Philosophy And Vedic Exegesis In Mimamsa
Added to library: September 2, 2025

Summary
Here's a comprehensive summary of Johannes Bronkhorst's "Philosophy and Vedic Exegesis in the Mimāṃsā" based on the provided text:
This article by Johannes Bronkhorst explores the intricate relationship between philosophical inquiry and the method of Vedic exegesis within the Mīmāṃsā school, particularly as articulated in Śabara's Mīmāṃsābhāṣya. Bronkhorst builds upon the observation by Professor Halbfass that Mīmāṃsā, even in its own understanding, is not merely a reflection of Vedic thought but a distinct interpretive and philosophical endeavor.
The core argument of the article is that two fundamental tenets of Mīmāṃsā philosophy – svataḥprāmāṇya (the self-validating nature of correct cognition) and apauruṣeyatva/nityatva (the authorlessness and eternality of the Veda) – are deeply intertwined with the school's exegetical methodology. Bronkhorst posits that these philosophical positions are not just apologetically motivated but are inherent to the very way Mīmāṃsā approaches and interprets Vedic texts.
Bronkhorst delves into the exegetical practices of the Mīmāṃsā, focusing on Śabara's Bhāṣya to illustrate this connection. A key principle he identifies is the preference for the "nearest" (sāmnikṛṣṭa) meaning over the "more remote" (viprakṛṣṭa) meaning. This principle guides the Mīmāṃsā in resolving interpretive conflicts within Vedic statements. The "nearest" interpretation is understood as the most direct, explicit, and least inferential approach, requiring minimal mental or epistemological steps.
Several examples are provided to demonstrate this:
- Interpreting an injunction: When an injunction specifies the use of a sacred formula for one purpose, but the formula itself contains a name that suggests another, the Mīmāṃsā prioritizes the injunction's explicit instruction as the "nearest" interpretation.
- Interpreting sacred formulas: When a formula lacks an explicit injunction, its internal structure and the directness of its reference to a ritual action determine the "nearest" interpretation. For instance, a part of a formula that directly addresses the placement of a sacrificial cake is considered a nearer interpretation than a preceding part that is syntactically linked to it.
- Word meanings: The Mīmāṃsā asserts that each word has a single primary sense, from which other meanings are derived. The primary sense is considered the "nearest" and is often determined by its usage in the Veda or etymological considerations.
- Denotation of words: Śabara argues that words directly denote a shape (ākṛti) rather than an individual instance (vyakti). This is because the shape is understood more directly from the word itself, and the individual is grasped through the shape.
- Composite words: In compound words, the Mīmāṃsā favors the interpretation where the direct meaning of the individual parts is preserved in the compound, even if a secondary interpretation might seem more contextually fitting.
Bronkhorst argues that this principle of "direct interpretation" has significant epistemological and philosophical implications:
-
Minimizing Mental Intervention: The insistence on the most direct interpretation is driven by a desire to minimize the involvement of the human mind. The mind is seen as a potential source of error or distortion, and therefore, correct interpretation should involve the least possible mental activity. This leads to the idea that correct cognition is the norm, and error arises from disturbances.
-
Foundation of Svataḥprāmāṇya: The principle of direct interpretation forms the basis for svataḥprāmāṇya, the self-validating nature of valid cognition. Just as Vedic statements, when interpreted directly and without mental disturbance, yield correct understanding, so too does all valid cognition arise naturally and correctly unless interfered with by external factors or mental disturbances.
-
Justification for Authorlessness (Apauruṣeyatva): The conviction that the Veda's purity is threatened by the human mind's intervention extends to its composition. To preserve this purity, the Mīmāṃsā denies any human author for the Veda. Since the Veda has no beginning in time, it cannot have been composed by a mind, human or divine. This eternality and authorlessness are seen as two sides of the same coin, rooted in the belief that any contact with a mind compromises the Veda's integrity.
-
Addressing Apparent Contradictions: The principle of direct interpretation, combined with the dogma of the Veda's eternality, necessitates complex exegetical strategies to resolve apparent discrepancies. Vedic statements that seem to refer to historical events or experiences that contradict ordinary perception are reinterpreted to avoid attributing a temporal beginning to the Veda. This often leads to the development of "secondary interpretations," which are employed when a direct interpretation is impossible due to such conflicts.
In conclusion, Bronkhorst argues that the Mīmāṃsā's philosophical tenets of svataḥprāmāṇya and apauruṣeyatva are not merely apologetic responses but are deeply embedded within and derived from its fundamental exegetical principle of prioritizing the "most direct interpretation." This principle, by minimizing mental intervention, aims to preserve the purity and inherent validity of the Veda, both in its composition and its understanding, ultimately driving significant philosophical developments within the school.