Pashchatya Darshan Me Karm Siddhant - Book Summary

Here's a comprehensive summary in English of the provided Jain text, "Pashchatya Darshan me Karm Siddhant" (The Concept of Action/Karma in Western Philosophy) by K.L. Sharma:

Overview:

The article "Pashchatya Darshan me Karm Siddhant" by Dr. K.L. Sharma explores the concept of "action" (क्रिया - kriya) within Western philosophy, drawing a distinction from the Indian philosophical concept of "Karma." While Indian philosophy, with the exception of the Charvakas, largely explains Karma through the lens of rebirth, Western philosophy has developed a distinct "action theory" that focuses on the nature, causes, knowledge, and ethical implications of human actions. The author argues that understanding Western action theory can be beneficial for grasping the nuances of dravya karma (material action) and bhava karma (mental action) in Jainism.

Key Differences from Indian Karma:

Rebirth: The primary difference highlighted is the Indian philosophical context of Karma being intricately linked to rebirth and its cycle. Western philosophy does not share this foundational belief, thus approaching "action" from a different perspective.

The Field of Action Theory in Western Philosophy:

Interdisciplinary Interest: Action theory is a relatively new branch in Western philosophy, attracting interest not only from metaphysicians but also from psychologists, sociologists, and jurists.
Metaphysical Focus: Traditionally, metaphysicians were primarily concerned with issues related to human freedom and responsibility in relation to action.
Contemporary Focus: Modern philosophers debate whether human actions can be explained solely in terms of cause and effect, or if concepts like "intention" and "motive" are necessary to distinguish human actions from other events.

Philosophical Questions Regarding Action:

The article identifies five main categories of questions that Western philosophers have pondered since Plato:

Conceptual Questions: What is human action? What can persons do? What does it mean to say someone acted? What does it mean for someone to be able to act?
Explanatory Questions: Are the theories and methods of physics and biology sufficient to understand human action? Are concepts like purposiveness and goal-directedness essential for explaining human actions?
Metaphysical Questions: Are all human actions caused? Can human action be caused? These questions are closely tied to the complex issues of free will.
Epistemological Questions: How do we know we are acting? How do we know that other people are acting?
Ethical and Meta-ethical Questions: Are actions or their consequences good or bad? What does it mean to say a person is responsible for their actions or their consequences?

The author emphasizes that conceptual questions about the nature of action are foundational, as understanding what "action" means is a prerequisite for explaining its causes, knowledge, and ethical evaluations.

The Nature of Human Action:

Distinction from Natural Changes: Human actions are fundamentally different from natural changes (like a mountain moving or a flower blooming) because humans are "self-movers" who initiate, direct, and control their movements.
Beyond Self-Propulsion: However, mere self-propulsion isn't enough to define human action, as rockets also move themselves. The crucial element is that human actions are often performed intentionally by an agent, whereas objects and even rockets lack this intentionality. Humans have control over their actions, which plants and rockets do not.
Intentionality vs. Passivity: While humans can be passive and subject to external forces (like falling from a window), the reason for their movement differentiates them. An intentional jump (suicide) is distinct from being pushed. The article acknowledges that distinguishing internal from external causes might oversimplify the issue.
Internal Causes and Uncontrollable Actions: Some internal causes (like involuntary movements due to nerve issues, e.g., trembling or epileptic fits) are not considered intentional or under the agent's control.
Importance of Intentionality for Responsibility: The difficulty in precisely defining intentionality does not negate its existence. Without this distinction, the difference between sentient and non-sentient beings would be blurred. Intentionality is directly linked to responsibility, which in turn forms the basis for labeling actions as good or bad. Plants and inanimate objects, lacking control and intentionality, cannot be held responsible.
Mind-Body Connection: Intentional actions that involve bodily movement (like jumping) are important for understanding the mind-body relationship. Purely mental actions (remembering, thinking) do not necessarily have a direct bodily component, but the article suggests that action often implies some outward physical manifestation.

Distinguishing Actions from Similar Concepts:

The article further differentiates "action" from several related concepts:

Actions vs. Processes: Actions always have an agent (e.g., "He did 'A'"). Processes (e.g., evaporation) do not necessarily require an agent, and thus no responsibility is implied.
Actions vs. Passions/Reactions: An action is something an agent does, distinct from something that happens to someone (e.g., sitting down due to weakness vs. falling because of a slippery peel).
Actions vs. Mere Behavior: Some behaviors are not considered actions because they are not the focus of agency or control (e.g., shivering involuntarily).
Actions vs. Terminations (Achievements): There's a difference between "activity verbs" (e.g., listening for, looking at) which represent ongoing actions, and "achievement verbs" (e.g., hearing, seeing) which represent the result or completion of an action. Participating in a wedding ceremony is an action; entering married life is a result of those actions.
Refraining vs. Non-Action: Refraining is a conscious choice not to act despite the possibility (e.g., resisting the urge to scratch a mosquito bite). Non-action is simply the absence of doing something (e.g., not writing a letter while reading).
Actions vs. Purely Mental Actions: Actions, in the context of the article, seem to require some form of bodily movement, either positive (doing) or negative (refraining). Purely internal mental acts are not considered actions in this strict sense. Even a tacit mental assent is not an action; a verbal assent is.

Elements of Action Description:

To describe an action, the following elements are considered:

Agent: Who performed the action?
Act-type: What was done?
Modality of Action: How was it done?
- Manner (e.g., quickly, gently)
- Means (e.g., with a tool)
Setting of Action: The context in which it occurred.
- Temporal (when)
- Spatial (where)
- Circumstantial (under what conditions)
Rationale of Action: Why was it done?
- Causality (reason)
- Finality (aim/purpose)
- Intentionality (motive)

The Agent: Can be an individual or a group (collective action).

Types of Actions: Actions can be described at different levels of generality, from broad categories (opening a window) to specific instances (opening this window). The "object" of the action (e.g., to Mohan) is crucial for defining the act-type. Modality often reveals the agent's mental state.

The "Why" of Action: Causality, finality, and motive (voluntary/involuntary, knowing/unknowing) are considered.

Interconnectedness of Aspects: The interplay of opposite pairs (e.g., voluntary/involuntary), act-type, modality, and setting illuminates the dual nature of the action concept. Similar to how a "person" has intertwined physical and mental aspects, an "action" has external (bodily, observable) and internal (mental, unobservable) components. The external relates to "what," "how," and "where," while the internal concerns mental states like thoughts, intentions, and motives.

Description vs. Evaluation: A distinction is made between describing an action and evaluating it, which is considered both theoretically possible and practically desirable.

Divisibility of Actions: The article questions whether actions can be infinitely divided into constituent parts, referencing paradoxes of infinite division. It suggests that the limit of division is often based on the agent's mental state.

Two Major Accounts of Action:

Extra-Systemic Method (e.g., Behaviorism): This approach attempts to analyze action-utterances by translating them into non-action utterances, essentially equating human actions with observable physical events or processes.
Systematic Method: This approach explains action-utterances through a structural calculus or system.

Theories Explaining Action:

The article briefly introduces five theories that help understand the distinction between a bodily movement and an intentional action:

Mental Events as Causes: Intentional actions are movements caused by specific mental events or states (intentions, decisions, choices).
Agency Theory: The agent, not an event, is the cause of the movement. The agent is the cause.
Performative Theory: Stating that a movement is an intentional action is not just describing something but performing an act of attributing responsibility for the movement to the agent.
Goals as Explanations: Some philosophers believe that goals, rather than prior causes or the agent alone, are necessary to explain why a movement becomes an action.
Contextual Account of Actions: A movement becomes intentional when it is described within a framework of rules, norms, or established practices.

In conclusion, the article provides a foundational exploration of how Western philosophy conceptualizes and analyzes human action, setting the stage for a deeper understanding of related philosophical and ethical inquiries.