa-para-vyavasaayaatmak (determining of self and other). This attribute is also termed swa-paravabhasi by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra.
  • Sanvyavaharika Pratyaksha: The concept of empirical or conventional direct perception (sanvyavaharika pratyaksha) originates from the Nandi Sutra and Jinabhadragani Kshamashramana's "Visheshavashyaka Bhashya," which describes sensory and mental perception as conventional. This likely influenced Akalanka's distinction between sanvyavaharika and mukhya (primary) pratyaksha.
  • Shruta Jnan as Agama Pramana: The Shruta Jnana described in the agamas is established as the Agama Pramana. The Anuyogadvara Sutra further classifies Agama Pramana into laukika (worldly) and lokottara (transcendental).
  • Implications for other Pramanas: While the direct establishment of smrti (memory), pratyabhijna (recognition), and tark (reasoning) as pramanas is not found in early Prakrit literature, their basis can be traced to Umaswati's categorization of matijnana. Akalanka derived smrti, pratyabhijna, and tark from terms like "smriti," "sanjna," and "chinta" within matijnana, and anumana from "abhinibodha." Thus, these pramanas are essentially different forms of matijnana.
  • Avagraha and Iha as Pramana: The inclusion of avagraha and iha as pramanas stems from the acceptance of knowledge itself as pramana. However, the author notes a debate on whether avagraha is nishchayatmak (determinative), with some philosophers (Umaswati, Jinabhadragani, Yashovijaya) following the Agama tradition where it is not, and others (Pujyapada, Akalanka, Vidyānanda) influenced by later epistemological streams where it is considered determinative.
  • Pradhanya of Samyagdarshana vs. Absence of Defects: The author asserts that the validity of pramana in Jain Nyaya relies not on samyagdarshana (right faith) but on the absence of defects like doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya), and uncertainty (anadhyavasaya), and its effectiveness in practical life (samvaadakata).

Prakrit Literature's Specific Contributions:

  • Anuyogadvara Sutra: This text contains a significant independent exposition of pramana, distinct from knowledge. Here, pramana is used in the sense of measurement, with classifications like dravya-pramana, kshetra-pramana, kala-pramana, and bhava-pramana. Bhava-pramana includes the four types of knowledge: pratyaksha, anumana, aupamya (comparison), and agama. The detailed breakdown of these, especially in Anuyogadvara Sutra, is considered more extensive than in other philosophical texts. The Sutra also presents unique classifications of pratyaksha (indriya and no-indriya) and anumana.
  • Bhadrabahu's Niyukti: These Prakrit works discuss the constituents of anumana, proposing various numbers of "limbs" (e.g., two, three, five, ten), influencing later philosophical debates on the structure of inference.

Conclusion:

The author concludes that while the independent expositions of pramana in early Prakrit literature might not have directly formed the entire basis of later Jain Nyaya, the seeds are undoubtedly present in the agamas' descriptions of the five types of knowledge. The development of these descriptions in subsequent Prakrit literature provided support for the systematization of Jain pramana-mimamsa. Jain philosophers, while adhering to the agamas, incorporated new characteristics like determinativeness and freedom from doubt to align pramana with practical concerns (vyavahara), even introducing smrti, pratyabhijna, and tark. The acceptance of sense-perception as pratyaksha and the continued emphasis on the agamic origins of knowledge, even when discussing the obscuration of knowledge-covering karma, highlight the enduring influence of Prakrit literature on the edifice of Jain Nyaya. The agamic seeds have truly blossomed into the great tree of Jain Nyaya.