Perennial Philosophy And Law Of Karma

Here's a comprehensive summary of the provided text from "The Perennial Philosophy and the Law of Karma" by Johannes Bronkhorst:

The article critically examines Aldous Huxley's concept of the "Perennial Philosophy," which posits that all major religions share a common set of core spiritual truths. Huxley believed this philosophy recognized a divine reality underlying the world, found a divine element within the human soul, and aimed for union with this divine ground through specific ethical practices. He argued that "rudiments" of this philosophy could be found in traditions worldwide, even among primitive peoples.

Bronkhorst acknowledges the appeal of Huxley's work but notes its lukewarm reception in academic circles. Critics point out that Huxley selectively focused on certain aspects of religions, largely ignoring significant traditions like Confucianism and Judaism. They also question the claim that mystics universally agree on the nature of their experiences, citing the "That art thou" (Tat Tvam Asi) concept from the Upanishads as an example of a potentially unique philosophical expression rather than a universal one. Huxley himself admitted that his Perennial Philosophy was primarily for those who had cultivated the necessary spiritual conditions, implicitly excluding many academics.

Bronkhorst then proposes a more constructive and potentially "risky" approach: to investigate whether the religious currents Huxley draws upon (and others) share significant features that can be described in non-spiritual, non-edifying terms. His focus narrows to a recurring concept he terms the "concept or notion of inaction," which he initially defines as "the expression of a disinclination to identify with the activities of the body."

Bronkhorst illustrates this concept of inaction through numerous examples from various traditions:

• Mysticism and Theology: He cites mystics like Ruysbroeck and Eckhart, as well as thinkers like Albertus Magnus and Shankara, who describe the divine or the realized self as being characterized by rest, immutability, and lack of activity. Huxley himself highlights this in his descriptions of the Perennial Philosophy.
• Asceticism: Bronkhorst argues that inaction is most radically and visibly manifested in extreme ascetic practices. He mentions early Christian ascetics, Stylites who endured extreme physical immobility, and notably, Jain ascetics who practice prolonged periods of motionless starvation. He notes that while these ascetics aimed for liberation from karma, their practices were not always linked to the notion of an inactive soul.
• Taoism: He points to philosophical Taoism, where the concept of wu wei (inaction) signifies allowing the Tao to act through the body. He also cites examples of Taoist practitioners described as inert, like dead wood or ashes.
• Indian Philosophy and the Law of Karma: Bronkhorst emphasizes that in India, the concept of inaction is deeply embedded within the doctrine of karma. Karma dictates that past actions shape the present and future, perpetuating the cycle of rebirth. Liberation is achieved by abstaining from actions or by realizing that the true self is inactive, thus unaffected by bodily actions.
• Buddhism: He notes that early Buddhism was critical of both extreme asceticism and the search for a permanent, inactive self, proposing a different path to liberation. However, he argues that the concept of inaction and its associated practices eventually re-entered Buddhism, suggesting its persistent influence.
• Gnosticism: He highlights Gnosticism as a significant movement where the divine and the human soul are frequently described as immovable and immutable.
• "Primitive" Societies: Bronkhorst revisits Huxley's claim about rudiments of the Perennial Philosophy in "primitive" societies. He suggests that the concept of inaction might indeed be found there, particularly in the idea of a remote and inactive Supreme Being (deus otiosus) and in the concept of a "free-soul" or "dream-ego" that does not participate in bodily actions.

Bronkhorst concludes that while Huxley's overarching "Perennial Philosophy" might be too broad or unsubstantiated, the adjective "perennial" might still apply to the notion of inaction in the sense of its recurrence across diverse cultures and historical periods. He proposes that this concept might be a "human universal," a "bioprogramme" that doesn't necessarily manifest universally but appears under specific favorable circumstances.

However, he raises crucial questions about the universality of this concept, pointing out its relative absence or different manifestation in traditions like Confucianism and Judaism. He concludes by underscoring the need for further refinement and investigation into the precise definition and expression of this "concept of inaction" to determine its true pervasiveness and implications.