Parikshamukham

Here's a comprehensive summary of the Jain text "Parīkṣāmukham" by Manikyanandi, based on the provided pages, with the English commentary and introduction by Saratchandra Ghoshal:

Book Title: Parīkṣāmukham Original Author: Manikyanandi Commentator/Editor: Saratchandra Ghoshal, M.A., B.L. Publisher: Central Jaina Publishing House, Lucknow Year of Publication: 1940 Series: The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Volume XI

Overall Purpose and Nature of the Work:

"Parīkṣāmukham" is a foundational and standard work on Jain Nyaya (Jain logic and epistemology). It is written in the style of aphorisms (sūtras), a format also used by earlier important Jain scholars like Umāsvāmi. The work is a systematic exposition of Jain logic, aiming to provide a concise yet comprehensive understanding of the subject, making it accessible to a wider audience. Saratchandra Ghoshal's edition includes an English translation, introduction, notes, and an original commentary, drawing from various scholars and Jain texts to elucidate the complex philosophical concepts.

Introduction by Saratchandra Ghoshal:

Ghoshal's introduction provides crucial historical and philosophical context for "Parīkṣāmukham."

• Jain Nyaya Tradition: He traces the lineage of Jain Nyaya, highlighting key early figures like Kundakundacharya and Umāsvāmi, whose works laid the groundwork for later logical treatises. He then discusses prominent commentators on Umāsvāmi's "Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra," such as Pujyapada Devanandi, Samantabhadra, Akalanka, and Vidyanandi, who significantly developed Jain logic.
• Akalanka's Influence: Ghoshal emphasizes Akalanka Deva as a pivotal figure who masterfully elaborated Jain Nyaya, with subsequent writers modeling their works on his treatises.
• Manikyanandi's Contribution: Manikyanandi is presented as the first writer to condense the subject matter of Jain Nyaya into aphorisms, drawing extensively from Akalanka's works. Ghoshal notes that "Parīkṣāmukham" gained considerable celebrity, leading to numerous commentaries, the most famous being "Prameyakamalamārtaṇda" by Prabhāchandra and "Prameyaratnamālā" by Anantavirya.
• The Goal of Nyaya Philosophy: Ghoshal explains that, similar to Hindu philosophies, the ultimate goal of Jain Nyaya is liberation (moksha). This is achieved through right faith (samyak-darśana), right knowledge (samyak-jñāna), and right conduct (samyak-chāritra), which are considered the "three jewels" of Jainism. Proper understanding of reality, facilitated by Nyaya philosophy, is essential for dispelling false knowledge and attaining liberation.
• Astika vs. Nastika: Ghoshal delves into the distinction between Astika (orthodox) and Nastika (heterodox) philosophies in Indian tradition, explaining that the exclusion of Jain and Buddhist philosophies from the traditional "six systems" was primarily due to their non-acceptance of the Vedas as infallible, rather than a denial of concepts like rebirth or karma.
• Nomenclature of Nyaya: He discusses the term "Nyaya," originally "Anvikṣiki" (discussion), and its application to logic. He notes its presence in ancient texts and its evolution as a philosophical discipline.
• Pramāṇa in Jainism: Ghoshal details the Jain understanding of Pramāņa (valid means of knowledge), contrasting it with Hindu Nyaya. He highlights the Jain acceptance of two primary Pramāṇas: Pratyakṣa (direct/immediate knowledge) and Parokṣa (indirect/mediate knowledge), and discusses the classification of knowledge types (Jñana) within Jainism. He also touches upon the different interpretations of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa within the Jain tradition itself, noting the evolution of thought from earlier writers like Umāsvāmi and Akalanka to later ones.
• Dating of Akalanka and Manikyanandi: Ghoshal dedicates a significant portion to the scholarly debate surrounding the historical periods of Akalanka and, by extension, Manikyanandi, analyzing various epigraphic and literary evidence to establish their likely timelines. He concludes that Manikyanandi likely flourished at the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th century CE, based on his reliance on Akalanka's works.
• Commentaries: He reviews the major commentaries on "Parīkṣāmukham," particularly "Prameyakamalamārtaṇda" by Prabhāchandra and "Prameyaratnamālā" by Anantavirya, highlighting their value in explaining Jain Nyaya and engaging with other philosophical systems.
• Structure of Parīkṣāmukham: Ghoshal outlines the work's division into six sections (Samuddeśas), covering:
  1. Definition and explanation of Pramāṇa.
  2. Classification of Pramāṇa into Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa.
  3. Detailed description of Parokşa Pramāņa and its subdivisions.
  4. Treatment of the object of Pramāņa (Viṣaya), focusing on Sāmānya and Viśeşa.
  5. The results of Pramāņa (Phala).
  6. Fallacies of Pramāņa (Pramāṇābhāsa).

Summary of "Parīkṣāmukham" (as interpreted by Ghoshal's commentary):

The book is a systematic treatment of Jain epistemology and logic, structured into six sections:

1. Samuddeśa I: Pramāṇa:

   • Definition of Pramāṇa: Valid knowledge of itself and of things not previously proved (Svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam). It is knowledge that is commensurate with its object and is free from fallacies.
   • Nature of Pramāṇa: Ghoshal emphasizes that according to Jainism, knowledge itself is Pramāṇa, and it illuminates both itself and its object simultaneously, unlike some Hindu philosophies that posit external causes for knowledge.
   • Apurvārtha: Defines "not previously proved" and explains its significance in distinguishing true knowledge from mere remembrance or repeated cognitions.
   • Self-illumination (Sva-vyavasāya): Explains that knowledge is aware of itself, akin to how a lamp illuminates itself and other objects.
   • The Goal: Connects the study of Pramāṇa to the Jain path to liberation (right faith, knowledge, and conduct).

2. Samuddeśa II: Pratyakṣa:

   • Two Kinds of Pramāṇa: Establishes that Pramāṇa is primarily of two kinds: Pratyakṣa (direct/immediate) and Parokşa (indirect/mediate).
   • Definition of Pratyakṣa: Defined as clear knowledge (Visadam Pratyakşam).
   • Subdivisions of Pratyakṣa: Introduces Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa (empirical/conventional direct knowledge) arising from senses and mind, and Mukhya or Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa (absolute/ultimate direct knowledge) which is absolutely clear, unhindered, and independent of senses.
   • Mukhya Pratyakṣa: Further divided into Vikala (limited, like Avadhi and Manahparyaya Jñāna) and Sakala or Kevala (omniscience).
   • Reconciliation of Views: Discusses the difference between earlier Jain views (where sensory knowledge was considered Parokşa) and later views (where sensory knowledge is Pratyakşa), often reconciling them by classifying sensory knowledge as Sānvyavahārika Pratyakṣa.

3. Samuddeśa III: Parokşa:

   • Definition of Parokṣa: Defined as unclear knowledge (A spaștam parokşam), contrasted with the clearness of Pratyakṣa.
   • Five Varieties of Parokşa: Enumerates and defines the five varieties of indirect knowledge:
     • Smriti (Remembrance): Knowledge of something previously experienced, recognized by the impression (saṁskāra) and the recognition "this is that."
     • Pratyabhijñāna (Recognition): Deduction following from direct perception and remembrance, recognizing identity or similarity ("this is verily that," "this is like that"). Ghoshal notes that Jain logic considers this comprehensive, encompassing what Hindu logic calls Upamāna (comparison).
     • Tarka (Reasoning/Universal Concomitance): Knowledge of universal concomitance (vyāpti), the basis of inference, defined as the understanding of "this exists when that exists, and does not exist when that does not exist." Ghoshal highlights the Jain emphasis on vyāpti itself as Tarka, rather than just a part of inference.
     • Anumāna (Inference): Knowledge of the major term (Sādhya) from the middle term (Sādhana or Hetu). Ghoshal clarifies the Jain view that Anumana typically consists of only two parts: Pratijñā (thesis) and Hetu (reason), refuting the necessity of Udāharaṇa (example), Upanaya (application), and Nigamana (conclusion) favored by other schools.
     • Āgama (Testimony): Knowledge derived from the words, signs, etc., of a reliable person (Āpta) or scripture. This is equivalent to Śabda Pramāṇa in Hindu philosophy.
   • Fallacies: This section also begins to outline various fallacies associated with these logical steps.

4. Samuddeśa IV: Vişaya (Object of Knowledge):

   • Nature of Viṣaya: Discusses the object of knowledge as having both general (Sāmānya or Dravya) and specific (Viśeşa or Paryāya) aspects.
   • Dravya and Paryāya: Explains these fundamental Jain concepts – Dravya representing the substance or essential nature that persists through change, and Paryāya representing the modifications or states that the substance undergoes. The discussion highlights the Jain doctrine of Anekāntavāda (many-sidedness of reality).

5. Samuddeśa V: Phala (Result of Pramāṇa):

   • Primary and Secondary Results: The primary result of Pramāṇa is the dispelling of false knowledge (Ajñāna-nivṛtti). The secondary results are the acquisition of desirable objects, rejection of undesirable ones, or indifference.
   • Identity and Difference: Discusses the relationship between Pramāṇa and its result, noting that while in one sense they are identical (as the self undergoing transformation), in another sense they are distinct (instrumental cause vs. action).

6. Samuddeśa VI: Pramāṇābhāsa (Fallacies):

   • General Definition: Fallacies are that which resemble Pramāņa but are not valid knowledge.
   • Classification of Fallacies: Ghoshal's commentary and the aphorisms detail various fallacies:
     • Pratyakṣābhāsa: Fallacies of direct knowledge (e.g., accepting unclear knowledge as direct).
     • Parokşābhāsa: Fallacies of indirect knowledge (e.g., accepting sensory knowledge as clear).
     • Smaraṇābhāsa: Fallacy of remembrance (e.g., misremembering someone).
     • Pratyabhijñānābhāsa: Fallacies of recognition (e.g., mistaking twins or misidentifying based on similarity).
     • Tarkābhāsa: Fallacies of reasoning (e.g., assuming concomitance between unrelated things).
     • Anumāṇābhāsa: Fallacies of inference, including:
       • Pakṣābhāsa: Fallacies related to the thesis/minor term (e.g., the unaccepted, opposed, or uncertain proposition).
       • Hetvābhāsa: Fallacies related to the middle term (e.g., Asiddha - unproven, Viruddha - contradictory, Anaikāntika - uncertain, Akiñchitkara - redundant).
       • Driṣṭāntābhāsa: Fallacies of illustration (e.g., inappropriate examples for Anvaya and Vyatireka).
     • Bāla-prayoga-ābhāsa: Fallacy of child-like usage (e.g., incomplete syllogisms).
     • Āgamābhāsa: Fallacies of testimony (e.g., words of unreliable persons, falsehoods).
     • Sankhyābhāsa: Fallacy of number (e.g., asserting only one valid means of knowledge when others are accepted).
     • Viṣayābhāsa: Fallacies related to the object of knowledge (e.g., accepting only general or only specific aspects as the sole object).
     • Phalābhāsa: Fallacies of the result (e.g., misconstruing the relationship between Pramāņa and its result).

Key Jain Philosophical Concepts Discussed:

• Pramāņa: The valid means of knowledge, central to the work.
• Pratyakṣa & Parokşa: The two main categories of knowledge.
• Jñana: The different types of knowledge (Mati, Śruta, Avadhi, Manahparyaya, Kevala, and their wrong counterparts).
• Naya: Standpoints or partial views of reality, crucial for understanding Jain epistemology.
• Anekāntavāda: The doctrine of manifold aspects of reality, which these Nayas help to illuminate.
• Dravya & Paryāya: Substance and modification, core concepts in Jain metaphysics and epistemology.
• Hetu & Vyāpti: The middle term and the universal concomitance, the pillars of inference.
• Syādvāda: The doctrine of conditioned predication (implied through the discussion of Nayas) used to express reality's multifaceted nature.

Significance of Ghoshal's Edition:

Saratchandra Ghoshal's edition is significant for making a complex Jain philosophical text accessible in English. His detailed introduction and commentary bridge the gap between the original Sanskrit text and an English-speaking audience, explaining the nuances of Jain logic in relation to broader Indian philosophical discourse and providing historical context.

In essence, "Parīkṣāmukham" is a systematic and foundational text for understanding Jain logic, aiming to guide the seeker towards correct knowledge and, ultimately, liberation, by analyzing the nature, varieties, and fallacies of valid means of knowledge.