Paurandara Sutra - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary of Eli Franco's "Paurandara Sutra" chapter:

This paper by Eli Franco focuses on a fragment attributed to the Lokayata school, specifically the Paurandara Sutra, and its interpretation within Jain sources. Franco expresses gratitude to Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, whose teachings on Lokayata influenced this study.

The Importance of Jain Sources for Indian Philosophy: Franco highlights the critical role of Jain texts in understanding other Indian philosophical systems, particularly for their honest and thorough presentation of opposing viewpoints (purvapaksha).

The Lokayata School and Epistemology: He notes that while modern research on Lokayata often focuses on epistemology (pramāṇaśāstra) and is preoccupied with the Bṛhaspati Sutra, the logical arguments of Lokayata thinkers are frequently overlooked. The rise of Buddhist logicians like Dignaga and Dharmakirti forced all philosophical schools, including Lokayata, to re-evaluate their epistemological stances. The Lokayatas, to maintain their doctrine that inference (anumāna) is not a valid means of knowledge, developed complex, even self-refuting, logical arguments.

The Paurandara Sutra and its Meaning: The central focus is the Paurandara Sutra: "pramāṇaśyāgauṇatvād anumānad artha-niscayo durlabhah." Franco translates this as: "Determination of object through inference is impossible, because means-of-knowledge is not secondary."

Examining Interpretations of the Sutra:

Vadi Deva's Interpretation (and Solomon's explanation):
- This interpretation, explained by Professor Solomon, suggests the sutra argues that inference is not a valid means of knowledge because the "paksa" (the subject of the syllogism) is used in a secondary (gauna) or metaphorical sense.
- The paksa, understood as the aggregate of attribute and thing, is deemed "gauna" (secondary). Because the hetu (reason) is an attribute of the paksa, it too becomes secondary, rendering the inference itself secondary and thus not a valid pramāṇa.
- Franco finds this interpretation problematic, arguing it doesn't make logical sense and the wording of the sutra ("pramāṇasyägauṇatvät" - because the means-of-knowledge is not secondary) doesn't directly support this. He also questions the idea that a secondary use of "paksa" is inherently wrong, referencing Buddhist debates on this very issue. He posits that Vadi Deva's interpretation might be an attempt to explain a potentially nonsensical original argument.
Prabhācandra's Interpretations: Franco then turns to Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamārtanda, which offers two main interpretations:
- Interpretation 1: Inference's object is "gauna" (unreal):
  - This view suggests the sutra claims inference is not a valid means of knowledge because its object is secondary or unreal.
  - Franco finds this interpretation more plausible, as it aligns with the Buddhist critique of inference involving universals, which they considered mental constructs.
  - However, he expresses unease because it seems to limit the argument to Buddhist inference and not Lokayata's broader critique. Prabhācandra himself acknowledges that Jainas, unlike Buddhists, do not accept inference with mentally constructed universals as its object. Franco believes the sutra likely intended a more general objection to inference, possibly involving a refutation of universals.
- Interpretation 2: Inference itself is "gauna" (secondary) to perception:
  - This interpretation argues that inference, as a cognitive process, is secondary because it is preceded by perception (pratyaksa).
  - Franco acknowledges this is a common view in Indian philosophy, including the Nyaya school.
  - He questions why this dependence on perception should disqualify inference as a means of knowledge, comparing it to a dwarf on a giant's shoulder reaching higher.
  - He suggests the dependence must be more specific:
    - Dependence on vyāpti (universal concomitance): The apprehension of vyāpti is not through inference itself, as inference requires prior knowledge of vyāpti. If vyāpti is apprehended by perception, it's limited to perceptible objects. If it's apprehended by inference, it leads to infinite regress or mutual dependence. Since vyāpti involves universals and thus extends beyond perceptible particulars, perception cannot fully grasp it. Therefore, inference's dependence on vyāpti, which perception cannot fully provide, invalidates inference.
    - Dependence on apprehension of universals: A vyāpti relation applies to universals, not particulars. If inference's object is a universal, it's proving something already known (siddha-sadhana). If its object is a particular, there's no concomitance. Thus, inference is secondary because its object is already apprehended by perception, making its determination of the object redundant.

Purandara's Overall Goal: Franco believes Purandara's intent was not to discard inference entirely but to limit its scope to "worldly affairs" (loka-prasiddham). This is supported by another fragment where Purandara rejects inferences that "transgress the worldly path" and are used by "would-be philosophers." By emphasizing inference's dependence on perception (its "gauna" nature), Purandara aimed to confine inference's domain to perceptible objects.

The Necessity of Purandara's Argument: Franco argues that Purandara's stance was a response to the increasingly sophisticated epistemological challenges posed by Buddhist logicians like Dharmakirti. The older Lokayata position of "perception alone is knowledge" was becoming untenable. Purandara sought to defend core Lokayata principles (likely related to social and political institutions independent of religious dogma) by accepting inference only to the extent that it didn't contradict these principles, and rejecting its application to non-perceptible entities like the soul or God.

The Problem of Interpretation: Franco acknowledges the difficulty in definitively determining Purandara's original intention. He discusses the tension between interpretations that "make sense" (like Prabhācandra's) and those favored by earlier commentators (like Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña). He argues against prioritizing earlier or majority interpretations if they appear illogical, but also questions why an "untrue" interpretation might have become widespread, suggesting a possible misattribution based on Dharmakirti's discussion of "paksa."

Conclusion: Franco concludes that while he favors Prabhācandra's interpretations for their logical coherence, the lack of context for these fragments makes it impossible to definitively choose between the remaining valid interpretations. He leaves the question open, stating that both remaining interpretations are compatible with the Lokayata position and could potentially have been intended simultaneously, as sutras can be deliberately ambiguous.